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Abstract 
In this research I have attempted to answer the question of how the external 
security and fiscal environment has affected Syrian authoritarianism. 
Contrary to much previous research that emphasizes domestic factors in 
leading to a lack of democracy, my hypothesis was that the external level 
indeed created means for enhancing the authoritarian structures of the state. 
I studied to which extent war preparation and external resource extraction 
can be held accountable for changes, especially in the coercive, fiscal and 
institutional capabilities of the state, and how they influence state power and 
the autonomy, efficiency and legitimacy of the state. 
I demonstrate that during the Cold War, Syria could afford its large war 
preparation effort by external resource extraction without a need to resort to 
domestic resource extraction that would have demanded political bargaining 
and increased political participation. In addition, war preparation assisted in 
the creation of coercive powers of a security state and the institutional 
powers of an authoritarian state, the rule of the president, army and the party 
instead of political institutions. After the Cold War, the external revenues 
and the fiscal powers of the state actually increased and costs of war 
preparation decreased, which assisted in maintaining the power structures 
and in adapting to the new world order without any significant changes 
domestically. The results of this study from the year 2000 onwards finally 
show just how vulnerable state power was to the changes in the external 
environment. Since 2000, external revenues have been at their highest. 
However, fear of a rapid exhaustion of external revenues, mainly fuel export 
income, led to a fear of a decline in the fiscal capabilities of the state. This 
forced the state to adopt a domestic resource extraction campaign by 
economic liberalization. This turn in economic policies contributed then 
again to an intra-elite conflict, which weakened the institutional powers of 
the state. At the same time, the pressure from the external security 
environment was high, which further affected the state power and enforced 
the intra-elite conflict. All in all, the capabilities of the state were however 
such that a fall of the regime was not a concern. 
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After analyzing the impact of the external environment during these 
different time periods, I analyze the impact of a number of external actors, 
their coercive or engaging policies and their direct democracy promotion to 
the Syrian political system. Here I also offer some regional comparisons. I 
find that external actors have contributed to the development of semi- 
authoritarianism at best. In the Syrian case, there was insufficient 
engagement with the external actors, which would have promoted some 
semi-authoritarian development. Coercion and isolation have not promoted 
political liberalization or democratization. However, the deeper engagement 
with the European Union in 2002-2004 indicated that Syria would indeed 
have adopted some liberal policies if the engagement had continued. Finally, 
I review some state strategies to overcome the external influence on state 
power, and the authoritarian nature of the state. These strategies ensure that 
the impact of the external democracy promotion remains very minimal in 
the Arab world. 
The main contribution of this study to the field of Middle East research is 
that it is adding a layer to explaining the causes of authoritarianism in the 
Arab world by showing the importance of the external level, which has been 
neglected thus far. This research also develops a conceptual framework for 
understanding the linkages between the different external factors and a 
domestic political system. Another outcome is detailed data related 
especially to fiscal capabilities of the Syrian state. This data is more 
extensive than any data presented before. With a detailed analysis of the 
effects of external security and external resource extraction on fiscal, 
coercive and institutional capabilities of the state as well as the autonomy, 
efficiency and the legitimacy of the state, the research demonstrates the 
hypothesis to be correct. The external environment has indeed provided 
conditions conducive to authoritarianism. 
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1. Introduction 
This research studies how the external environment has influenced the 
authoritarian state structure in Syria from the presidency of Hafez al-Asad 
until 2005. The significance of the topic lies in the focus on external 
variables: thus far, the undemocratic nature of Syria and other Arab states 
has been seen to have been caused by their domestic political and socio- 
economic structures. Indeed, previous research has regarded the Arab state- 
making process since independence as somewhat isolated from their 
external sphere. This research shows how since the Ba'athist revolution, the 
external security and fiscal environment of Syria greatly contributed to the 
resources of the state and gave means for building and maintaining the 
authoritarian state. 
1.1. Tradition of domestic variables in explaining lack of democracy 
Analysis of the domestic level has dominated the study on democratization 
and political liberalization in the Arab world. Within the domestic level of 
analysis, the explanations for the reasons behind the birth and persistence of 
authoritarian rule are debated. Research-revolves around two schools: that of 
political economy'; and that o political culture2. Within these schools of 
thought, the most domin. nt explanatory variables for Middle East 
authoritarianism have been rentierism, socio-economic (class, corporatist) 
structures, neopatrimonialism and Islam. 
The school of political culture guided by Weberian tradition sees values and 
persisting traditions of thinking in the region as distinctly different from 
liberal democratic values and therefore explains persisting authoritarianism 
by means of these guidelines of political culture. In its possibly most 
1 The classics of the political economics approach include at least Beblawi, Hazem and 
Luciani, Giacomo (Eds. ). The Rentier State. London: Croom Helm, 1987 and Luciani, 
Giacomo. The Arab State. London: Routledge, 1990. 
2 For political culture approach see for example Sharabi, Hisham. Neopatriarchy. A Theory 
of Distorted Change in Arab Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. Pipes, Daniel. 
In the Path of God. - Islam and Political Power. New York: Basic Books, 1983. Fish, 
Steven. M. "Islam and Authoritarianism". World Politics, Vol. 55, No. 1,2002, pp. 4-37. 
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extreme, but common form, the political culture approach sees Islam and its 
influence as alien to democracy. Based on this, the approach has often been 
criticized of orientalism and very narrow "textually" based interpretation of 
Islam that fails to analyze the complex social and ideological reality. 3 
Some claim however, that the aspect of political culture should not be 
excluded on the basis of this burden of the traditions of the school of 
political culture. 4 A respected view that can be viewed as belonging to the 
school of political culture is that of neopatrimonialism, studied for example 
by Hisham Sharabi. He explains the neopatrimonial feature of a society as 
follows: "A central psychosocial feature of this type of society... is the 
dominance of the Father (patriarch), the centre around which the national as 
well as the natural family are organized. Thus between the ruler and ruled, 
between father and child, there exist only vertical relations: in both settings 
the paternal will is the absolute will, mediated in both the society and the 
family by a forced consensus based on ritual and cohesion... Thus in social 
practice, ordinary citizens not only are arbitrarily deprived of some of their 
basic rights but are virtual prisoners of the state... "5 The political economy 
school explains this societal feature in terms of socio-economic structures, 
while the political culture approach explains it in terms of cultural factors. 
Similarly, the feature of clientelism or patronage, in other words, the 
existence of patron-client relations and importance of family, clan and sect, 
all somewhat related to neopatrimonialism, is seen as an important factor 
explaining political organization. Their sources, however, are analyzed 
differently by political culturalists and political economists. 
3 Brynen, Rex, Korany, Bahgat and Noble, Paul. "Introduction: Theoretical Perspectives on 
Arab Liberalization and Democratization". In Brynen, Rex, Korany, Bahgat and Noble, 
Paul (Eds. ). Political Liberalization & Democratization in the Arab World. Vol. 1, 
Theoretical Perspectives. London: Lynner Rienner Publishers 1995, p. 7. 
Hudson, Michael C. "The Political Culture Approach to Arab Democratization: The Case 
for Bringing It Back In, Carefully". In Brynen, Korany and Noble, Political Liberalization 
& Democratization in the Arab World, Vol 1, Theoretical Perspectives, pp. 61-77. s Hisham Sharabi is quoted in Anderson, Lisa. "Democracy in the Arab World: A Critique 
of the Political Culture Approach". In Brynen, Korany, and Noble (Eds. ). Political 
Liberalization & Democratization in the Arab World. Vol 1, Theoretical Perspectives, pp. 
77-93, p. 84. 
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The school of political economy that is guided by Marxian tradition sees 
economic and socio-economic structures of a state as the most important 
factors influencing the nature of the political order. Classically, this 
approach is a class-based analysis of the nature of state and society. The 
political economy approach has been further advanced by Giacomo 
Luciani's concept of rentierism. The Arab states are viewed to varying 
extents as "rentier states", "in which access to large amounts of externally 
generated economic resources serves to strengthen state autonomy"6, which 
therefore explains their authoritarianism. The rentier nature of the state is 
also seen to promote patrimonialism. Explaining a lack of democracy solely 
by rentierism has been criticized of overdeterminism. Empirical analysis has 
not always been supportive of the simple explanation of rentierism - for 
example, a degree of political opening has emerged regardless of the fact 
that the level of rentierism has remained the same. 7 The rentier concept has, 
nonetheless, been seen as an important feature in explaining lack of 
democracy. 
The large role of a state in the economy is also seen to hinder democratic 
openings according to the thesis of the liberal theory that purports that 
economic liberalization will increase political liberalization. The application 
of the liberal thesis to the Middle East became, however, problematic as the 
signs of increasing authoritarianism became clearer after some economic 
structural adjustment programs were implemented in many countries. This 
has been explained by the observation that political liberalization under 
conditions of economic liberalization can sustain or re-introduce 
authoritarianism! Although these structural adjustment programs were 
accompanied by some political reforms, and elections were widely held, 
6 Brynen, Korany and Noble, "Introduction: Theoretical Perspectives on Arab 
Liberalization and Democratization". In Brynen, Korany, and Noble (Eds. ). Political 
Liberalization & Democratization in the Arab World. Vol. 1, Theoretical Perspectives, p. 
15. 
7 Ibid, p. 16. 
8 Pool, David. "The Links between Economic and Political Liberalization". In Niblock, Tim 
and Murphy, Emma (Ed. ). Economic and Political Liberalization in the Middle East. 
London and New York: British Academic Press, 1993, pp. 40-55, p. 53. 
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changes were widely perceived as partial. 9 Analytically, the failure to prove 
that economic liberalization would lead to political liberalization at the same 
pace in the Arab world has been complicated by the fact that the economic 
reforms have also been very shallow and very deep structural reforms have 
not been implemented. Therefore, the impact on political and socio- 
economic structures has been weak. The failure of the liberal thesis both in 
practice and as an analytic framework for understanding political 
development in the Middle East has become at least implicitly 
acknowledged. 10 
There is also a wide consensus surrounding the belief that the lack of 
democracy is due to regimes' efficient strategies in holding onto power 
through coercion, patronage and co-option. Coercion has been implemented 
by a large domestic security apparatus. Co-option (inclusion in the economic 
and political benefits of the state) is used in situations in which the regime 
aims to reach out to new, emerging counter-forces, to negotiate a new socio- 
economic pact or to adjust to changes caused by economic liberalization. 
Co-option was carried out in the era of large rent income primarily through 
the enlargement of the regime's patronage networks by distributing rent. 
This specific strategy is termed patronage-politics (distribution of benefits 
and services in return for political loyalty)". As the financial resources of 
the state were squeezed due to falling oil revenues and a reduction in 
superpower largesse at the end of the 1980s, liberalization became a more 
common tool of co-option for the regime. Only the challenge caused by 
Islamism has been contained by coercion, although some co-option 
strategies have also been used. Indeed, regimes used controlled or selective 
9 Brynen, Rex, Korany, Bahgat and Noble, Paul. "Conclusion: Liberalization, 
Democratization and Arab Experiences". In Brynen, Rex, Korany, Bahgat and Noble, Paul 
(Eds. ). Political Liberalization & Democratization in the Arab world, Volume 2: 
Comparative Experiences. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, pp. 267-279, 
271. 
Springborg, Robert. "Reviews the book of Kienle, Eberhard. A Grand Delusion: 
Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt. " Middle East Journal, Summer 2002, Vol. 56, 
Issue 3, pp. 522-523. 11 Kassem, Maye. Egyptian Politics. The Dynamics ofAuthoritarian Rule. Boulder London: 
Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2004, p. 3. 
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economic and political liberalization as "a survival strategy" to co-opt and 
avoid true economic and political liberalization. 12 
The states that have engaged in this kind of limited political liberalization to 
a larger extent in addition to fostering an image of having some democratic 
features, yet remain authoritarian, can be termed semi-authoritarian. Marina 
Ottaway defines these semi-authoritarian regimes as "ambiguous systems 
that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy, the existence of 
some formal democratic institutions, and respect for a limited sphere of civil 
and political liberties with essentially illiberal or even authoritarian traits. "13 
Such countries should not be seen as following the path of democratization, 
but as states that have created a more or less stable semi-authoritarian form 
of government. The democratic features adopted include regular elections, 
opposition parties, some level of political competition, freedom of speech, a 
free media, and civil society formation. The authoritarian features include 
limited opportunities to effect a change of government, ensuring that the 
ruling party remains unchallenged, weak institutions and little connection 
between economic and political reforms. 
It is most important to remember when observing the regime behaviour of 
these semi-authoritarian states that their ambiguous character is deliberate. 
Partial liberalization is controlled and enhances state power. "Semi- 
authoritarian systems are not imperfect democracies struggling towards 
improvement or consolidation but regimes determined to maintain the 
appearance of democracy without exposing themselves to the political risks 
12 Brunberg, Daniel. "Authoritarian Legacies and Reform Strategies in the Arab world. " In 
Brynen, Korany and Noble, Political Liberalization & Democratization in the Arab World, 
Vol 1, Theoretical Perspectives, pp. 229-260. Moves of democratization are defined here as 
"expansion of political participation in such a way as to prove citizens with a degree of real 
and meaningful collective control over public policy". Expansion of political liberalization 
is defined here as "expansion of public space through the recognition and protection of civil 
and political liberties, particularly those bearing upon the ability of citizens to engage in 
free political discourse and to freely organize in pursuit of common interests. " The 
definitions are as quoted in Brynen, Korany and Noble, Political Liberalization & 
Democratization in the Arab World, Vol 1, Theoretical Perspectives, p. 3. 13 For the definition of semi-authoritarianism as well as the features referred see Ottaway, 
Marina. Democracy Challenged. The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism. Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 2003, pp. 3-19. 
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that free competition entails. " 14 For example, in the case of Egypt, "the 
combination of these strategies [coercion, patronage and co-option] allows 
for the existence of contained pluralism within an authoritarian regime and 
permits it to adopt images of liberalization and democratization without 
actually conceding to such measures. "15 Many Arab states have moved 
towards some level of semi-authoritarianism, exhibiting at least a formal 
multi-party system and no true competition for power. Syria, however, has 
not engaged in political liberalization to any significant degree, and remains 
clearly at the authoritarian end of the spectrum. 
1.2. Explaining Syrian authoritarianism 
Syria can accurately be defined as an authoritarian state. It is true to say that 
Syria has no rule by democratic institutions, multi-party elections, no 
independent opposition parties, no political competition from outside the 
party, no personal freedom of speech, no free media and no liberal civil 
society. The Syrian political system is founded upon the triangular power of 
the president, the Ba'ath party and the army instead of democratic 
institutions. The current system of one-party rule has dominated since the 
coup of 1963, which gave birth to an authoritarian Ba'athist state that 
consolidated itself by 1970. The presidential powers are more absolute than 
those found elsewhere in the Arab world. The Ba'ath party organs exist and 
function in parallel with the representative state institutions, and the party 
institutions are mostly superior to the state institutions. The power structure 
is supported by the army. There exists no free political competition in Syria. 
The elections for president, the People's Assembly, trade unions, local 
government, and local leaders have consistently been dominated by the 
Ba'ath party since the 1970s. 16 Basic liberties such as freedom of expression 
14 Ibid, p. 3. 
15 Kassem, Egyptian Politics. The Dynamics ofAuthoritarian Rule, p. 3. The brackets are 
added by the author. 
16 George, Alan. Syria. Neither Bread nor Freedom. London and New York: Zed Books, 
2003, p. 84. Some minor parties are allowed to operate and some independent candidates 
are allowed by the Ba'ath party to run in elections. The parties that are allowed to exist 
have to accept the Ba'ath party program and follow the guidelines of the Ba'ath party's 
congresses. They cannot, therefore, be considered as opposition parties. These parties are 
14 
or assimilation do not exist. Political life is also governed by emergency 
law, which has been in force since 1963. Regionally, Syria stands among the 
most authoritarian Arab states, together with Libya and Saudi-Arabia. This 
is clear from the following index of political freedom in the Middle East. '? 
Table 1: 
Index of political freedom 
Source: EIU 
Israel 8.20 
Lebanon 6.55 
Morocco 5.20 
Iraq 5.05 
Palestine 5.05 
Kuwait 4.90 
Tunisia 4.60 
Jordan 4.45 
Qatar 4.45 
Egypt 4.30 
Sudan 4.30 
Yemen 4.30 
Algeria 4.15 
Oman 4.00 
Bahrain 3.85 
Iran 3.85 
UAE 3.70 
Saudi Arabia 2.80 
Syria 2.80 
Libya 2.05 
How, then, has Syrian authoritarianism been explained? Like Arab states 
such as Egypt and Iraq, Syria is considered to be a "populist authoritarian" 
state. 18 This means that it emerged through a revolution forced with 
leadership of the military and bureaucracy, supported by the middle and 
also forbidden from engaging in most political activities. They remain marginal and 
o1pressed. George, Syria. Neither Bread nor Freedom, pp. 87-88. 
Economist Intelligence Unit. The indicators used were: election of head of government, 
election of parliament, fairness of electoral laws, right to organize political parties, power of 
elected representatives, presence of an opposition, transparency, minority participation, 
level of corruption, freedom of assembly, independence of the judiciary, press freedom, 
religious freedom, rule of law and property rights. The study was conducted 2005. 18 Hinnebusch, Raymond A. Authoritarian Power in Ba'thist Syria: Army, Party and 
Peasant. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, pp. 1-3, Ayubi, Nazih N. Over-Stating the Arab 
State. Politics and Society in the Middle East. London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1995, pp. 
196-223. 
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lower classes. The revolution re-formed political elites, classes, political 
structure and system, but from the top down. The state gained support by 
supporting "populist" interests, but created authoritarian political systems. 19 
The power remained in the hands of the leaders of the revolution, the 
support in the hands of supporters. Raymond Hinnebusch explains the 
persistence of Syrian authoritarianism precisely in terms of the origin of the 
state. According to him, "the state grew out of a populist movement against 
the upper classes that linked rural intellectuals and army officers, peasants, 
and deprived minorities, notably the Alawis. " The social revolution that the 
Ba'ath party forced eliminated any social class powerful enough to 
challenge the state, most notably the industrial bourgeoisie. Following the 
political economy approach, Hinnebusch views the authoritarian structure as 
a result of the absence of classes that could challenge the existing political 
order. 20 The structure of the institutions in the Ba'athist state is another 
explanatory factor for Hinnebusch. The alliance between party, army and 
the state and balancing between two major sources of power, the Alawi 
dominance in security and co-option of Sunni bourgeoisie, is at the core of 
this structure of power that leaves no independent alliances. 21 Hinnebusch 
elaborates this view also in his numerous other writings on Syria. 22 
The writing of other scholars such as Volker Perthes is along similar lines. 
Perthes describes the restructuring of the political system in Syria after 1970 
as creating certain structures by coercive and economic means that 
maintained stable authoritarianism. These structures were institutional 
(hierarchical organization of the army, party and bureaucracy under the 
president), corporatist and neo-patrimonial. 23 For him, "Asad's regime may 
best be characterized as an authoritarian presidential system with distinct 
19 Hinnebusch, Raymond. Syria. Revolution from Above. London and New York: 
Routledge, 2001, p. 2. 
20 Hinnebusch, Raymond. "Calculated Decompression as a Substitute for Democratization: 
Syria". In Brynen, Korany, and Noble, Political Liberalization & Democratization in the 
Arab World, Volume 2: Comparative Experiences, pp. 223-240. 21 Hinnebusch, "Calculated Decompression as a Substitute for Democratization: Syria", pp. 
225-227. 
u Most important of these is Hinnebusch, Syria. Revolution from Above. 23 Perthes, Volker. The Political Economy of Syria under Asad, London and New York: 
I. B. Tauris, 1995, pp. 133-141. 
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neo-patrimonial traits. "24 Perthes therefore also emphasizes the domestic 
structures as a reason for stability and durability of the regime and its 
authoritarianism. He also points out that economic crisis or socio-structural 
change will not bring political demands because the groups that would 
challenge the existing order are very weak. Nor would the strongest groups, 
such as the bourgeoisie, necessarily wish to challenge the regime, so tied are 
their interests to the state. 25 This analysis coincides with theoretical 
literature on dominant-class, clientilist, patrimonial structures and co-option 
strategies as variables in explaining authoritarianism. 
Very limited political and economic liberalization has appeared in Syria as 
in other Arab states, not because of any need to establish a new balance of 
power with the birth of new socio-economic groups, but as a regime strategy 
to gain support and co-opt new economic interest groups. According to 
Hinnebusch, liberalization depends on the ability of the regime to broaden 
the participation to challenging group(s), in this case the bourgeoisie, 
without compromising too much with the existing social base or threatening 
regime security. Hinnebusch notes that the regime has used the strategy of 
balancing between original social bases and bourgeoisie specifically to resist 
political liberalization. 26 In addition to using patronage, the opening up of 
the economy in the 1970s was used by Hafez Al-Asad to consolidate his 
power and build alliances between the politically privileged Allawis and the 
economically important Sunni bourgeoisie of Damascus. 27 This economic 
liberalization was, however, managed in a way that didn't threaten the 
privileged position of Ba'ath party officials and their allies; in addition, it 
24 Ibid, p. 133. 
25 Ibid, p. 260 
26 Hinnebusch, "Calculated Decompression as a Substitute for Democratization: Syria", p. 
223-240. 
27 Allawis are 12 per cent of the Syrians, a distinct shi'a sect of Muslim religion. Sunnis 
have traditionally held power of trade in the cities, whereas Allawis have been the rural 
poor, until the Ba'athist revolution that relied much on the minorities and rural population, 
especially the Allawis. Later the Ba'ath party has had representation of all different 
religious and ethnic groups, with a clear over-representation of the Allawi's and under- 
representation of the Sunnis. Leverett, Flynt. Inheriting Syria. Bashar's Trial by Fire. 
Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2005, p. 2. 
17 
allowed them jointly to manage the economy for their own prof The 
second opening up of the economy came in the 1990s and was due to 
economic difficulties, namely the debt crisis following a fall in the external 
rents. Some political liberalization also occurred. In a classical move of co- 
option, the number of seats was increased in the Parliament to allow the 
election of a larger number of independents, who gained access to the state 
and its patronage. 29 The third phase of economic and political relaxation, 
which began at the beginning of 2000, has been introduced in a gradual 
manner, with a view to preserving the balance of power. 30 The context of 
this last liberalization era is the change of president after the death of Hafez 
al-Asad and succession of his son Bashar. The liberalization is therefore 
partially explainable by the aim to consolidate the power of the new 
president, although the change of president presented a continuation of the 
regime. 31 
Indeed, there is no period in Syrian Ba'athist history that could be defined as 
a significant political opening. There has been no meaningful increase in 
competition for power or political liberalization, including increased 
freedom of speech and formation of civil society in liberal terms. The 
periods of political or economic change mentioned may have increased 
political participation by patronage and co-option, but in the end they all 
enhanced state power instead of diminishing it. As there are no periods of 
significant political reform to observe (with the possible exception of 
political changes around 2003-2005 that will be further scrutinized later in 
the study), the focus will be on explaining why there were no deeper 
political reforms. Does the previous research fully explain why Syria has not 
resorted even to such limited political and economic liberalization that 
28 Owen, Roger. State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East 3d ed., 
London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p. 119. 29 Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State. Politics and Society in the Middle East, pp. 402-403, 
423. 
30 Perthes, Volker. Syria Under Bashr al-Asad. " Modernization and the Limits of Change 
IISS Adelphi Paper, No. 366,2004, p. 36. Economic liberalization in Syria has been studied 
extensively. See, for example, Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above. Hinnebusch, 
Raymond. "The Political Economy of Economic Liberalization in Syria, " International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3, August 1995, pp. 305-320. 31 Perthes, Volker (Ed. ). Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change. Boulder, London: 
Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2004, p. 87. 
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would have lead it towards semi-authoritarian direction along the lines of 
Egypt and Jordan? 
Even if one was to completely accept and follow this hegemonic domestic 
level argumentation on the lack of political liberalization in Syria, the 
question remains: What are the resources of regime power to create a strong 
social base, eliminate previously dominant classes and create strong 
institutional power structures that resist political upheaval, challenges and 
pressures of political liberalization? What created the opportunity for the 
Syrian regime to become and maintain these durable structures of state 
power and therefore authoritarianism, especially after the 1990s in an age 
when most other Arab regimes liberalized? The aim here is not to disregard 
or to repeat these previous works on domestic sources for lack of political 
liberalization in Syria, but to shed more light on the persistence of 
authoritarianism by analyzing the extent to which external variables can 
have explanatory potential. After all, the complex reality is never a product 
of one or few factors but several levels of factors intervening with each 
other. 
1.3. Potential of external variables 
As presented in the previous chapter, the primacy of the domestic level and 
the lack of explanatory potential of external influence is apparent in existing 
research on democratization and sources of authoritarianism in the Middle 
East. Theoretical works on external influence on democratization that 
compared democratic transitions conclude that international context is the 
forgotten dimension of democratization. Pridham & Whitehead have 
theorized this aspect on the basis of comparative examples. 32 Their works 
32 Whitehead, Laurence (Ed. ). International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and 
the Americas. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Whitehead, Laurence. "International 
Aspects of Democratization". In O'Donell, Guillermo, Schmitter, Philippe C. Transitions 
from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986, pp. 3-46. Whitehead, Laurence. "The Imposition of Democracy". In 
Lowenthal, Abraham F. Exporting Democracy: United States and Latin America. Volume 
One: Themes and Issues, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991, pp. 234-260. 
Pridham, Geoffrey. "The International Dimension of Democratization: Theory, Practice 
and Inter-Regional Comparisons". In Pridham Geoffrey, Herring, Eric and Sanford, 
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are, however, not particularly applicable to the Middle East, because their 
focus has been on situations where actual transition from an authoritarian to 
a liberal democratic political system has occurred, which is not the case in 
the Middle East. They have also focused largely on the role of actors rather 
than conditions. Their approach does not offer a meaningful framework 
through which to analyze external influence on the persistence of 
authoritarianism in the Arab world. 
The lack of systematic application of theoretical frameworks on external 
influence on the democratization process in the Middle East is logically due 
to the low level of external influence or actual democratization process in 
the region. Indeed, although the Middle East has been penetrated by external 
actors, the impact on domestic systems has been regarded as remarkably 
small. Syria has been even less subject to direct external influence than 
many other Arab states, such as Egypt and Jordan. According to Volker 
Perthes, "Syrian policy-making has been marked by the virtual absence of 
external interference, that is, by a high measure of national autonomy. , 
33 
This viewpoint that maintains that there is a lack of external impact is 
strengthened further still by such findings as the fact that the Arab regimes 
have not been powerless actors in the process of globalization, and they 
have been able to restrain and control the effects of external influence in 
political, economic and social spheres. 34 However, although Syria was not 
subject to the direct influence of external creditors such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, or a military ally demanding political 
reforms such as the US, this does not imply that Syria would not have been 
subject to the conditions of its external environment. It is important to 
consider what kind of domestic effects the external environment, such as the 
security threat environment and economic environment, has on states. 
George (Eds. ). Building Democracy? The International Dimension of Democratization in 
Eastern Europe. London and Washington: Leicester University Press, 1997, pp. 7-29. 33 Perthes, Volker. "Si Vis Stabilitatem, Para Bellum. State Building, National Security, and 
War Preparation in Syria". In Heydemann, Steven (Ed. ). War, Institutions and Social 
Change in the Middle East. Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2000, 
pp. 149-173, p. 149. 
Dodge, Toby and Higgott, Richard (Eds. ). Globalization and the Middle East. Islam, 
Economy, Society and Politics. Royal Institute for International Affairs, 2002. 
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Two theoretical articles have analyzed the influence of the external level on 
democratization or political liberalization in the Arab world. Gregory Gause 
focuses on regional influences, namely the influence of the prevalence of 
inter-state conflict, external rents and transnational identities. He found that 
the regional level does not appear to bear a significant influence on regimes' 
decisions regarding political liberalization, although "they can contribute to 
an explanation of the relative lack of liberal regimes in the Arab world. "35 
Gause found in his comparative assessment that if regional effects were 
high, there was a high level of conflict, external revenues and support for 
transnational identities, there were no democratization processes. If the 
regional influences were low, there were some experiments with 
democratization. However, he sees the domestic factors as "far more 
36 important" in explaining democratization. 
The domestic level also appears to dominate when studying the adoption of 
structural adjustment programs that created at least some window-dressing 
of democratic changes in the region. Mustapha Al-Sayyid has analyzed the 
amount of external influence on regime decisions to liberalize, particularly 
focusing on the influence of the International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank. He found that the very decisions to liberalize were accelerated by 
external actors, but the rationale was domestic. 37 This view matches with the 
body of literature on structural adjustment experiences. They were not seen 
to have been imposed from above by international creditors, such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, but the sources for the 
turn in development policies are seen to have arisen from domestic 
economic and political considerations. The "fiscal crisis" explanation 
underlines constraints caused by rentierism to the state and the need for 
regimes to adopt structural reforms to solve their debt crisis, caused by a 
35 Gause, Gregory F. III. "Regional Influences on Experiments in Political Liberalization in 
the Arab World" In Brynen, Korany & Noble (Eds. ). Political Liberalization & 
Democratization in the Arab World Volume 1, Theoretical Perspectives, pp. 283-307, p. 
302. 
36 Ibid, pp. 293-294. 
37 Al-Sayyid, Mustapha K. "International and Regional Environments and State 
Transformation in Some Arab Countries. " In Hakimian, Hassan and Moshaver, Ziba (Eds. ). 
The State and Global Change. The Political Economy of Transition in the Middle East and 
North Africa. London: Curzon, 2001, pp. 156-176. 
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decline in rents at the end of the 1980s. The fiscal crisis, debt crisis and 
failure in economic development strategies are different parts of the same 
explanation founded in the political economics approach that stresses 
domestic reasons for the adoption of economic and political reforms. For 
proponents of this approach, the fact that countries that were not in the 
throes of debt crises still adopted structural reforms shows that the 
Washington consensus was much larger, and the regimes' decisions to adopt 
neoliberal economic policies were not from their part due to the external 
pressure exerted by the creditors. The international environment and the 
hegemony of Washington consensus played a role as provider and 
formulator of solutions for economic development strategy, but domestic 
reasons appear to explain the adoption of structural reforms. 38 These 
explanations for political and economic reforms deriving from domestic 
political economics have been criticized, however, for their inability to link 
the rentier nature of the state and the external politico-military environment 
from which the external rents are generated. 39 
This research seeks to explain the external factors providing the foundations 
for the stability of the Syrian regime and explain why there were no political 
reforms when the external environment changed. The main external factors 
analyzed here are external security and the fiscal environment. These factors 
have been mentioned as contributors to domestic political systems in earlier 
research as well, although never systematically studied in a single work of 
research. Most systematic research has been conducted by Volker Perthes on 
the effects of war preparation on the Syrian state and society in a broader 
research project by Steven Heydemann. 40 The Syrian regional and 
international position has also been viewed as important domestically: 
Volker Perthes argues that Syrian foreign policy and the maintenance of 
38 Nonneman, Gerd (Ed. ). Political and Economic Liberalization: Dynamic and Linkages. 
London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1996, p. 34. 39 Schwarz, Rolf. State Formation Process in Rentier States: The Middle Eastern Case. 
Paper for Fifth Pan-European Conference on International Relations, The Hague, 
September 9-11.2004. 
40 Heydemann, Steven (Ed. ). War, Institutions and Social Change in the Middle East. Los 
Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2000. 
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threat contributed significantly to regime legitimacy. 41 The abovementioned 
article by Gregory Gause, covers the roles of external threat and finance. 
The external fiscal environment has possibly been most extensively studied 
- the importance of this external source of finance is referred to regularly in 
the Syrian case - but the ways in which these rents influence the political 
system have not been systematically studied to date. 
41 Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Asad, p. 264. 
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2. Conceptualizing external influence on state power 
2.1 Development of state power 
In this thesis, the external environment is analyzed as a source of both 
pressures and opportunities for the state-making elites. This perspective 
emphasizes the existence of an active interrelationship between the domestic 
and international levels, between which the state acts as a mediator. The 
focus is on the development of state power and its implication on the 
development of participation. 
The development of state power is linked to a state-making process, in 
which a state creates legitimate rule over the society. In a state-making 
process, centralized political authority, integrated national economy and 
shared political culture develop within the borders of a sovereign state 42 
According to Charles Tilly, in a state-making process, states first try to 
eliminate both external and internal rivals. They then seek to protect the 
parties supporting their rule. To do all this they need resource extraction, 
normally from a population and territory they wish to control. This is done 
through taxation, which demands the development of administration and 
state penetration into the society. Resource extraction eventually leads to 
increased participation. In this way, the state-making process evolves to a 
legitimate rule of the state over the territory that it controls. 43 
42 Mufti, Malek. Sovereign Creations. Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq. 
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 14. The state's main function has 
been famously defined by Max Weber as "monopolizing of legitimate violence". Another 
definition for state is provided by Guanfranco Poggi. For him the state "is perhaps best seen 
as a complex set of institutional arrangements for rule operating through the continuous and 
regulated activities of individuals acting as occupants of offices. The state, as the sum total 
of such offices, reserves to itself the business of rule over territorially bounded society; it 
monopolizes in law and as far as possible in fact, all faculties and facilities pertaining to 
that business. " Desch, Michael C. "War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States. " 
International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 2, Spring 1996,237-268, p. 240. 43 Tilly's theoretical approach was first published in Tilly Charles (Ed. ). The Formation of 
National States in Western Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975. Thies, 
Cameron G. "State Building, Interstate and Intrastate Rivalry: A Study of Post-Colonial 
Developing Country Extractive Efforts, 1975-2000", International Studies Quarterly, 48, 
2004, pp. 53-72, pp. 54-55. 
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According to Michael Mann, the state enhances its `despotic and 
infrastructural powers' to strengthen its power to force state-making. These 
include the development of a military and police force, as well as building 
the capacity to penetrate society through taxation, welfare distribution and 
public investment. 44 State power can therefore be defined as states' ability to 
do all the above. A strong state would logically be a state that has been able 
to accumulate power. According to Michael Barnett, state power refers to 
"the resources available to state managers in their governance of society in 
relation to societal actors. s45 
Mufti has defined state power as exhibiting three characteristics: autonomy, 
efficacy and legitimacy. According to him, "autonomy means that state has 
sufficient coercive and financial resources at its disposal to provide ruling 
elites with a reasonable degree of insulation from external pressures, 
enabling them to implement policies that do not simply reflect the interests 
of the foreign governments or domestic groupings. Efficacy46 refers to the 
ruling elite's ability to deploy state power as it seeks to manage and 
transform society. " Legitimacy means for Mufti that, "the state (as opposed 
to a specific regime) enjoys general societal consent and support. It captures 
the normative element in state building and identity formation. , 47 
According to Charles Tilly, the development of state power naturally leads 
to a stage in which the state uses its authority to pursue its aims in the 
society. 48 As previously discussed, the regime uses its coercive and fiscal 
capabilities in order to consolidate the power of the regime. According to 
Ayoob, all regimes use coercion to strengthen their statehood, this meaning 
"to persuade and coerce the disparate populations under their nominal rule 
to accept the legitimacy of state boundaries and institutions, and the right of 
the state to extract resources from them, as well as the right of the state to 
" Mann is quoted in Mufti, Sovereign Creations. Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria 
and Iraq, p. 12. 
as Barnett, Michael N. Confronting the Costs of War. Military Power, State and Society in 
Egypt and Israel, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 40. 
ab From here on the word efficiency is used instead of efficacy. 47 Mufti, Sovereign Creations. Pan Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq, pp. 12- 
13. 
48 Tilly is referred to in Ibid, p. 12. 
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regulate important aspects of their lives". 49 Central control is therefore a 
typical stage of state-making. Only after this consolidation of a regime, did a 
gradual opening of the political system for participation of the masses 
appear in Europe. 
0 
The Arab states all experienced political turmoil after their independence, 
and some even long periods of coups and counter coups. Regimes began to 
consolidate themselves from the 1970s. 5° In other words, following 
competition for the use of state power among different elites in a 
consolidation phase, state powers were enhanced and the use of these 
powers was less disputed by competing groups. According to Mufti, this 
was a result of the identification of strategies that prevented domestic 
instability and expanded financial resources chiefly the oil boom that 
allowed state spending. As a result, these states created very long-lasting 
regimes, 5' such as that which is still in power in Syria today. In other words, 
the state powers grew to rule society without competition, but also without 
the ability to fulfil all the functions of the state, thus leaving these states 
weak. What seems to have appeared is an increase in state power. Following 
consolidation, the state did not share power with society. 
The reason for this difference in the Arab world has been explained, 
although not systematically studied, by different strategies of war 
preparation and revenue extraction. 52 Theoretically, both economic and 
military aspects have been seen to influence the development of state power. 
49 Ayoob, Mohammed. The Third World Security Predicament. State-making, Regional 
Conflict and International System. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press, 1995, p. 29. 
50 Hinnebusch, Raymond. "Introduction: The Analytical Framework". In Hinnebusch, 
Raymond and Ehteshami, Anoushiravan. The Foreign Policies of Middle East States. 
Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2002, pp. 1-28, p. 12. There is very little 
research of the process of Arab states becoming `stronger'. Few studies ponder the issue. 
See for example Gause, Gregory. "Sovereignty, Statecraft and Stability". In Owen, State, 
Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East. Dawisha, Adeed and 
Zartman, William I. (Eds. ). "Beyond Coercion: The Durability of the Arab State. " Vol 3 in 
a series by Luciani, Giacomo and Salame, Ghasan. Nation, State and Integration in the 
Arab World. London: Croom Helm, 1987. Zartman, I. William. "State-building and the 
Military in Arab Africa". In Korany, Bahgat, Noble, Paul and Brynen, Rex. Many Faces of 
National Security in the Arab World, Houndsmills and London: Macmillan 1993, pp, 239- 
258. 
Mufti, Sovereign Creations. Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq, p. 12. s2 This is very clear especially in Heydemann, Steven (Ed. ). War, Institutions and Social 
Change in the Middle East. 
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War and war preparation have been major explanations in increasing the 
scope and cohesiveness of a state or as stimulus to state-building. 53 From the 
economic perspective, states' ability to extract resources independent from 
the society has been a major explanation in the development of state power. 
The following chapters will view the theoretical approaches regarding the 
influence of war-making or war-preparation and external resource extraction 
54 on state power. 
2.2 Influence of war-preparation on state-making and participation 
"Wars made states and states made wars" - Charles Tilly" 
Based on the European example, Tilly concluded that wars made states. This 
is because war-waging allows rulers to raise more revenue, and therefore 
allows them to become stronger. Otherwise, attempts to tax may fail due to 
internal competition. If there are close substitutes to the ruler, the state has 
less leverage to extract. 56 According to this logic, states need wars to engage 
in state-making. Because war enhances taxation, and taxation enhances 
participation, wars also support the development of democracy. 
Clearly the state-making environment was completely different in Medieval 
Europe than it was in the Middle East of the 19th and 20th centuries. 57 Not 
33 Desch, "War and Strong States, Peace and Weak States", p. 241. 54 Resource extraction is of course the major war preparation strategy as well. Here the two 
are separated in order to take into account the general effect of the economic/fiscal 
environment that gives considerably important challenges and opportunities for the states 
and to avoid seeing all resource extraction of an Arab state simply as a function of war 
preparation. 
s Tilly, Charles. "Reflections on the History of European State-Making". In Tilly, Charles 
(Ed. ). The Formation of National States in Western Europe, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1975, pp. 3-83, p. 42. 
56 Thies, "State Building, Interstate and Intrastate Rivalry: A Study of Post-Colonial 
Developing Country Extractive Efforts, 1975-2000", pp. 54-55. s' For example the following works have researched the relationship between war and state- 
making in the Middle East: Barnett, Confronting the Costs of War. Military Power, State, 
and Society in Egypt and Israel. Gongora, Thierry. "War Making and State Power in the 
Contemporary Middle East". Heydemann, Steven (Ed. ). War, Institutions and Social 
Change in the Middle East. Gause, Gregory. Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security 
Challenges in the Arab Gulf States. Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1994. 
Sadowski, Yahya. Scuds or Butter? The Political Economy ofArms Control in the Middle 
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only was the domestic socio-economic and political setting different, but the 
external environment differed remarkably. The main differences can be 
found in the relationship between the state and the regime, and in the source 
of revenue to the states. The clearest difference would appear to be the fact 
that the statehood of the Arab states - as other developing states - was rooted 
in international law, and their sovereignty was therefore guaranteed. The 
external actors had established states to the Arab world. In the Middle East, 
state-making was more about regime consolidation. In the example of Tilly, 
state-making was the attempt of the regime to build and consolidate the 
state. In the Middle East, states with borders and institutions existed, but the 
regimes were not consolidated. As Heydemann has noted, the resources also 
differed. In Europe the regimes aimed to build and consolidate states. They 
used domestic financing for war preparation. This contributed to political 
systems in a democratizing manner. In the Arab world, the state existed and 
regimes were aiming to establish and consolidate their rule, and unlike the 
states in Europe, they used external financing for war preparation. 
According to Heydemann, this contributed to the political system in an 
authoritizing manner. 58 
Heydemann has concluded that it is the external dimension of states' war 
preparation strategies that is most defining in the Middle East. This is 
because wars did not lead to increased domestic resource extraction. As a 
result of the external financing of the war in the Middle East, war 
preparation did not cause a fiscal crisis and there was no need to bargain 
with the domestic constituencies. For Heydemann, this explains much of the 
differences in the state-making process in the Middle East compared to 
Europe. Heydemann also finds that a high level of external resources 
correlates positively with the intensity of militarization and authoritarian 
character of the regime. 59 
East. Brookings Institution, Washington, 1993. Rassler, Karen A. and Thompson, William 
R. "War making and State Making: Governmental Expenditures, Tax Revenues and Global 
Wars. " The American Political Science Review, Vol. 79, No. 2, June 1985, pp. 491.507. 
58 Heydemann, War, Institutions and Social Change in the Middle East, p. 12. 59 Ibid, p. 24. 
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Another notable difference is the nature of wars themselves. Despite the fact 
that the Middle East in particular has had a very unstable regional system, 
the Arab states did not have as threatening an external environment as states 
in Europe. According to Thies, developing states have not faced existential 
threats to their statehood or engaged as much in actual war-waging, 
therefore the states are structurally smaller and internal divisions and 
instability are commonplace. The regimes did not reap the benefit of uniting 
the population under the same political culture with the aid of wars. A case 
study from Africa by Jeffrey Herbst appears to confirm this. As borders of 
the new states were guaranteed and they faced no serious threats to the 
statehood, African states became weak. They have inefficient fiscal policies 
and a poor tax system. By the same token, stronger states developed in Asia 
as a result of war-waging. 60 
Ian Lustick argues that the reason why "state-making wars" did not appear 
in the Middle East is that the international involvement contained conflicts 
and prevented "state-building wars". According to him, the absence of a 
threatening external environment explains why the states are weak in the 
Middle East. 61 This difference would lead us to conclude that the lack of 
wars resulted in persistent authoritarianism in the Arab world because 
intense war-waging did not create political unity and necessary bargaining 
with the population. Because the external environment was not as 
threatening, and the fact that the states engaged more in war preparation 
then actual war-waging, logically meant that if access to external resources 
existed, there was no reason for extensive domestic resource extraction and 
broader participation. 
Although it is true that the states in the Middle East did not face an 
existential crisis due to their internationally guaranteed sovereignty, it can 
not be said that the security environment was not threatening. The external 
environment of the Arab states has been dominated by wars or, at best, by 
60 Thies, "State Building, Interstate and Intrastate Rivalry: A Study of Post-Colonial 
Developing Country Extractive Efforts, 1975-2000", pp. 57-59. 61 Lustick is reviewed in ibid, p. 57. 
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cold peace. In fact, there is a high degree of normalization of the state of 
war. For this reason, wars in this region must be treated as a state of 
condition at the core of the Middle Eastern politico-military environment. 62 
Concrete decade-long war-waging and the threat of war/war preparation 
again, then, seem to impact differently on the state-making process and they 
must be separated in analysis. In this kind of a situation, the need for war 
preparation has been often defensive rather then offensive. Perthes has 
researched how Syria, for example, has actually engaged in war preparation 
with the aim to avoid actual war-waging. 63 Even though this state of 
condition has not led to continuous, decade-long existential wars, it has 
borne influence on state-making through the war preparation need against 
external threat and rivalry. What influence, then, does this kind of external 
environment have, where war preparation rather than war-waging is 
prominent? 
Empirical studies provide the following conclusions. Thies has argued that 
external rivalries prompt the state to extract more revenues than it otherwise 
could, but this has not led to the development of strong states. Thies states 
that rivalries are indeed not as effective as actual wars for states' fiscal 
policies and resource extraction. M According to him, the states would still 
benefit from war preparation to their state-making or regime consolidation 
attempts. The impact can, however, also be contrary. War preparation can be 
costly and it can render a regime's position unstable. Michael Barnett has 
analyzed the effects of war preparation on Israel and Egypt, and in both 
cases wars and threats from the external environment led first to the building 
of a strong state power before 1967, but after this it was the principle reason 
for a decline in state power. 65 Both Israel and Egypt experienced a change in 
government as a result. This, however, can be much due to the costs of 
actual wars. Barnett discovered that Israel and Egypt used external threat to 
62 Owen, Roger. "The Cumulative Impact of Middle Eastern Wars". In Heydemann, War, 
Institutions and Social Change in the Middle East, pp. 325-335. 63 Perthes, "Si Vis Stabilitatem, Para Bellum. State Building, National Security, and War 
Preparation in Syria", pp. 159-165. 
64 Thies, "State Building, Interstate and Intrastate Rivalry: A Study of Post-Colonial 
Developing Country Extractive Efforts, 1975-2000", p. 68. 65 Barnett, Confronting the Costs of War. Military Power, State and Society in Egypt and 
Israel, pp. 13,17. 
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extract more and had to bargain and give economic rewards to achieve their 
war preparation aims. 66 The conclusion of Gongora confirms the argument, 
according to which war preparation can be costly for regime stability. He 
says that war in the Middle East over-bums the state, which loses its 
legitimacy. 67 These studies conclude that wars and war preparation can both 
strengthen or weaken state power. 
Obviously the impact of war preparation is dependent on the resources of 
the state. One can assume that when a state is weak, it needs to resort to 
participatory strategies in order to regain legitimacy or extract the necessary 
resources to gain strength. If this is done domestically, it requires 
participatory strategies. 
As regards the institutional effects of war preparation, there are studies that 
conclude that wars or war preparation can enhance authoritarianism. 
Thompson argues that frequent participation in warfare tends to concentrate 
political power within a state because war-making encourages and often 
rewards more authoritarian approaches to resource mobilization and 
decision-making. Relatively peaceful regions can facilitate the gradual 
expansion of the political participation process. According to him, political 
systems in regions characterized by high conflict will tend to become more 
authoritarian. 68 Gause has also noted that the larger the size of armed forces, 
the higher the level of authoritarianism. Gause finds that Egypt, Syria, 
Jordan and Iraq have been most intensively involved in conflicts, but they 
have no history of democratic processes, with the exception of Egypt and 
Jordan that took some steps after the demise of major conflicts. 69 
"Barnett is reviewed in Thies, "State Building, Interstate and Intrastate Rivalry: A Study 
of Post-Colonial Developing Country Extractive Efforts, 1975-2000", p. 57. 67 Gongora, Thierry. "War Making and State Power in the Contemporary Middle East". 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3, August 1997, pp. 323-340, p. 
335. 
68 Thompson William R. "Democracy and Peace, Putting the Cart Before the Horse? 
International Organization 50,1, Winter 1996, pp. 141-174, p. 144. 69 Gause, "Regional Influences on Experiments in Political Liberalization in the Arab 
World", p. 285-286. 
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To conclude, based on the existing research conclusions, the external 
security environment appears to have had a fundamental effect on Arab 
states by establishing the state system, by containing war-waging and by 
financing war preparation. External actors can also be more concretely 
involved in influencing the political system or a state by aiding specific 
regimes or rivalries between competing elites. Wars and war preparation 
deriving from external threats have an impact on state strength or weakness 
depending on the level and strategies of resource extraction for war 
preparation. War preparation can enhance authoritarianism or promote 
adoption of more participatory strategies. From the previous analysis it can 
be noted that war preparation may influence the political system by 1) 
influencing the fiscal policies of the state; 2) concentrating political power; 
and 3) enhancing the coercive apparatus of the state and promoting 
militarization, namely role of the army in politics. According to Gause, war 
preparation affects the state structures in addition by 4) suppressing 
opposition; and 5) creating greater state control of the economy and limiting 
the private sector. 70 
Without understating the level of external threat to the Arab states, it must 
also be considered to what extent the regimes use external threat deliberately 
for enhancing their power. For example, Tilly himself has said that 
"governments themselves commonly stipulate, stimulate or even fabricate 
threats of external war" for their own ends. 71 Considering that the external 
threat is, as already stated, not directed at the state, as the states' sovereignty 
is guaranteed by international law and external actors, external threat is in 
the end directed at the regimes. Considering also that the aim of state- 
making is to consolidate the regime, war preparation would seem to advance 
this aim if it dilutes external threat and enhances regimes' domestic standing 
at the same time. Regime calculations related to their external threats and 
needs for war preparation should not be excluded. 
70 Ibid, p. 286. 
71 Tilly, Charles. "War Making and State Making as organized Crime. " In Evans, Peter B. 
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich and Skocpol, Theda (Eds. ) Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 169-187, p. 171. 
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Heydemann argues that war preparation was a means of conscious domestic 
social control and social mobilization for the regimes: "This strategy binds 
the process of state building, state institutional formation and organization 
of state capabilities to the maintenance of a level of threat, sufficient to 
permit regimes to extract rents from regional and international alliance 
networks. s72 Perthes has argued that war preparation indeed was a function 
of state-making in Syria. The building of a security state was deliberate, 
because it brought social and political benefits, and it was possible to be 
subsidized by external resources. He says that "... state-building and 
strengthening of the means of national security can not be separated in 
Syrian case. "73 Also according to Quilliam, rivalry with Israel was very 
linked to state consolidation. 74 It can be assumed, therefore, that although 
the external threat was real, the regional strategic situation was used for 
domestic control and it has had an impact on the political system. 
2.3 Influence of external rents to state-making 
"... nature of the sources of the income of the state influences the basic rules 
of political life in each individual country. "75 
As already mentioned, an important difference to the state-makers in the 
Arab world compared to the Europeans is that resource extraction has not 
primarily been conducted domestically, but externally. 76 The Arab states 
have been dependent on external aid and other revenue in their state-making 
as Lisa Anderson has noted. 77 The availability of external revenues resulted 
in a situation in which states did not need to increase domestic taxation. This 
72 Heydemann, War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East, pp. 13-14. 73 Perthes, Si Vis Stabilitatem, Para Bellum. State Building, National Security, and War 
Preparation in Syria", pp. 150-151. 74 Quilliam. Neil. Syria and the New World Order. Reading: Ithaca Press, 1999, p. 63. " Luciani, "Allocation vs. Production States: a Theoretical Framework", p. 67. 76 This observation has also been made for example by Heydemann and Schwartz. See 
Heydemann, War, Institutions and Social Change in the Middle East, p. 12 and Schwartz, 
State Formation Processes in Rentier States: The Middle Eastern Case, pp. 23-24. "Anderson, Lisa. "State in the Middle East and North Africa". Comparative Politics, Vol. 
20, No. 1, October 1987, pp. 1-18, p. 10. 
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conclusion leads to the failure of state-making models based on European 
experience to explain state-making process in the Middle East, and indeed in 
any developing country that relies heavily on external aid and rents. 
External extraction of resources seems to have a clear impact on state 
powers versus those of the society, and therefore also on participation. 
The state that relies on income from abroad, such as oil exports, 
transportation infrastructure of international relevance and economic, 
military and political aid (even these often include limits in allocation) is 
called a rentier state. 78 In the early stage of statehood, most Arab states 
relied on subsidies from the former colonial powers. Later, many Arab states 
were able to gain external revenue from oil exportation, which gave states 
their own resources for state-making. 79 States that did not have oil of their 
own benefited to various degrees from aid and worker remittances from the 
oil-rich countries. 
In rentier states where income for the state comes from abroad, allocation is 
the only relationship needed for domestic economies. Luciani has called 
such countries allocation states, whose "revenue derives predominantly 
(more than 40 %) from oil or other foreign sources and whose expenditure is 
a substantial share of the GDP"80 External revenues strengthen the 
autonomy of the state and allow it to spend on defence, internal security and 
an extensive welfare system. These increase the coercive abilities of the 
state and ability to `buy' legitimacy by allocation. 8' 
In an allocation state, the political game is entirely different to that of a 
production state, in which the domestic economy is the financial basis for 
'a Rent is defined as "the income derived from the gift of nature". Beblawi, Hazem, "The 
Rentier State in the Arab world. " In Luciani. The Arab State. London: Routledge, 1990, pp. 
49-62, p. 85. Worker remittances do not make a rentier state, but a rentier economy, 
because they are not resources of the state, Luciani, Giacomo. "Allocation vs. Production 
States: a Theoretical Framework. " In Luciani, The Arab state, pp. 65-84, p. 72. 79 Luciani, "Allocation vs. Production States: a Theoretical Framework", p. 66. 80 Ibid, p. 72. More on different rents, Beblawi, Hazem, "The Rentier State in the Arab 
world", pp. 87-97. 
81 Brynen, Rex. "Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab world: The 
Case of Jordan. " Canadian Journal of Political Science, No. 1, March 1992, pp. 69-97, p. 
74. 
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the state's functions. An allocation state gains more independence, and the 
gap between state and society can remain wide even as the state-making 
process advances. According to Lisa Anderson, this is because socio- 
economic forces do not constitute the political regime as in a production 
state, but the political regime allocates goods and services based on other 
grounds than citizens' position in the economy, namely on the grounds that 
best maintain the power basis of the regime, for example on loyalty, family, 
tribal or ethnic grounds. States actually created the dominant class by 
controlling wealth creation and power. Therefore, the state is not dependent 
on internal economic flows or pressed by a powerful class. The state is also 
not a battleground for competing economic interest groups who wish to gain 
most of the domestic economic growth, but a society of groups receiving a 
varying share of the allocation of the state revenues. 82 Luciani argues 
similarly, that the aim of the allocation state is not to maximize economic 
growth, or to have a satisfying economic policy. This way the state does not 
develop into an accountable servant of societal forces83 but remains an 
important economic actor itself, on which the social forces are dependent. 
A production state needs taxation to gain resources for state-making. 
Taxation increases participation, because people guard their economic 
interests. In an allocation state, taxation is mostly not needed, as already 
concluded. The higher the amount of rent of the per capita income, the less 
dependent the states/rulers are on domestic production for revenues and the 
demands of the citizens. 84 State spending satisfies the economic needs and 
even competition for state spending does not appear to lead to demands for 
participation. Despite the fact that state resources are often unequally 
distributed within society, demands for participation do not seem to 
increase. According to Luciani, unequal allocation is not a sufficient 
ding incentive to attempt to change political institutions. 85 Instead of dem an 
participation, people are likelier to manoeuvre for more benefits and 
82 Anderson, Lisa. "A Review of Recent Studies on Oil and State Formation in the Middle East". 
Journal of International Affairs. Vol. 53, No. 1, Fall 1999, pp. 351-354. 83 Luciani, "Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework", p. 71. 84 Anderson, "A Review of Recent Studies on Oil and State Formation in the Middle East", 
pp. 351-354. 
Luciani, "Allocation vs. Production States: a Theoretical Framework", pp. 75-76. 
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personal advantage in other ways. Calls for participation do not therefore 
increase in a state-making process in allocation states. Opposition grows 
only if the external revenues fall or if the regime can be accused of 
corruption. 86 Rentierism has been concluded to lead to low levels of 
participation. 87 
It is noteworthy, however, that rentierism has not been a guarantee for 
regime security as the cases of Iran and Algeria attest, but according to 
Gause, it has reduced the need to control political demands for 
democratization. Rentierism has increased the ability to spend on social 
groups and coercive apparatus. 88 It has also been argued that neo- 
patrimonial and clientelist structures, in other words vertical stratification, is 
enforced in a rentier state. Tribal, sectarian and ethnic cleavages may also 
become more apparent. 89 When a rentier state becomes the main economic 
actor, the private sector also becomes tied to the state. These structures tie 
social groups to the state as they are seeking their share of the government 
allocation and the entire society is very tied to the state. 90 
If the external extraction declines, and a state faces problems in allocation, 
regimes need economic and political strategies to overcome this crisis that 
threatens to rock its autonomy. Regimes have used mixed measures for 
revenue extraction and political stabilization. First, the regimes aim to build 
new alliances for external extraction and find new sources of loans, aid, 
trade opportunities, investments and joint ventures. 91 If income is not 
guaranteed, then regimes use economic restructuring. According to Barnett, 
86 Ibid, pp. 65. 97 See for example the following articles: Luciani, Giagomo. "The Oil Rent, the Fiscal 
Crisis of the State and Democratization. " In Salame, Ghassan. (Ed. ) Democracy without 
Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World. London: I. B. Tauris, pp. 130- 
155. Ross, Michael L. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy? " World Politics, Vol. 53, No. 3, April 
2001, pp. 325-361. 
88 Gause, "Regional Influences on Experiments in Political Liberalization in the Arab 
World", pp. 291-292. 
89 Brynen, "Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab world: The Case 
of Jordan", p. 74. 
90 Knowles, Warwick Malcolm. Changing Patterns of Rent: State, Private Sector and 
Donors in Jordan, 1989-2000, Thesis (PhD), University of Durham, 2001, pp. 14-15. 91 The rent-seeking mentality has been discussed in broad literature on rentierism. Seeking 
investments has become an option for foreign revenue in the latest decades by the liberalizing 
global economy. 
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accommodational and restructural economic strategies are used if a regime 
fails to create income for war preparation. The same could be said of a 
situation in which a rentier state loses a significant amount of its external 
revenues. Accommodational strategy is a minor adjustment, whilst 
restructural strategy is a deep, structural socio-economic change. 
92 Brand 
argues that if regimes use a restructural strategy, the state tries "... to create a 
new mix of agriculture, commerce, and industry, or the introduction of new 
industries, new attempts at raising revenues and fees, or perhaps cuts in state 
services and allocations. " She argues further that domestic economic 
reforms are a last resort, due to the possible opposition by powerful groups 
that can threaten regime security. "So as not to rock the domestic boat, 
foreign rather than domestic policy options may be the first choice of a 
"93 regime in dealing with economic crises. 
Certainly, in a situation in which external resources are not sustainable and 
regimes fail to diversify and find new external resources, this will have an 
effect on budget security and undermine regime security. If external 
revenues fall and there are no substitutes, domestic resource extraction must 
be increased, which requires domestic adjustment or restructural strategies 
to maintain the same level of budget income. Alternatively, state spending 
must fall, which would have more direct impact on the socio-economic 
setting of the society and patrimonial structures. 
In any case, economic problems that threaten a regime's budget security and 
its very autonomy constitute a crisis of legitimacy domestically. The 
inability of the state to provide, allocate and maintain the existing economic 
benefits will compromise its legitimacy and arouse reactions from political 
criticism to unrest and direct challenge to the regime. 94 Regimes need to 
92 Barnett, Confronting the Costs of War. Military Power, State and Society in Egypt and 
Israel, pp. 31-32. 
93 Brand, Laurie A. Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations. The Political Economy of Alliance 
Making. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, pp. 35-37. 94 Ehteshami and Murphy have shown how in the event of weakening of the corporatist 
structures in a liberalizing process, the criticism has increased and protest has been 
channelled especially through the Islamist parties. Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Murphy, 
Emma. "Transformation of the Corporatist State in the Middle East". Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 4,1996, pp. 753-772. 
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resort to domestic extraction or adjustment strategies to substitute the lack of 
revenues and dilute criticism, but the very domestic economic strategies 
adopted themselves will affect the political scene and can also undermine 
regime security. For this reason, the economic adjustment or restructural 
strategies are often insufficient, and regimes also need to resort to political 
reforms as a means to gain legitimacy. The political strategies can include, 
for example, broadening the regime's support base by co-option, increasing 
political participation to include new socio-economic groups either through 
minimal strategies such as appointments, or for example, through 
patrimonial structures or representative institutions. 
Regimes' strategies in reacting to crises of legitimacy in the Arab countries 
can be observed in the broad literature that has studied economic 
liberalization policies and their impact on political participation. We know 
from the previous studies that economic liberalization has been the main 
reaction to a fall in external revenues in the 1980s and 1990s. Political 
strategies have mainly comprised the use of cooption or a minor broadening 
of representation, such as revitalizing the institution of parliament, as in 
Jordan in 1989 and Saudi-Arabia in 1991, or increasing the number of seats 
in parliament as seen in Syria in 1991. 
2.4 Regional and international position 
The nature of external threats (and need for war preparation) and availability 
of external revenues (and need for domestic extraction) depend on a state's 
regional and international position. States' alliances and rivalries, 
engagement and isolation, influence their ability to dilute the pressures and 
maximize the benefits of the external environment for securing the state and 
the regime strategically and economically. They either help or hinder a 
regime's attempts to increase regime autonomy and suppress opposition. 
The needs of states from the external environment depend on the level of 
state-making. When state-making is in its earlier stages, the domestic needs 
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are very pressing. According to Ayoob, foreign policy of developing states 
95 is very much driven by domestic needs and constraints. Robert Good says 
similarly, "foreign policy of a new state seeks to effect its international 
environment in ways favourable to the building of the state and to the 
maintenance of the regime in power. " 96 
Bruce Moon argues that the aim of late state-makers is not to pursue 
"national interest" - as assumed by the realist school - but rather the interest 
of the state over the nation. A state's interest is not deeply rooted in the 
society. 97 Because the powerful economic groups that would drive their 
independent economic interests are lacking, the state itself has broad 
economic interests. Indeed, according to Moon, the state has interests that 
are exactly the same as those of private capital. The state is the main 
investor and employer. "In an environment where the state is at least as 
important a determinant of material success as the market, rent-seeking 
behaviour concentrated on control of the state is a rational response. "98 This 
serves to protect the regime from competition domestically. The state is not 
pursuing national interest, maximizing welfare for the society, but rather 
pursuing the interests of the state. As a result, the state behaves in a way that 
protects itself from domestic competitors". 99 
For foreign policy this means first that the state attempts to maximize its 
security and economic gains from the international level to maintain its 
93 Ayoob, Mohammed. The Third World Security Predicament. Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1995. For more literature of the domestic level as an explaining factor for 
foreign policy, see Hagan, Joe D. "Domestic Political Explanations in the Analysis of 
Foreign Policy. " In Neack, Laura, Hey, Jeanne A. and Haney, Patrick J. (Eds. ) Foreign 
Policy Analysis. Continuity and Change in its Second Generation. Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall, 1995, pp. 117-144. Müller, Harald and Risse-Kappen, Thomas. "From the 
Outside In and From the Inside Out. International Relations, Domestic Politics and Foreign 
Policy. " In Skidmore, David and Hudson, Valerie (Eds. ). The Limits of State Autonomy: 
Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation. Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, pp. 25- 
48. Moon, Bruce. "The State in Foreign and Domestic Policy. " In Neack, Laura, Hey, 
Jeanne A. and Haney, Patrick J. Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its 
Second Generation. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1995, pp. 187-200. 96 Good, Robert C. "State-Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States". 
In Martin, Laurence W. (Ed. ). Neutralism and Nonalighnment: The New States in World 
Affairs. / New York: Praeger 1962, pp. 3-12, p. 11. 97- "The State in Foreign and Domestic Policy", p. 192. 9' Ibid, p. 196. 
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independence from society. The regime also uses foreign policy to increase 
its legitimacy to rule. In addition to war preparation and external revenues, 
foreign policy can provide the means to enhance national pride, self- 
definition, domestic unity and the status of the ruler. 10° This often includes 
ideological devotions, such as anti-colonialism, the Palestinian cause or pan- 
Arabism. These legitimating attempts become especially important if they 
include military rivalry or conflict. Moon says that "legitimating appeals 
come in a variety of forms, often emphasizing an external. enemy against 
whom the state is seen as a unifying force. "101 The third way in which states 
use foreign policy is therefore to repress domestic opposition. External 
support against domestic opposition is one aim of foreign policy. 102 
One example of the use of foreign policy and external level for the domestic 
aims of the states has been provided by theories of unity projects. Mufti has 
argued that one specific method of using foreign policy against domestic 
opposition has been unity tendencies, in which sovereign states voluntarily 
form unities with others. He has showed how numerous unity projects have 
appeared (although only few have taken place) in the Arab world as a result 
of the lack of domestic stability of the regimes, in a phase of state- 
formation, in which states struggled for the maintenance of regimes against 
continuous coups, and the consolidation of their power. "It is the inability of 
ruling elites to consolidate their hold of power that has pushed them in a 
pan-Arab direction in search of legitimacy and support". 103 Unity projects 
therefore appear to offer one indication of a search for a solution for the 
domestic political system from the external environment. The usefulness of 
these projects, according to Mufti, lies in the ability to use the other 
countries' military, intelligence and financial resources against their own 
domestic opposition, to use the support for other countries' clients, to justify 
administrational changes in order to clear opposition representatives from 
officials, and to create ideological legitimacy and popular support 
10° Good, "State-Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States", pp. 5-8. 101 Moon, "The State in Foreign and Domestic Policy", p. 193. 102 Good. "State-Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States", pp. 11-12. 
Moon, "The State in Foreign and Domestic Policy", pp. 194-195. 103 Mufti, Sovereign Creations. Pan Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq, p. 2. 
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particularly to counter other challenging ideologies such as communism. 
After immediate consolidation, the unity projects normally cease. )°4 
At such a time when the regimes are not yet consolidated, domestic needs 
seem to indeed mirror and determine much of the behaviour towards 
external actors. As state-making advances, Mufti identifies a more "rational" 
foreign policy that responds increasingly to the external threats over 
domestic ones. 105 Indeed, the more the ruling elites become independent 
from society, the more rationally they seem to behave in foreign policy. The 
rationality of foreign policy and domestic consolidation closely affect each 
other. In the Syrian case, domestic consolidation was the reason behind the 
success of Syrian foreign policy after Asad came to power. A higher level of 
state-building was necessary for Syrian regional aims, but the means for the 
state-building came from the external environment. 106 
Analyses of Syrian foreign policy have shown it to be rational following the 
consolidation of Ba'athist power in the 1970s. Before that, the foreign 
policy was indeed a tool for domestic rivalries. 107 Increasing 
authoritarianism seemed to greatly advance independent rational foreign 
policy. Moshe Maoz with his `Sphinx of Damascus' and Patrick Seale in 
`Struggle for the Middle East' were among the earliest advocates of the 
rational foreign policy model, followed by several works of Raymond 
Hinnebusch and Volker Perthes. The logic of Syrian foreign policy is 
perhaps best captured in Hinnebusch and Ehteshami's work on Syria and 
Iran. They see that Syrian foreign policy has been based on rational 
responses to the external environment, seeking to accumulate as much 
power as possible to manage the challenges from regional and global 
environment. This rational foreign policy can be interpreted as a policy that 
aims to accumulate power or, if the state is weak, to manage or reduce its 
104 Ibid, pp. 7-8. 
105 Mufti, Sovereign Creations. Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq, p. 9. 106 Hinnebusch, Syria. Revolution from Above, p. 139. 107 Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Hinnebusch, Raymond A. Syria and Iran: Middle Powers 
in a Penetrated Regional System. London: Routledge, 1997, pp. 2-4,61-62. 
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vulnerability and maximize autonomy and sovereignty. 108 According to 
Hinnebusch, the rational nature of Syrian foreign policy was manifested in 
the scaling down of revisionist policies to suit the regional realities, the 
consistency in keeping rational goals and in the adaptation of strategies to 
regional realities. 109 Indeed, in the Syrian case, the foreign policy is seen as 
an ideal-type of realist foreign policy, given its high level of autonomy from 
domestic constraints. "" 
There is also a counter-argument, proposed for example by Daniel Pipes, 
according to which Syrian foreign policy is an ideologically driven 
revisionist policy that aims to legitimate domestic authoritarianism and 
challenge the West and moderate regimes in the region. ' 11 At the core of this 
argument is a notion that the authoritarian nature of the regime needs a 
revisionist foreign policy in order to "divert attention from domestic 
opposition". 112 According to this argument, Syrian interest in waging war 
against Israel and maintaining the state of war between the countries was not 
a reaction to the regional environment that was defined by Arab-Israel 
confrontation, but by Syrian domestic needs. Similarly, for example, the 
assumed Iranian nuclear drive after the Iraq war is explained by several 
neoconservative leaning scholars as a product of the need to maintain the 
power of the regime, rather than as a response to the US military threat and 
the new security balance in the Persian Gulf region after the fall of Saddam 
Hussein. ' 13 
This research follows the rational foreign policy argument and sees Syrian 
foreign policy responding to the systemic threats dominated by aims to 
overcome its inherent weakness and manage these threats! " It therefore 
108 Ibid, p. 15. See also Quilliam, Syria and the New World Order, p. 9. 109 Hinnebusch, Syria. Revolution from Above, p. 151. 110 Ibid, pp. 148-149. 
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2 Ibid, p. 16. 
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rejects the argument that Syrian foreign policy is driven by ideological 
needs to maintain domestic authoritarianism. The fact that this research 
views the linkage between external level and internal authoritarianism 
should not be confused with a domestic driven argumentation along the lines 
of Pipes. Indeed it is quite the opposite. The research argues that rather than 
domestic authoritarianism significantly affecting foreign policy, the external 
environment significantly affects domestic authoritarianism. Hinnebusch 
and Ehteshami also suggest that "Indeed, it is possible that external conflict 
may affect the internal politics more than the reverse. "115 This research aims 
to view how the impact of the external environment, mediated by Syrian 
rational foreign policy, has affected the Syrian domestic political system in a 
manner that enforced authoritarianism. One could even go as far as to argue 
that domestic consolidation was to some extent a by-product, as it was a 
necessary prerequisite for regional power. Hinnebusch argues that "Asad's 
power concentration was driven by foreign policy"'116 Syrian domestic 
weakness in the earlier years was seen as a result of domestic fragmentation. 
After this fragmentation was overcome, resources could be mobilized to a 
struggle against Israel. This suggests that the foreign policy was rationally 
driven, as the aim was to gain regional power. The domestic consolidation 
was a means to secure regional power, not vice-versa as the ideologically 
motivated foreign policy would suggest. The fact that the resources for this 
domestic consolidation came from external rents, as Hinnebusch argues, 117 
does not contradict the argumentation that the aim of enforcing domestic 
authoritarianism was regional supremacy. 
It should be emphasized, however, that although Syrian foreign policy is 
primarily rationally driven, it is not as much so as in developed countries. 
Hinnebusch and Ehteshami conclude that to date, the Arab states do not 
behave solely as `black boxes' as in realist theory in responding to external 
changes in their foreign policies, but their lower level of state-making in 
comparison to developed states is very clear in the formation of their foreign 
15 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran. Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional 
System, p. 17. 
16 Hinnebusch, Syria. Revolution from Above, p. 147. 117 Ibid, p. 147. 
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policies. ' 18 The clearest such domestically based factor appears to be 
economic and fiscal security. This particularly applies to economically weak 
and dependent states, rentier and allocation states. Luciani sees that for 
states that depend on external aid for their existence, foreign policy is the 
primary means of enhancing their power. For Luciani "the only relevant 
problem to an allocation state is extracting the maximum potential revenue 
from the rest of the world" implying that because the political legitimacy of 
the regime is based on allocation, the primary foreign policy aim is to secure 
the flow of rents for allocation. 119 Laurie A. Brand argues similarly that 
alliance-building in foreign policy should be seen as primarily motivated by 
a regime's economic security needs or in Brand's terms `budget security', 
that is crucial for regime security. 120 Syria is not dependent on external aid, 
but the search for economic security has indeed been relevant to Syrian 
foreign policy. The economic needs should not be over-emphasized, 
however. Particularly they should not be seen as supreme to maintaining 
security. Neither does the recognition of domestic economic needs in 
foreign policy need to contradict the rational foreign policy model. States 
react to the external security environment and aim to maximize their power, 
including economic gains. Again, external aid was mainly used to the end of 
enhancing regional power and forging a successful foreign policy. 
In the end, it is not a choice between the one or the other. As David 
famously put it, regimes have to `omni-balance' between external and 
domestic threats and needs. 121 Mohammed Ayoob has expressed similar 
sentiments. 122 For Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, foreign policy, "far from 
being irrational functions of domestic politics, reflects some balance 
" Hinnebusch, Raymond. The International Politics of the Middle East. Manchester and 
New York: Manchester University Press, 2003, p. 8. 119 Luciani, "Allocation vs. Production States: a Theoretical Framework", p. 76. 120 Brand, Jordan's Inter Arab Relations. The Political Economy ofAlliance Making, pp. 
15-38. 
121 David, Steven. "Explaining Third World Alignment", World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2, 
1991. 
122 See his book Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament. 
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between the conflicting requisites of raison d'etat, the maintenance of 
internal legitimacy, and economic health. " 123 
2.5 Framework for research 
The aim of this study is to research the influence of the main aspects of the 
external environment on state power in Syria and to show in which way the 
external level provides explanatory potential for a high level of 
authoritarianism or changes in it. The hypothesis of the research is that the 
external influence has contributed to the development of state power in a 
way that has prevented the development of participation. The particular 
aspects studied are external security and fiscal environment and the 
influence of certain external actors. The impact of the external security 
environment is taken to mean external threats to the state and regime 
security and strategies of war preparation. The impact of the external fiscal 
environment is taken to mean the abilities of the Syrian state to acquire 
external revenues through foreign trade (oil trade in particular) and 
economic aid and its effect on regime resource extraction strategies and 
economic policies. 
In addition to the focus on external factors, the originality of the thesis lies 
also in the methodology. This thesis aims to prove the hypothesis by 
showing how the Syrian international and regional position affected its war 
preparation and abilities regarding resource extraction. Secondly, this thesis 
views the ways in which particular war preparation and resource extraction 
strategies that Syria adopted enhanced the resources of the state, in terms of 
the state's fiscal, coercive and institutional capabilities. These resources then 
again contributed to the strength of the state versus society, and the nature of 
the political and economic order. State strength is seen to consist of 
autonomy, efficiency and legitimacy. This conceptualization of the 
123 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran. Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional 
System, p. 24. 
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influence of the external environment on the domestic sphere is original and 
gives a powerful methodological tool for analyzing the topic. 
The impact of the external environment on state power is mapped in the 
following table: 
Table 2: 
War pry aratlon --=- Rssaxci extraction 
Externe! strategies 
" Aißances. anus 
Domestic strategies 
- MiALiz. Xion \/ 
Extem ! strategies 
- External revenues 'aid. oil) 
Domestic strategies 
- Taxation. coudiol of pioduiction 
Fiscal capabilities 
Coercive capabilities 
Institutional cwifiiities 
Autonomy (coercive aiN1 füuicM a tonomy 
Efficiency lability to claige the society) 
Legitimacy Isuppoitl 
In the following section the methodology and data related to the analysis of 
the economy are viewed. The methodology in this research is employed to 
analyze the importance of external rents to state fiscal capabilities in order 
to study the amount of external revenues in relation to domestic revenues. 
As noted, the Arab states rely significantly on external revenue and many of 
them are to varying degrees 'rentier states'. The following section clarifies 
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the terminology on rent, rentier economy, rentier state economy and semi-124 
rentier state. 
According to Adam Smith, rents are rewards for the ownership of natural 
resources, including land and minerals. Later, the term has been extended to 
include the amount earned that is above the cost of production of the 
resource/service. "12 The types of rents can be varied and they have different 
effects on the domestic economy as can be seen from the following table: 
Table 3: 126 
Type of Rent Example 
Accrues to 
State/Private Sector 
Portfolio Dividends, State or Private 
Interest Sector 
External Capital Official State 
economic aid 
Quasi-Rents (Worker) Private Sector Remittances 
Natural 
Resources Oil, Phosphates State 
Locational Transit Trade State 
A state that relies significantly on external rents has a rentier economy. 127 
The rentier economy has three main areas of external rents: oil rent, foreign 
aid and remittances. The first two directly benefit the state, and the latter the 
private sector. A state that relies on significant rents from natural resources 
and foreign aid is a rentier state economy, as these rents contribute to the 
state. If a state relies mainly on oil rents, it is a `pure rentier state economy'. 
If it relies on foreign aid, it is an induced rentier state economy'. 128 The 
124 The following draws largely from Knowles, Changing Patterns c? f Rent: State, Private 
Sector and Donors in Jordan, 1989-2000. 
125 Knowles, Changing Patterns (#'Rent: State, Private Sector and Donors in Jordan, p. 8, 
citing Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. The New Arab Social Order: A Study c? %'the Social Impact (J 
Oil Wealth. Boulder: Westview Press, 1982, p. 2. 
126 Knowles, Changing Patterns of'Rent. State, Private Sector and Donors in Jordan, p. 8. 
127 Mahdavy, Hossein. "The Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier 
States: The Case of Iran. " In Cook, M. A. (Ed. ) Studies in the Economic Histo Y of the 
Middle East. From the Rise of /slum to the Present Day. London: Oxford University Press, 
1970, p. 428. 
128 Knowles, Changing patterns o/ Rent: State, Private Sector and Donors in Jordan, p. 
1I. 
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extent of the rentier nature is indicated by a larger sum of non-tax related 
revenue in comparison to tax revenue. A country can be described as having 
a full rentier state economy if its external revenues are over 50% of GDP. A 
semi-rentier state economy has external revenue of around 20-50% of the 
GDP. 129 
When analyzing the extent and type of rentierism, or fiscal capabilities of 
the state, significant problems with data occur. Here, the method of analysis 
is briefly described, the availability and reliability of data, problems related 
to them and the main sources used. 
The chapters on the Syrian international and regional position provide 
analysis of the economic gains for Syria from the external environment. The 
ability to gain aid revenues, fuel export revenues, to increase trade and 
attract foreign direct investments (FDI) are shown where relevant in each 
time period. Here the gains are presented in absolute terms that provide a 
more accurate picture of the actual economic gains or losses from the 
international and regional environment, while later figures are provided as 
% of GDP in order to analyze and compare them. 
The following chapters analyze the effects of the external environment on 
the fiscal capabilities of the state. Analysis of data on the fiscal capabilities 
of the state would be more accurate if it were possible to use data on actual 
revenues and expenditures of the state. This is impossible as Syria does not 
publish the final revenues and expenditures, only budget figures. 130 Budget 
figures are provided in the Syrian Annual Budget, available also at the 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and 
Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. According to Clawson, budget 
129 This definition is largely used in case examples. See for example Gause, "Regional 
Influences on Experiments in Political Liberalization in the Arab World", p. 291. 
130 "[Syria] does not publish year-end data reporting actual, as opposed to planned, 
spending, and offers few details on its debt profile. " Economist Intelligence Unit. Country 
Profile 1999-2000, pp. 16-17. "Budget figures always indicate a balanced budget, and no 
fiscal outturn figures are published. " Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Profile 2002, pp. 
15-16. 
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figures overstate receipts and understate expenditures. 13 1 The budget also 
excludes arms imports and its finance from aid, as well as some of the 
military expenditures. 132 Most importantly, the budget does not include oil- 
related income. 133 Moreover, planned budget figures are not as telling as the 
actual revenues and expenditures. 
A different approach is therefore taken to estimate the fiscal capabilities of 
the state and the importance of external revenues. The fiscal capabilities of 
the state are seen to consist of domestically extracted revenues and 
externally extracted revenues, which are both estimated separately. External 
revenues are estimated by counting the annual revenues from fuel exports 
and foreign aid. Fuel export income is based on figures provided by the 
World Bank. Foreign aid income is analyzed by using figures from the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and the World 
Bank. These revenues contribute directly to the state and therefore affect its 
rentier nature. Also, worker remittances based on International Monetary 
Fund and World Bank figures are estimated in order to see if they make a 
large enough contribution to affect the rentier nature of Syrian economy. In 
practice, only the fuel export revenues and aid revenues seem to have been 
important in Syria and only they affect state power directly, therefore they 
are used as indicators of external revenues. 
Usually the main indicator for foreign aid is Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) and Official Economic Assistance (OEA) reported by the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance 
Committee. ODA has been defined since 1979 as 
"those flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided 
by official agencies, including states and local governments, or by their 
131 Clawson, Patric. "Unaffordable Ambitions: Syria's Military Build-up and Economic 
Crisis. " The Washington Institute Policy Papers, No. 17, Washington 1989, p. 50. 
132 [bid, pp. 50,53 
133 "The government does not include in its budget details of revenue from oil, its largest 
single source of income, or of spending on the military, its largest single item of 
expenditure. " Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Profile 1999-2000, pp. 16-17. 
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executive agencies, each transaction of which meets the following terms: a) 
It is administered with the promotion of economic development and welfare 
of developing countries as its main objective, and b) It is concessional in 
character and contains a grant element of at least 25%. " 134 
OEA is a broader concept than ODA. It includes ODA and all official grants 
and loans that do not comply with the ODA rule of 25% of grant elements 
and concessionality. Therefore, it includes all International Monetary Fund 
and World Bank activities that do not otherwise fit within the definition of 
ODA. 
ODA includes different categories of aid. "ODA is not necessarily 
dispensed as a grant or loan, but can include a number of categories 
including project aid, programme aid, technical assistance, food aid and 
emergency or relief aid. Each type of aid can have different effects on the 
recipient country depending on a wide-ranging number of variables, such as 
the administrative capabilities of the country and the desirability/ 
appropriateness of the assistance. " 135 
The problems in using ODA or OEA figures is that only DAC member 
countries are obliged to report their aid to the ODA. 136 Other donors - of 
which mainly the Soviet block and OPEC/Arab countries are of major 
interest in the Syrian case - have done it on a voluntary basis. This is often 
said to be enough to claim that ODA covers all aid that the country has 
134 Knowles, Changing Patterns of Rent: State, Private Sector and Donors in Jordan, p. 26. 
135 [bid, p. 44. 
136 "Members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and 
Development Assistance Committee are not synonymous. The DAC developed from the 
Developmental Assistance Group (DAG), which was formed in 1961. The original DAG 
members were Belgium, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, The 
Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom, United States of America, and the Commission of 
the European Economic Community. They were joined by Austria, Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden to create the DAC in 1965. Since then the members have been joined by Australia 
(1966), Switzerland (1968), New Zealand (1973), Finland (1975), Ireland (1985), Spain 
(1991), Luxembourg (1992) and Greece (1999). Portugal withdrew in October 1974 and 
rejoined in 1991. " Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, "DAC 
Members, Date of Membership, and Their Aid at a Glance", Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development website. 
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received. However, all aid is clearly not reported. The difference in 
reporting of the aid figures is apparent if one compares the aid figures 
provided by the DAC and national governments that have received aid from 
OPEC countries or the Soviet block. For example, in the Jordanian case, the 
difference in Arab aid figures between the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committee and 
Jordanian Central Bank during the period of 1967 to 1973 is around 320%, 
total aid according to Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development being 47.4 million JD and 201.1 million JD according to the 
Jordanian Central Bank. 137 In the Syrian case, comparison with official 
government figures is not possible, as they are not reported. It can be 
assumed, however, that all the aid that Syria received has not been reported 
to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. According 
to Clawson, at least Soviet aid is not listed in Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development data. 138 On the other hand, the figures are 
also largely estimates and subject to political motivations and therefore not 
entirely reliable. The problem in reporting is also acknowledged by the 
DAC. t39 There is also a problem related to the demand of concessionality in 
ODA. Aid that is defined as falling within the ODA criteria has to be 
concessional. However, it is largely known that the aid from the Arab 
countries and agencies and from the Soviet Union was not concessional in 
the spirit of the definition of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development. Despite these shortcomings, in this research, ODA 
figures are used to indicate the amount of foreign aid that Syria received 
137 Comparison of figures is done by Knowles, Changing Patterns of Rent: State, Private 
Sector and Donors in Jordan, p. 28, based on the sources of Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, International Development Statistics, CD ROM 2000 
edition, (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) and Annual 
Report, (Amman: Central Bank of Jordan). 
138 Clawson, "Unaffordable Ambitions: Syria's Military Build-up and Economic Crisis. " p. 
54. 
139 E-mail correspondence with Ann Zimmerman, DAC, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development 7. November 2006. According to Zimmerman, currently the 
Arab donors that report their aid to Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development are Arab Bank for Economic Development (BADEA), Islamic Development 
Bank, (ISDB), OPEC, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. However 
Zimmerman says that there have been problems in reporting even during the latest years 
with these donors. Notable is that donors such as Qatar are not reporting to Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development even today. Of the earlier years there is no 
detailed information. 
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1970-2005, as the figures by DAC are the only systematic and existing 
source of information. The figures are, however, assumed to be 
underestimations. The aid is also not considered concessional to the extent 
that it would diminish the ability of the state to benefit from the aid directly. 
Figures related to fuel export revenues are based on data from the World 
Bank, OPEC and International Energy Agency. 
The estimation of domestic revenues is also problematic. First of all, the 
figures are again not actual revenues but from the budgets. Until 1999, the 
figures are based on World Bank figures, "total domestic revenues 
excluding grants". 140 Although according to the World Bank definition rents 
are included in this figure, aid and fuel export income are not assumed to be 
included in these estimations as discussed earlier. Since 1999, the 
Economist Intelligence Unit has been used as a source of information on 
government revenue. They rely on different Syrian government sources for 
their data (Central Bureau of Statistics; Ministry of Finance statements: 
Official Syrian government finances, budget outturn, Revenue, Syrian 
Bureau of Statistics, Statistical abstract: Government finances, Revenue). 
The reliability of any revenue data was discussed earlier. In addition, there 
is a problem of difference in the figures of the World Bank and the 
Economist Intelligence Unit. If compared, Economist Intelligence Unit (that 
has figures since 1995) had higher figures since 1997, as the table below 
indicates. In spite of this, Economist Intelligence Unit figures have been 
used since 2000 for estimating the domestic revenues in the absence of other 
systematic data. Oil revenues are not included in Economist Intelligence 
Unit figures. It is not clear if ODA is included, but it is assumed here that it 
is not included. ODA to Syria from 2000 has been less than one per cent, 
which renders the discrepancy small. 
140 "Revenue is cash receipts from taxes, social contributions, and other revenues such as 
fines, fees, rent, and income from property or sales". Grants are also considered as revenue 
but are excluded here. International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook and data files. World Development Indicators (Edition: April 2006). 
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Table 4: 
S. A. R. domestic revenues' share of GDP in 1992-2004 according to different sources (%) 
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Already, the method of analysis starts from aiming to create estimations. 
This is also necessary because of the assumed inaccuracy of the data. Where 
possible, the results of the analysis of the data are always compared to the 
existing estimations in the secondary sources. Generally, the economic data 
is relatively extensive on Syria. Patrick Clawson estimates in his first, and 
this far only, available comprehensive analysis on Syrian aid and military 
expenditures that the data available is as extensive as in middle level income 
countries generally. By 1989 he also finds no evidence of extensive 
manipulation of data for political purposes. As a proof of this, he points out 
that Syria has used a strategy of systematic and extensive publishing of data, 
instead of selective sample type of publishing. The systematic data does not 
appear to be manipulated, according to Clawson. 14' On the other hand, the 
Syrian Country Profile by the Economist Intelligence Unit argues that, for 
example, since 2001 has Syria overstated the domestic oil production figures 
in order to hide the illegal Iraqi oil imports. 142 
141 Clawson, "Unaffordable Ambitions: Syria's Military Build-up and Economic Crisis", p. 
50-52. 
12 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2003, pp. 33-34. 
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Overall, the data used in this research is not treated as fully accurate, rather 
as best estimates. Although detailed figures are used in this research, they 
are used in order to show trends and estimations. 
To analyze the extent of war preparation, data on military expenditures by 
Syria (based on figures by SIPRI) and arms imports to Syria (based on 
figures from the World Bank) are collected and translated into % of GDP in 
order to add them together to show an estimation of total military 
expenditure and in order to compare this figure with the estimated external 
revenues, domestic revenues and total revenues if counted by adding 
external and domestic revenues. This way, the extent of militarization can be 
shown. The financial burden to the fiscal capabilities of the state is also 
shown. Particularly, the amount of the total military expenditure funded by 
the external revenues can be shown. It is assumed that the military 
expenditures do not include figures related to security sectors other than the 
army. 
The analysis of the rentier nature and fiscal resources of the state is then put 
into a context of economic strategies of the regime and the overall economic 
environment. The rentier features of Syria are analyzed, as is the overall 
autonomy of the state from the society and domestic resource extraction. 
In addition to this analysis of the fiscal capabilities of the state, based on 
economic data, coercive and institutional capabilities are analyzed in every 
time period in focus. The development and maintenance of the coercive 
apparatus, meaning the military, intelligence and police, is studied both in 
figures and as an important pillar in the political system. 
Similarly, the other pillars of authoritarianism, the role of the party and the 
president, are analyzed, as well as the level of authoritarian and any liberal 
and democratic developments. This way, the effect of war preparation, the 
security environment and the external resource extraction on institutional 
capabilities is studied. 
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This provides the basis for the analysis of the autonomy, efficiency and 
legitimacy of the state. In the time period from the 1970s to 2000, the focus 
is mainly on state autonomy, because the strength of the state's autonomy 
during that period brought with it efficiency and legitimacy. However, since 
2000 there has also been a greater focus on efficiency and legitimacy as 
state autonomy declined, and some questions arose regarding the efficiency 
and legitimacy of the Syrian state. 
This research focuses on three different time periods. First, an analysis is 
made from the rise of the republic of Hafez al-Asad to the end of the Cold 
War at the end of the 1980s. The Syrian gains from its strategic 
environment, the impact on fiscal powers and the impact on coercive powers 
and state-building are analyzed in chapter 3. Chapter 4 analyzes the post- 
Cold War era from 1990 towards the end of the era of Hafez al-Asad in 
1999, much defined by regional peace-making. It focuses on the effect of 
the regional changes on the Syrian regime's fiscal and coercive powers and 
state structures. The last era in focus in chapter 5 is the era of President 
Bashar al-Asad from 2000 to 2005, a time period defined by growing 
external pressure and coercion. The chapter seeks to analyze the effects of 
the tense strategic environment on the regime and its fiscal and coercive 
powers and the political system. 
Thus far, the external environment has been viewed as a set of conditions in 
which states operate. Chapter 6 analyzes the impact of some chosen external 
actors to Syrian political system. It will also view the strategies of the Arab 
regimes in general and the Syrian regime in particular to overcome the 
effects of the external actors and their policies of democracy promotion. In 
Chapter 7, the results of the research are concluded. 
In the end, it bears note that by no means does this research aim to claim to 
build a comprehensive presentation on how the external environment has 
impacted the Arab states, or Syria in particular, and their political systems. 
Rather, some of the most important aspects of the general external 
environment are selected and studied. Particularly, this research leaves the 
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cultural aspects and diffusion of values aside, as well as the effect of 
international actors and international and non-governmental organizations, 
including the United Nations, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, which have had the most significant effect on state power 
and state-society relations in the Arab countries, less so however in Syria. 
I/ 
56 
3. External influence on Syrian authoritarianism during the Cold 
War 
3.1 International and regional gains and pressures 
This chapter reviews the main external pressures and opportunities for 
Syria between 1970 and 1990 and studies the way in which the Syrian 
regime used the external environment to maximize its security and financial 
benefits. During this era, the Syrian external environment was defined by 
intense military rivalry and the aim to regain the lost territory in the 1967 
war with Israel. The military rivalry and the political aim to regain territory 
were the basis of Syrian foreign policy for decades to come and they also 
defined the direction of Syrian domestic politics. During this period, Syria 
grew from a weak state vulnerable in the face of regional conflicts and 
external pressures into a state that had an important role in the region both 
politically and militarily. At the same time Syria, overcame its domestic 
vulnerability, and decades of changing regimes was substituted by the 
authoritarian rule of the Ba'ath party and President Hafez Al-Asad. This 
chapter analyzes the gains and losses from the external security and fiscal 
environment for Syria that are argued to be at the core of the build-up of the 
authoritarian state. 
From independence, the Syrian external security environment was 
extremely threatening. Syria's regional and international position was 
defined by weakness in the face of extra-regional powers and regional 
conflict. The influence of the old colonial powers continued to be strong 
and the weak new states in the region suffered from numerous coup 
attempts aided by extra-regional superpowers or neighbouring states. In 
addition, the establishment of Israel in 1948 and the Arab-Israeli conflict 
that followed formed the foundation of the security politics of the region. 
The dynamics of the security politics changed, however, ahead of the rise 
of Hafez al-Asad to power. More recently, from the 1960s, the presence of 
the Cold War superpowers complicated the regional security politics. More 
57 
importantly, the war of 1967 with Israel changed the borders of the region. 
It created an Arab quest for regaining the lost territories and to balance the 
Israeli military power. This created an enormously threatening external 
security environment. Indeed, Syria was involved in Arab-Israeli wars in 
1967,1970,1973 and 1982. The Arab-Israeli conflict also erupted in the 
form of several asymmetric conflicts affecting Syria at least indirectly. 
Syria was directly involved in asymmetric conflicts in Lebanon from 1976, 
as well as in the Jordanian-Palestinian conflict in 1970. Aside from actual 
wars and asymmetric conflicts, all states in the region, Syria included, were 
involved in military rivalries and rivalries of regional hegemony. As a 
result, the Syrian external environment was very much defined by war 
preparation and war-waging. 
Syrian foreign policy from 1970 was about gaining more regional power to 
manage the threats from the external environment, promote sovereignty and 
to challenge the Israeli regional position. 143 The aim to gain regional power 
is a logical consequence of a rational foreign policy, according to which in 
an anarchical world order, states aim to acquire power and balance against 
the attempts of other states to extend their dominance. Regional power 
accumulation was especially motivated by the Arab-Israel context, to rival 
Israel and the inter-Arab context, to rival for Arab leadership. Gaining 
regional power was also motivated by the aim to increase sovereignty and 
reduce dependence on the international level, a chronic problem of weaker 
third world states. 
External security and fiscal environment in the context of the Cold war 
The aim to promote regional power was achieved through the building of 
international and regional alliances for security and resource accumulation. 
Building meaningful international alliances was possible because of the 
143 For more, see for example Hinnebusch, Raymond. "The Middle East Regional System". 
Hinnebusch, Reymond and Ehteshami, Anoushiravan(Eds. ). Foreign Policies of the Middle 
East States. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2001, pp. 29-55. 
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Cold War. The Cold War affected the region in two major ways. 144 On the 
one hand, the Cold War prevented wars and maintained the status quo, and 
therefore maintained the conflicts and prevented state-making wars. On the 
other hand, Cold War rivalry allowed the states in the region to acquire 
alliances, aid and means for war preparation, which intensified existing 
conflicts. 
The superpowers made great efforts to prevent wars in the region. The 
superpowers contained expansionist states and much of the actual war- 
waging in the region. 145 The clearest example of this was the unwillingness 
of the Soviet Union to arm the Arab states, especially Syria and Egypt, 
sufficiently in order to allow them to overcome Israeli military force by 
giving sufficient means for war-waging. '46 This allowed the status quo and 
military rivalry to continue. Although the Cold War did not define the 
security politics of the region, the impact of the superpowers was 
substantial, as has been the impact of all external actors influencing the 
Middle East. 147 The external powers legitimized the states and regimes as 
well as the state system. This, in addition to the prevention of actual war- 
waging, ensured that state-making wars did not take place. 
144 The Cold War has been said to have influenced the Middle East, but the impact should 
not be exaggerated. Sayigh and Shlaim (Eds. ), The Cold war and the Middle East. The 
same has been argued by Brown in Brown, Carl. L. International Politics and the Middle 
East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game, London: I. B. Tauris, 1984. For a Cold War history of 
the Middle East, see also Gerges, Fawaz A. The Superpowers and the Middle East, 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, Taylor, Alan. The Superpowers and the Middle East, 
Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991 and Lesch, David W (Ed. ). The Middle East and 
the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment, Boulder: Westview Press, 1996. 
145 According to Kinsella and Tillemma, arms transfers did not have significant impact on 
conflicts in the region. Kinsella, David and Tillema, Herbert K. "Arms and Aggression in 
the Middle East: Overt Military Interventions, 1948-1991". The Journal ofConfict 
Resolution, Vol. 39, No. 2, Jun. 1995, pp. 306-329. For example the Soviet Union preferred 
`a no war, no peace' situation. Shlaim, Avi. "Conclusion", In Sayigh, Yezid and Shlaim, 
Avi (Eds. ), The Cold War and the Middle East. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, pp. 279- 
293, p. 282. 
146 Seale, Patrick. "Syria". In Sayigh and Shlaim, The Cold War and the Middle East, pp. 
48-77, pp. 57,67. 
147 The influence of the Cold War on the Arab-Israeli sub-region, as on the region as a 
whole, was not very significant as a generator of wars, conflicts and rivalries. Threats were 
generated and experiences mostly at the regional and domestic level. The Cold War had 
indeed less impact on the Middle East than other regions. As Fred Halliday put it, conflicts 
and revolutions in the region were the context for the superpower competition in the Middle 
East not vice-versa. Halliday, Fred. "The Middle East, the Great Powers, and the Cold 
War". In Sayigh and Shlaim. The Cold War and the Middle East, pp. 6-26, pp. 16-17. 
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The Cold War did, however, intensify the already existing regional disputes 
and rivalries. 148 This is particularly the case with the Israel-Arab conflict, in 
which the superpowers were involved by arming the competing sides. Syria 
gained significantly from superpower rivalry by being able to manipulate for 
aid and deterrence. 149 Other states in the region also gained significant 
economic and military benefits from external actors. According to Shlaim & 
Sayigh, "far from being only the passive `receivers' of superpower dictates, 
the local actors also exerted an active influence on the course of the Cold 
War...,, "5° Almost all cases in their edited volume illustrate the relative 
advantages that the domestic elites were able to gain from the international 
level. Regional actors pursued their interests conditioned by the context of 
the Cold War. At the same time, superpowers provided arms, gave 
economic aid and promoted their ideologies to maximize their influence. '5' 
Syria benefited from the Cold War environment and was able to increase its 
regional power through alliance with the Soviet Union and alliances based 
on pan-Arab credentials. The alliance with the Soviet Union superpower 
brought 1) military security; 2) ability to engage in military rivalry; and 3) 
economic resources. All these affected the fiscal and coercive powers and 
legitimacy of the Syrian state, and were bound to also have a domestic 
impact. Before arguing how the Soviet relationship affected the Syrian 
regime, some analysis is needed of the history and debt of the relationship. 
The Syrian-Soviet alliance has been defined by Seale as having an initial 
honeymoon phase 1954-1958 and a marriage with ups and downs from the 
mid-1960s to the mid-1980s. '52 Soviet interest in the Middle East increased 
as a result of a need to contain the perceived threat from the American 
Baghdad pact from the mid-1950s. This resulted in the creation of "a 
Northern tier" of Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan and alliance with possible 
148 Dawisha, Adeed. "Egypt", In Sayigh and Shlaim (Eds. ), The Cold War and the Middle 
East, pp. 27-47, p. 46. 
149 Hinnebusch, Syria. Revolution from Above, p. 153. 150 Sayigh, Yezid and Shlaim, Avi. "Introduction". In Sayigh and Shlaim. The Cold War and the 
Middle East, pp. 1-6, p. 5. 
151 Ibid, pp. 5,279-281. 
152 Seale, "Syria", p. 49. 
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Arab countries, Egypt and Syria being most important of them. Syria was 
interested in a closer Soviet alliance as a result of its insecure position 
regarding its neighbours and domestic challengers. In addition to the Israeli 
threat, Syria needed protection, particularly against Turkish and Iraqi threat, 
and was indeed able to secure itself from possible military intervention by 
means of the announcement of Soviet military support for Syria in 1955 and 
1957. The relationship became more intense from the 1966 coup within the 
Ba'ath party, when the left wing seized power and approached the Soviets. 
The Soviet Union wished to safeguard the first left-wing Ba'athist regime 
for strategic purposes. 153 
Hafez al-Asad was, however, very critical of close relations with the USSR. 
Soviets were originally distrustful of his regime. However, after the initial 
crisis in relations, Asad convinced the Soviets of Syria's domestic and 
foreign policy and the countries' cooperation intensified significantly. '54 
The Syrian-Soviet alliance was not totally exclusive, although in practice the 
relations to the Western sphere remained few. '55 In the mid-1970s, Syrian 
and Soviet ties intensified also due to the fact that Egypt was allying with 
the US and had signed a peace agreement with Israel. 156 Syrian domestic 
instability towards the end of the 1970s also bore a significant impact on 
Syria's urge for intensified relations with the USSR. 157 In other words, Syria 
needed protection from external and domestic threats. In this context, Syria 
signed a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with the USSR in 1980 after 
long rejecting such formal agreements. 158 
153 The USSR declared in 1955 that it was to guard Syrian sovereignty and independence. 
Syria received Soviet arms from 1955 and the parties signed economic and technical 
a reement in 1957. Seale, "Syria", pp. 53-55,58. 
4 Karsh, Efraim. "The Soviet Union and Syria. The Asad Years. " Chatham House Papers, 
The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London and New York: Routledge, 1988, pp. 
3-9. 
155 Syria and the US cut diplomatic ties after the war in 1967 but there was a rapprochement 
in 1974. During a rare visit of an American President to Syria, the US also gave Syria 100 
million dollars in aid. Seale, "Syria", pp. 69-7 1. 
156 Karsh, "The Soviet Union and Syria. The Asad Years", pp. 19-20. 137 [bid, p. 47. 
158 The agreement was accompanied with significant economic aid by writing off 500 
million dollars of debts and largest military aid package that far. This started the more 
intensive Syrian military build-up. Politically, the Soviet commitment to Syrian foreign 
policy was however lowering. The USSR aimed to contain Syria, for example, in the crisis 
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The downhill slide of the marriage began with the Lebanon war 1982-1984. 
From this point on, Syria began to slowly lose its position as an exclusive 
ally, and the USSR became closer to Egypt and Jordan. This had a negative 
effect on Syrian regional power. The USSR also conditioned military and 
economic aid for the first time with supporting aims for peace in the 
region. '59 
The relationship has been defined by Karsh as the one of strategic 
interdependence, where Syria was not a client, but the Soviet Union was not 
pulled by the Syrians either. Clearly, Syria got more out of the 
relationship. 160 It should be noted that the Syrian alliance with the Soviet 
Union was not simply a result of Cold War divisions in world politics. The 
alliance was not of crucial interest to the USSR in the Cold War rivalry. 
Moreover, the alliance - as many other alliances in the Middle East during 
the Cold War - was formed to serve the purpose of power balancing by the 
regional states in Middle Eastern politics. Syrian motivation was therefore to 
achieve backing for its foreign policy vis-ä-vis Israel and its other regional 
adversaries. 161 Syria also effectively used and exploited its relationship with 
the USSR to support its regional objectives. 162 
Through this alliance Soviet Union not only secured the Syrian state but also 
the Ba'athist regime. The superpowers aimed at keeping the regimes in 
power that were strategically committed to stay on their side in the divided 
bi-polar world order. Therefore, protection of the state extended to the 
protection of the regime. As numerous examples from other parts of the 
world show, the security guarantee did not only concern external threats, but 
they could be extended to internal threats for the regime as well. Clear 
with Jordan 1980. Karsh, "The Soviet Union and Syria. The Asad Years", pp. 49,54-55, 
56. Karsh, Soviet Policy towards Syria since 1970, pp. 82-83. 159 Karsh, Efraim. Soviet Policy towards Syria since 1970. Basigstoke: Palgrave Macmillian 
1991, p. 84. 
160 Ibid, p. 96. 
161 Seale, "Syria", p. 49. 
162 For example during the Lebanese war Syria received large amounts of military aid, 
although this was not necessary due to war losses. Karsh, Soviet Policy towards Syria since 
1970, pp. 71-72. 
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knowledge of the Soviet commitment to keeping the Ba'athist regime in 
power in Syria is not available, although evidence can be found from 
studying some empirical cases. 
The Soviet Union secured Syria in both the 1967 and 1973 wars by actively 
working for a ceasefire when the Syrians were on the losing side. 163 In the 
event of the Lebanon war in 1982, the involvement of Soviet troops in 
support of Syria on Lebanese soil would not have been necessary according 
to the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, but the Soviet Union has been 
reported to have been committed to securing the Syrian regime from an 
Israeli attack, should Syria have been endangered. 'TM When the Ba'athist 
regime was threatened by the domestic outbreak of violence by Islamists 
from the end of the 1970s, Hafez countered the revolt not only by using 
military force but also by turning to Moscow with the aim of deepening the 
political commitment in the alliance. 165 
Secondly, the Soviet relationship aided Syria in engaging in military rivalry 
against Israel and other possible adversaries. The military side of the 
relationship was most important, according to Karsh. Altogether, Soviet aid 
to Syria was larger than to any other Middle Eastern country or indeed any 
country in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America or East Asia. 166 The Soviet 
Union aided Syria from 1955 with 20 billion US dollars in arms supplies 
and 4 billion in economic aid. Most arms were sold during peacetime, but 
the Soviets also supported Syria during wartime. 167 As a result, by the 
middle of the 1980s, the Syrian army was 11 % larger than the Egyptian, 
despite the fact that Syria was five times smaller as a nation if measured by 
labour force. 168 The arms sales declined only from the mid-80s due to Soviet 
lack of interest in Syrian military rivalry'and Syrian inability to pay. 169 
However, as already mentioned, the Soviets systematically disappointed 
163 Seale, "Syria", pp. 62,69. 
164 Karsh, Soviet Policy towards Syria since 1970, p. 70. 165 Seale, "Syria" p. 70. 
166 Karsh, Soviet Policy towards Syria since 1970, p. 94. 167 Ibid, p. 34. 
168 Ibid, p. 42. 
169 Ibid, p. 41. 
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Syria in refraining from providing enough arms to defeat Israel. 1 70 
According to Seale, the Soviets aimed for a status quo, a situation of no war 
and no peace. 171 
The following tables list military aid to Syria first by number of imported 
arms, second by value of arms imports in dollars. The data shows that the 
Soviet Union was the sole significant provider of arms to Syria. Most of the 
arms were imported between 1965 and 1986, ending almost completely 
after 1988.172 Motivated by changes in the strategic environment, the onset 
of the more significant arms imports coincides with the Ba'athist take-over 
of power in 1963 and, notably, the rise of the most leftist regime in Syria 
since 1966.173 As the first regime that managed to stabilize its rule 
following independence, the Ba'athists can be assumed to have benefited 
from these coercive resources domestically. Measured in dollars, the most 
expensive arms import seems to have been bought between 1981 and 1985. 
Most of the arms were funded by cheap loans or grants by other Arab 
states. 174 
Table 5: 175 
170 Seale, "Syria", p. 57. 
171 Seale, "Syria", pp. 57,67. 
172 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbooks (several years). 
173 The change in strategic environment demanded the USSR to strengthen its military presence 
(ports and airbases) in the region. Seale, "Syria", p. 58. 14 Karsh, Soviet Policy towards Syria since 1970, p. 47. 175 Only countries which sold more than 100 major weapons to S. A. R. during the period are 
included in the table. The register lists major weapons ordered by Syria during 1950-2004. 
Numbers ordered are systematically the same as numbers delivered, usually with around 
one or two years delay. Year(s) of deliveries occurs at maximum seven years after order. 
The weapons from USSR (and Russia) included aircrafts, helicopters, missiles, launchers, 
guns, tanks, ships and radars. From France, Syria received aircrafts, helicopters and 
missiles. From North Korea, Syria received rocket launchers and missiles. From Libya, 
Syria received aircrafts and tanks. From Egypt, Czechoslovakia, UK and the US Syria 
received mainly aircrafts. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI 
Yearbooks (several years). 
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Arms imports to S. A. R. in 1970-1989 
Source. SIPRI 
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Table 6: 1 76 
S. A. R. arms Imports in 1973-2003 (in millions USD) 
Source Clawson, 1989 (years 1973-1987) and worm Bank, 2005 (years 1988-2003) 
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Economic cooperation was much less important than military. 177 Economic 
cooperation was advanced by several agreements over the years. The Soviet 
176 Values for 1977 and 1978 are an average of the total value given for the two years. 
Source for the years 1973-1987: Clawson, "Unaffordable Ambitions: Syria's Military 
Build-up and Economic Crisis". Source for the years 1988-2003: World Development 
Indicators (September 2005) Arms imports (constant 1990 US$) in millions. 
177 Karsh, Soviet Policy towards Syria since /970, p. 52. 
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Union committed itself particularly to the development of' agriculture, 
infrastructure and transportation. 17S The Soviets aided the oil industry. 
railway and water resources, as well as giving economic assistance to cover 
the damage of the 1973 war and supporting irrigation projects, of which 
Euphrates Dam is the most well known. The Soviets also developed the oil 
sector. Syria provided small amounts of oil to the Soviets from 1972.17 
Accurate data on economic assistance is not available for this research. 
Syrian trade with the Soviet Union was small. The following table shows 
that the current European Union countries were the main trade partners 
already during the Cold War period. The trade with Eastern Europe was 
also, however, important. The trade with the Persian Gulf was very small. 
Notably, Syria also imported from the United States during the entire era. 
Table 7: 
Imports from selected countries to S. A. R. In 1970-1989 (%) 
Source IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, 2006 
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Table 8: 
Exports from S. A. R. to selected countries In 1970-1989 (°/a) 
Source IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, 2008 
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External security and fiscal environment in context of pan-Arabism 
Regionally, the pan-Arab ideology behind Syrian foreign policy was the 
primary means of resisting extra-regional interference and forging alliance 
building for territorial re-gains. Territorial re-gains included recovering 
occupied lands and the Palestinian rights based on the UN Security Council 
resolution 242 and recovering the occupied Golan. The strategy for gaining 
regional power was building military deterrence and alliances and extending 
spheres of influence against Israel. Asad used several instruments from war 
waging to negotiations and alliance formation to maximize his regional 
gains. Pan-Arab credentials and the commitment to the Palestinian cause 
were among the main tools for building alliances, waging war and extending 
spheres of influence. Asad's ability to maximize the regional gains has been 
seen to have been taken to the extremes as he was simultaneously allied with 
often rivalling parties such as the USSR, the Gulf states and Iran. 180 
From the 1950s, pan-Arabism opposed imperialism and Zionism and 
provoked Arab unity to stand against the challenge of the extra-regional 
180 Hinnebusch, Syria. Revolution from Above, pp. 151-152. 
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actors and Israel, also considered external to the region. This pan-Arab 
commitment forged by Nasserist Egypt built an alliance for the Palestinian 
cause that managed to increase Israeli isolation, although it did not form an 
effective military cooperation and action against Israel. 181 Most importantly, 
pan-Arab commitments lead to economic support for the front-line states 
like Syria from the oil-rich Gulf states against Israel and the extra-regional 
actors that lasted much longer than the actual pan-Arabism as an organizing 
principle of Arab politics. 
For Syria, the pan-Arab commitment was very coherent with the domestic 
ideology of state-building. The support for Arab unity served the purpose of 
domestic unity in an ethnically and religiously divided society. 182 The ruling 
ideology of Ba'athism from 1970 was directed at creating a national 
renaissance and Arab identity. However, the domestic influence can not be 
seen as most defining for support of pan-Arabism as the main ideology 
driving foreign policy. Pan-Arabism was a reaction to the external 
environment, an ideological legitimation of and mobilization for regional 
aims. 
Syrian national goals and Arab unity were seen to be the same. In the earlier 
days of the 1950s and 1960s, ideas of Greater Syria and the pan-Arab 
commitment were very much in line with each other. Later, pan-Arabism 
became focused on the liberation of Palestine. However, since Syria lost the 
Golan Heights to Israel in the 1967 war and had concrete territorial 
demands, Syrian - in contrast to Arab - interests started to play a major role 
in Syrian foreign affairs. Still, the ideological position was that the Syrian 
territorial interests and security needs and the pan-Arab cause were the 
same. Although the national and pan-Arab aims conflicted from time to 
time, policy based purely on Syrian interests did not exist. Indeed, Syria 
never reached a separate peace with Israel as Egypt did. 183 On the contrary, 
after the Egyptian peace deal, the Syrian Arab commitment translated into a 
181 Hinnebusch, "The Middle East Regional System", p. 37. 182 Hinnebusch, Syria. Revolution from Above, pp. 18-19. 
183 Hinnebusch, Syria. Revolution from Above, pp. 139-141. 
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policy that objected to, and actively prohibited, a separate peace agreement 
by any Arab country or the Palestinians with Israel without Syrian 
involvement. 184 
The security fallout from the pan-Arab commitment was two-fold. First, the 
search for Arab unity in conflict with Israel brought with it a quest for Arab 
and regional leadership. Egypt acquired this position, being the only Arab 
state able to counterweight the Israeli military power. The Syrian pan-Arab 
commitment, being "a front-line state" against Israel, brought it significant 
political weight as well. This weight translated to a perceived leadership role 
after Egypt signed a peace agreement with Israel in 1979. Syria became the 
first front-line state, and its political importance and military might grew 
accordingly. A previously weak state could now claim regional importance. 
Secondly, the pan-Arab commitment acted as a tool for alliance-building, 
and there was some joint effort for war preparation and actual war waging 
during the 1967 and 1973 wars against Israel. This increased Syrian external 
security by balancing with the Israeli military power. 
The economic fallout, very much related to the security fallout, was even 
more significant. The Arab cause brought the Syrian state the ability to 
extract resources for military build-up and enhancement of regional power. 
The Arab League collective aid was given to front-line states, mainly Egypt, 
--ý Syria and Jordan and the PLO from 1964. The financial aid was mainly for 
military purposes, but loans, deposits and investments were also given for 
civil economic development. 185 Arab aid started to increase from 1973 
because of the large oil income of the donors. Most aid was given between 
1975 and 1978. Syria benefited significantly from this aid as the second 
largest recipient. Between 1974 and 1978, Egypt received 30%, Syria 15% 
and Jordan 7% of Arab aid. After the 1979 peace between Egypt and Israel, 
Syria became the largest recipient gaining 30% of aid, Jordan gaining 21% 
184 Ibid, p. 155. 
185 Sela, Abraham. The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Middle East Politics and the 
Quest for Regional Order. New York: State University of New York Press, 1998, p. 26. 
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and Palestinians 11.4%. 186 Aid levels fell, however, after 1981 because 
Syria supported Iran in the Iran-Iraq war. The declining Arab aid from 1981 
was supplemented to some extent by Iranian aid, mostly in the form of free 
oil deliveries and grants that rose up to 1 billion dollars in some years. 
Syrian budget data shows that Syria received between 300 and 800 million 
dollars in Iranian aid from 1982-1986. This aid fell to 50 million dollars in 
1990 and zero thereafter. 187 The already reduced Arab aid decreased sharply 
in 1987.188 
The Arab aid was most significant to Syria during the Cold War. Some aid 
was also received from the USSR and the Eastern block and the Western 
countries. The following tables compare the amounts of aid that Syria 
received from different donors based on Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committee figures. 
The high level of Arab aid versus that of any other donor is easily 
noticeable. 
186 Ibid, pp. 25-26,367 and Hinnebusch, Syria. Revolution from Above, pp. 128-130. 187 Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Asad, pp. 33-35. 188 Sela, The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Middle East Politics and the Quest for 
Regional Order, p. 26. 
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Table 9: 
Total net ODA (OA) to S. A. R. In 1970-1989, in millions USD 
Source OECD/DAC 2006 
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Altogether, according to these figures, Syrian annual aid increased from 
some tens of millions of US dollars to around $500-800 million during 
1973-1978. rising enormously during 1979-1981 to around an annual 
$1500-1800 million. Aid declined from that point, falling from around 
annual $950 million in 1982 to around $650 million in 1987 annually. 
Subsequently, the aid levels witnessed a significant decline to less than $200 
million annually by the end of the decade. According to Clawson, Syria 
received $20 billion for military purposes from the Soviet Union and the 
Arab states between 1977-1988.11 billion US dollars were given in arms 
aid and $9 billion in civilian aid. In addition, Syria received normal aid of 
$11 billion (in both military and civilian aid). The remaining civilian aid 
came from international agencies ($900 million), western donors ($600 
million), Iran ($2 billion), Arab countries ($13 billion), Soviet Union ($3.5 
billion) and "banks, suppliers and unidentified sources". These figures by 
Clawson are somewhat higher than the ones presented here. 199 
189 Clawson, "Unaffordable Ambitions: Syria's Military Build-up and Economic Crisis", 
17. 
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Favourable trade terms ought also to be added to the financial benefits that 
Syria was able to extract from the Arab countries. The Arab countries were 
the second in importance in giving grants and loans for Syrian imports. 
According to Clawson, in 1977-1988,55% of the imports was covered by 
grants and loans from USSR ($23 billion), Gulf states ($12 billion), Iran ($3 
billion) and the West ($4 billion US). These also declined sharply in the 
1980s. 190 
Most aid was consumed by the military build-up, which will be examined in 
the next chapter. Civilian aid was also significant and it will also be assessed 
in the chapter. Although much of the aid was consumed by arms, much 
nonetheless remained for civilian use. Clawson has estimated how much 
Syria would have received in civilian aid without the military confrontation 
and compared it to the levels of aid Syria received on the basis of its pan- 
Arab commitment. According to him, Syria could have received up to 11 
billion dollars in civilian aid at most without military build-up during 1977- 
1988. During this time, Syria received 22 billion dollars. Clawson also 
estimates that around 11 billion dollars would have been spent for civilian 
purposes, with another 11 billion for military build-up. 191 
Syrian fuel exports also started during the Cold War, accounting for 
between 50% to over 70% of merchandise exports from the mid-1970s to 
the mid-1980s, when the oil prizes were particularly high. This is also a 
considerable gain from the external fiscal environment. 
190 Clawson, "Unaffordable Ambitions: Syria's Military Build-up and Economic Crisis". 
Hinnebusch, Syria. Revolution from Above, p. 150. 
191 Clawson, "Unaffordable Ambitions: Syria's Military Build-up and Economic Crisis", 
pp. 53-56. 
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Table 10: 192 
Structure of S. A. R. merchandise exports in 1974-1989 
Source World Bank. 2006 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, it can be said that during the Cold War. Syria was able to 
expand its political and military importance in the region. This was possible 
because of the Cold War bi-polarity and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Syria used 
192 Values are not available for 1988. 
19' World Bank values are not available for several years. OPEC values available for 1982- 
1989. 
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pan-Arab and Cold War alliances as strategies for resource accumulation. 
With alliances and resource accumulation, Syria was able to gain a 
significant level of regional power, considering its previous regional and 
domestic weakness. 194 Syria gained security, deterrence and arms from the 
superpower ally and cooperation in war preparation and war waging as well 
as strategic aid from the Arab states. In addition, Syria also benefited 
financially from other gains, such as favourable trade and civilian 
assistance. As a result, Syria was able to build a mighty army. The increased 
importance in regional politics, the superpower alliance and the military 
might reduced the external challenges to the regime. Success in foreign 
affairs also brought legitimation to the President and national pride. This all 
contributed to the consolidation of the state domestically. 
3.2 External resource extraction and state power 
"Regime security in its most basic terms may in fact be budget security, 
understood in terms of reproducing the conditions necessary for the ruling 
coalition to continue to pay the bills, pre-empt the development of 
opposition, or cultivate sufficient domestic support to make coercion against 
such groups possible ". 195 
This chapter aims to evaluate how the external resource extraction in the 
1970-1990 period increased the fiscal capabilities and autonomy of the state 
and contributed to state power. First, the extent of the rentier nature of Syria 
is estimated, by identifying the main sources of rents and the amount of 
rents within the total state revenue. Secondly, this chapter relates the 
proportion of aid and fuel exports to the domestic revenue in order to 
specify the importance of this specific rent in question to the fiscal 
194 According to Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, Syria became a regional "middle power". 
Middle powers' regional significance is rooted in the size of their population, economy and 
the military might. According to Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, middle powers are structurally 
defined to urge for regional leadership, act against the regional hostile powers and against 
the hegemony of extra-regional powers in the region. They aim to form alliances against 
external powers' hegemony to maintain their sovereignty. They are able to resist the 
pressure of external powers because of their regional significance. Ehteshami and 
Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a penetrated regional system, pp. 6-7. 195 Brand, Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations. The Political Economy ofAlliance Making, p. 26. 
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capabilities of the state. After this rather numerical analysis of the fiscal 
powers, the conclusion is placed in the context of economic strategies of the 
state to analyze how the Asad regime constructed its power base. I will view 
which elements of rentierism are apparent, how the state used its increased 
fiscal capabilities for broadening the role of the state in the economy, gave 
means for allocation policy to satisfy its support base and to maximise it by 
means of co-option strategies. The increased fiscal capabilities also provided 
greater means for strengthening coercive and institutional capabilities. These 
are discussed at a later point in chapter 3.3. 
Level of Syrian rentierism 
For analysis of the level of Syrian rentierism, the amount of oil rent, foreign 
aid and remittances are of particular interest in the Syrian case. I will first 
analyze the amount of these rents during the Cold War period and then 
relate the overall external revenue to the domestic revenue. The following 
tables designed for this analysis provide more specific data on Syrian 
external revenues from 1970 to 1989. The first table includes aid as a 
percentage of GDP, the second shows fuel exports as a percentage of GDP 
and the third shows worker remittances as a percentage of GDP. 
Table 12: 
Total net ODA (OA) to S. A. R. In 1970-1989 (% of GDP) 
Source World Bank. April 2006 and OECDIDAC. 2006 
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This data indicates that Syria gained most of its rents from lorcig, n aid and 
fuel exports. The foreign aid figures are surprisinoly low. According to the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ligures used in 
this research, the foreign aid as at its highest between I971 and 1982. 
196 Values are not available für 1971 -73 and 1989. 1'" Due to different editions of World Bank World Development Indicators used as a source 
for workers' remittance values, there are differences between the percentages in the tables 
(Edition: April 2006) and the percentages used in the text (Edition: September 2005). In 
addition to reported worker remittances. Syria benefited from annual money transtcrs from 
Syrian workers in I ehanon. lime transfers are estimated to have been around I. 5-2 billion 
(JSD annually accordino to I. ehanon-Syrian Centre (1 SC). The Syria report (February 
2005). 
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remaining between 5.9% and over 13% of GDP, with the exception of the 
peak in 1979 of 17.9%. From that point on, the aid income declined from 
5.9% in 1982 to 1.3% in 1989. This would suggest that the aid levels were 
not very high, even though it must be remembered that these figures are 
likely to be lower than actual aid income. The aid figures above can be 
estimated to be below the actual aid figures, because the figures include only 
aid reported to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. 198 
The amount of Syrian foreign aid is also not enormous in regional 
comparison, as the following table illustrates. Syrian aid was higher than 
Egyptian only in 1979-1981 in dollars when Egypt lost the Gulf aid due to 
its peace agreement with Israel, and the new Western based aid was not yet 
flowing in large quantities. Jordan continuously received marginally less 
than Syria during the Cold War in dollars. In relation to GDP, Syria received 
the least average annual aid among these countries during the years of large 
aid donations 1973-1979. Jordan received 25.4%, Egypt 13.7% and Syria 
10.6% of GDP as an annual average. In the 1980s, all aid declined 
drastically in relation to GDP and Syria received most. Jordan received 
1.4%, Egypt 5.0% and Syria 5.5% as an annual average of GDP. 199 The 
difference, of course, is that Syrian aid was unconditional, whereas much of 
the aid that Jordan and post-1979-Egypt received had an impact on domestic 
political and economic systems and therefore did not contribute in a similar 
manner to the fiscal capabilities of the state as in Syria. 
198 This is based on the comment by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, according to which all Arab aid is not reported to the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development even today. E-mail correspondence with Ann 
Zimmerman, DAC, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 7. 
November 2006. 
199 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, DAC 2006. 
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Table 15: 
ODA (OA) to Syrl., Egypt and Jordan In 1970-1989 (% of GOP) 
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The oil figures, on the other hand, seem surprisingly high. Unlike other 
similar aid recipient countries, Egypt and Jordan, Syria benefited relatively 
`0° much from its own oil production since it started to export oil in 1968. 
The revenue from fuel exports was between 6.7% and 12.7% during the 
years 1974-1985. According to these figures, the importance of Syrian fuel 
export income would seem to be somewhat underestimated in the previous 
research. 
201 
Indeed, the underestimation of the importance of oil export revenue already 
from the 1970s becomes clear if compared to aid figures. The most 
important finding here is that oil export revenue was actually higher than aid 
as an annual average during the entire study period. If one compares the aid 
and fuel export figures as percentage of GDP, foreign aid and fuel export 
income contributed close to the same amount of external revenues in the 
1970s, foreign aid being only marginally higher. Despite the peaks, on 
average the annual aid during the era of high aid income in 1973-1982 was 
10.3% of GDP. During the era of high fuel exports around the same time in 
1974-1985, the average annual fuel exports accounted for 9.1% of GDP. 
200 Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Asati, p. 40. 201 The importance of oil revenues is noted in late 80s and early 90s, but its overall 
importance related to aid is not really emphasised. This is even though Perthes for example 
notes that oil revenues were the one single largest revenue for the state budget. Hinnebusch, 
Syria. Revolution from Above, p. 132, Perthes, The Political Economv Of Svria under . Asad, 
p. 64. 
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From 1981, fuel export income increased consistently, with the exception of 
the year 1986. Indeed, the increased external revenues were more than 50% 
due to foreign aid and the military environment until 1981. From this point 
on, the fiscal autonomy was more than 50% due to oil revenues, although 
foreign aid still played a role. In the entire study period starting from 1974 
after which there is data available until 1989, average annual income from 
fuel exports was 8.7% of GDP and aid income 7.7% of GDP. In other 
words, income from fuel exports was higher than aid income in the 1970s 
and 1980s. 
None of the revenues separately were high enough to build a certain type of 
a rentier economy. Syria profited significantly from foreign aid, especially 
towards the end of the 1970s, but not enough to provide the opportunity to 
construct an induced rentier state economy. The oil export was also not 
sufficient to allow for Syria to be categorised as a rentier state economy at 
any stage. Worker remittances - mainly from the Gulf - benefited the Syrian 
economy from the lowest 0.7% in 1976 to the highest 5.9% in 1982 of GDP 
during this period, in other words not to the extent that Syria could be 
defined as a private sector rentier economy. Together, however, the aid and 
fuel export income must be assumed to have lent some rentier features to the 
Syrian state and economy. 
The following table presents the overall external revenues that directly 
benefit the state, fuel export income and aid revenues as percentage of GDP. 
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The table shows that the amount of rents contributing to state revenues 
varied between 9.7% and 29.9% of GDP from 1974 until the end of the 
study period, 1989. They did indeed decline from an average of 20.1% in 
1974-1982 to an average 11.4% in 1983-1989. The amount of rents fails to 
come even close to the level of major oil-economies such as Saudi-Arabia 
and other Gulf states. For example, in Saudi-Arabia, the oil exports reached 
87.4% of GDP and in Kuwait 61.9% of GDP during the height of the oil 
boom in 1980, decreasing to a still significant 34.4% of GDP and 45.8% of 
203 GDP in 1984-1985. 
Based on these tables, Syria did not reach the level of a semi-rentier state 
economy during this time period, because the income from fuel exports and 
aid remained less than 20% of GDP, with the exception of the end of the 
1970s and beginning of the 1980s. However, if one considers that the aid 
levels according to this data may be subject to underestimation, one can 
most likely consider Syria a semi-rentier state. According to Clause, Syrian 
external revenues are generally over 20% but under 50% of government 
revenues, which makes Syria a mid-level rentier state. 204 Rex Brynen also 
202 Fuel export values are not available for 1971-73 and 1988. 
203 Brynen, Rex. "Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab world: 
The Case of Jordan", p. 72. 
204 Gause, "Regional Influences on Experiments in Political Liberalization in the Arab 
World", p. 291. 
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defines Syria as a semi-rentier state. 205 Perthes relates the amount of rents as 
between 10% and 15% of GDP. 206 
More specifically, Syria can be defined as having been close to an induced 
semi-rentier state economy (foreign aid related-revenue) from 1970 until 
1981, after which it can be defined as being close to a semi-rentier state 
economy (oil-related revenue). For the analysis of the level of state fiscal 
autonomy or relation of the state to the private sector, oil or foreign aid can 
be seen as contributing similarly to the state revenues, provided that the 
foreign aid has been such that it has not included conditions by the donor, 
because conditions could limit the ability of the state to use the funds. 207 In 
Syrian case, as the foreign aid has mainly been from the Gulf region and the 
Soviet Union, and motivated by a security rationale, the donor aspect has 
not been relevant. 
The amount of external revenues is subsequently compared to domestic 
revenues. Here it is important to note again that the Syrian state does not 
report its revenues. The domestic revenue reported in the budgets is 
compared to total external revenue, which gives a better picture of the 
importance of the external revenues to the fiscal capabilities and state 
power. For technical reasons, the comparison is done in percentage of GDP. 
205 Brynen, "Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab world: The 
Case of Jordan", p. 72. 
206 Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Asad, p. 153. 
207 Knowles, Changing Patterns of Rent: State, Private Sector and Donors in Jordan, p. 14. 
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Table 17: '09 
Total domestic and external revenues of S. A. R. In 1970-1989 (% of GDP) 
Source World Bank, 2006 and OECD/DAC, 2006 
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The figures for the beginning of the 1970s are not fully available. Therefore, 
the analysis covers only the years from 1974 onwards. These tables indicate 
that external revenue was significant to the fiscal capabilities in addition to 
the domestic revenue. On average, the annual share of external revenues 
accruing to the state of total revenues as percentage of GDP was 39.1%, 
varying between the lowest 28.6% and the highest 55.8%. The external 
revenue was consistently lower than domestic revenue in the 1970s and 
1980s, with the exception of the peak year 1979 of 55.8%. What the table 
also indicates is that the overall revenues were significantly higher as 
percentage of GDP at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, 
compared to the end of the 1980s. The external revenues declined 
20 significantly in relation to the domestic towards the end of the 1980s. `' 
During the entire era, the level of taxation of domestic revenues was small 
in comparison. The annual average taxation was 12.2% of GDP-2210 
Hinnebusch evaluates this to account for up to 25% of state revenues. 
211 
This confirms that the state used external extraction and very low domestic 
extraction of revenues. 
201 Values are not available for several years. Domestic revenue does not include grants. 
209 The data for domestic revenue for years 1982-1988 is not available and therefore these 
years are not taken into account. 
'"' International Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics, October 2006. 
211 Hinnebusch,, Syria. Revolution from Above, p. 127. 
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Based on this, it can be concluded that the external revenues added greatly 
to the fiscal capabilities and autonomy of the state at least from 1974 
onwards. This timing coincides with the stabilization of Asad's regime. The 
external revenues declined sharply from the mid-1980s, when fiscal 
capabilities must also have been reduced. 
Building the economics of authoritarianism 
Syria had only what can be categorised as close to a semi-rentier state 
economy, and therefore the financial autonomy of the state has not been 
high enough to accord it a pure rentier nature throughout. However, much of 
rentier theory is relevant for the Syrian case and explains its 
authoritarianism. According to Perthes, Syria has exhibited all the 
characteristics of a rentier economy. Such characteristics are, for example, 
the state as an engine of growth, large public sector, subsidized imports, 
privileges and monopolies. 212 
According to Warwick Knowles, the following characteristics are related to 
the rentier state economy. "The state is the prime economic power, private 
sector is dependent of the state. The state aims to maintain control of and 
access to rent and allocating expenditure rather than the raising of domestic 
revenues. The state follows a politically-inspired "expenditure policy", that 
often includes infrastructure development, which will be led through state- 
controlled development plans, state-controlled or state-supported 
enterprises, subsidies both of basic necessities, such as bread, electricity and 
water, and those aimed at favoured businesses, such as cheap loans and tax 
breaks; contracts from the state to favoured businesses; `royal' favours, such 
as free land in return for political support; bureaucracy built around 
allocative, rather than extractive, mechanisms; Regulations aimed at 
preferred businesses, such as partnership agreements in Saudi Arabia, which 
212 Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Asad, p. 64. 
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allow foreigners to establish trades and professions in conjunction with a 
s2i3 Saudi national; and the state as a major source of employment. 
Here, the rentier nature is observed in the following terms: state control of 
economy, allocation and co-option. It is striking that there has been 
virtually no change in the political elite in power in Syria since the 1963 
revolution and no coup until today since 1970, when Hafez al-Asad took 
power in an intra-Ba'ath rivalry. This indicates that the socio-economic 
conditions formed from the 1970s created a very stable authoritarian 
structure. The political coalition of the end of the 1960s could not most 
likely have held power until today had there not been a drive to maximize 
and broaden the coalition as widely as possible, in other words bringing 
state services and benefits to the largest possible share of the population. 
This was done mainly through the state-led economy, expanding the state 
to all sectors of society particularly by means if allocation, that is 
bureaucratization, large state employment, subsidies and by co-option, 
allowing state-dependent bourgeoisie to create wealth. The maximizing of 
the political coalition that created regime stability and allowed 
authoritarianism was largely made possible because of the external 
revenues. 
The first indicator of rentierism in Syria was the extent and speed of the 
growth of the public sector. The broadening of the economic role of the 
state in the 1970s was rapid and extensive. This was preceded by a 
revolutionary change that abolished the existing liberal economic order. 
Since independence, Syria had had a market economy and a bourgeoisie. 
Until 1963, Syria had independent social actors that had the chance to 
compete with the regime, as the political instability and frequent changes of 
regimes indicated. The ruling political coalition that circulated power by 
means of several coups was supported by the dominant classes, the landed 
aristocracy and industrial and other bourgeoisie. The Ba'ath party coup of 
1963 served to reorganize the economy to support the new political 
213 Knowles, Changing Patterns of Rent: State, Private Sector and Donors in Jordan, pp. 
14-15. 
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coalition in power. This was done through land reform and nationalizations 
that weakened the old political elite, the landed aristocracy and 
bourgeoisie. 214 From 1964 the elite came instead from army officers and 
young Allawis from provincial towns and rural areas. 15 
The land reform and nationalizations brought with them state ownership. 
This was part of the popular development strategy according to which the 
state should have the leading role in economic development. After the 
demolition of the liberal economy and enemies of the popular revolution 
that gave the domestic resources and economic tools to the state, the 
socialist leaning strategy was adopted, as was done in numerous third world 
states. Also in Syria this included import subsidized industrialization (ISI), 
varying degree of state control of trade, large state run infrastructure, other 
development projects, extensive bureaucratization and state employment. 
The new economic and political order that came with it was a common 
development strategy at the time. The extent of it was highly assisted by the 
fiscal capabilities from external revenues. According to Perthes and 
Hinnebusch, oil and aid revenues indeed funded the development strategy 
and state expansion. 216 
The role of the state in the economy grew significantly from 1970. By the 
mid-1960s, the state owned all banks and most trade, commerce, 
agricultural cooperatives and industry. 217 In domestic production, the share 
of the public sector was around a half by 1970.218 In 1984, the industrial 
sector controlled by the state produced 78% of gross industrial output. 
Public sector surpluses were large, and state share of gross fixed capital 
214 More concretely, see Al-Ahsan, Syed Aziz. "Economic Policy and Class Structure in 
Syria: 1958-1980". International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3, August 
1984, pp. 301-323. Perthes, Volker. "The Bourgeoisie and the Ba'th. A Look at Syria's 
Upper Class", Middle East Report, No. 170, Power, Poverty and Petrodollars, May-June 
1991, pp. 31-37, p. 31. 
215 Al-Ahsan, "Economic Policy and Class Structure in Syria: 1958-1980", p. 314. 216 Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Asad, pp. 136,252. Perthes, "The Private 
Sector, Economic Liberalization, and the Prospects of Democratization: the Case of Syria 
and some other Arab Countries", p. 245. 
217 Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State. Politics and Society in the Middle East, p. 357. 218 Hinnebusch, "Calculated Decompression as a Substitute for Democratization: Syria. " p. 
229. 
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formation was around 60%. 219 State surplus financed more than 30% of 
state expenditures and reached up to 9% of GDP between 1966 and 
1967.220 State control of trade and especially foreign trade was extensive, 
the economy was dominated by state monopolies, and the number of state 
companies was large. The agricultural production was largely arranged by 
state lead cooperatives. 221 
The second feature of rentierism was emphasis on allocation of rents rather 
than active support for productivity. In addition to investments in industry 
and trade, the state spent heavily on the development of infrastructure and 
other development projects, education and health services and subsidies on 
basic foodstuffs and some other everyday products. For example, the 
development projects enhanced the tendency towards patrimonialism and 
gave means of allocation, such as the construction of the Eufrates Dam. 22 
Subsidies kept the poorest part of the population satisfied with the new 
rule. The allocation policy, in other words heavy spending, was the method 
of building the power base and creating political loyalties. 223 
State employment was also a means of allocation. Intense bureaucratization 
enhanced both the expansion of the state in society and political loyalty of 
the state employed. Expansion of the state by bureaucratization contributed 
greatly to the efficiency of the state in pursuing new economic policies such 
as agrarian reforms and nationalizations. Efficiency also gave a tool for 
socio-economic design that gave new means for fostering political loyalties. 
State employment, on the other hand, brought with it a tool for political 
control. 224 The increase in state employment was still small in 1965-1970. 
During that time, the number of state employed workers increased from 
219 Hinnebusch, "The Political Economy of Economic Liberalization in Syria", p. 307. 220 Hinnebusch, "Syria: Calculated Decompression as a Substitute for Democratization" p. 
229. 
221 Hinnebusch, Raymond A. "The Political Economy of Economic Liberalization in Syria. " 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3, August 1995, pp. 302-320, p. 
307. 
222 Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State. Politics and Society in the Middle East, p. 359. 223 On development programmes, see Perthes, "The Bourgeoisie and the Bath. A Look at 
Syria's Upper Class", p. 32. 224 Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Asad, p. 142. 
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135,000 to 236,000, which is an increase from 12.2% to 13.9% of total 
workforce. The increase is particularly significant, however, from 1970 to 
1980. During this period, the number of state employed workers increased 
from 236,000 to 757,000, from 13.9% to 32.9% of total workforce. In 1984, 
public industry gave employment to around 30% of the labour force in 
industry. 225 Roughly speaking, it can be stated that ever since the Asad 
regime consolidated its power, more than one-third of citizens have worked 
in the public sector. 
The third feature of rentierism was co-option, especially the creation of the 
state-dependent bourgeoisie. Bringing the old bourgeoisie into the political 
coalition was a major factor that enhanced regime stability, because the 
traditional industrialists and merchants constituted the largest opposition to 
the Ba'athist leaning regime after the economic restructuring. In the early 
1970s, the policy of Asad was to gain back the exiled capital and assure the 
bourgeoisie that returning their funds was safe. 226 In order to bring back 
private capital and in order to broaden the political coalition, the regime also 
engaged in limited economic liberalization from 1973. Contrary to Egypt, 
the war of 1973 did not force Syria to liberalize. To cover the costs of the 
war economy, Egypt had to resort to liberalization measures. 227 Syria 
avoided this immediate need due to its external revenues. 
The liberalization measures, for example the establishment of public- 
private companies and relaxation of imports, made the bourgeoisie 
involved but dependent. The regime managed to build a relationship of 
alliance between the political and the economic interests of the Sunni 
bourgeoisie by engaging them in military economic activity, for 
example. 28 Indeed, the liberalization in 1973-1979 had no economic 
logic. 229 The aim was a broad political coalition and regime stability. The 
225 Hinnebusch. "Calculated Decompression as a Substitute for Democratization: Syria", p. 
229. 
226 Perthes, "A Look at Syria's Upper Class: The Bourgeoisie and the Ba'th", pp. 31-32. 227 Barnett, Confronting the Costs of War. Military Power, State and Society in Egypt and 
Israel, p. xi. 
228 Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State. Politics and Society in the Middle East, p. 360. 229 Perthes, "The Political Economy of Syria under Asad", p. 44. 
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state kept its dominance over the main economic sectors, and the private 
sector headed towards less profitable sectors. 230 The involvement in state 
contracts, commissions and mixed companies, in which the state had a 
share, best served to tie the interests of the business elite to the state. 
231 The 
arrangement between the state and the private sector also created a 
completely "new bourgeoisie", who were not involved in business but now 
used their access to the state as a stepping ground for private profits. 
32 
These included high officials and their relatives who often also used 
smuggling and illegal means for wealth creation. Smuggling was 
particularly common in the military. 233 The interests to the state were 
broader than those of the people involved in concrete business with the 
state, because the alliance of bureaucrats and bourgeoisie controlled the 
state resources and access to employment and therefore involved large 
allocation activities. Again, the creation of the new bourgeoisie was greatly 
assisted by the external revenues. 234 
It can be concluded that Syria bore clear features of a rentier state economy 
because of the state control of economy, allocation and co-option. This was 
only possible due to the external revenues that boosted the fiscal 
capabilities of the state. As in rentier states, large parts of the population 
needed the state economically, there was no middle class, or independent 
bourgeoisie, and the nature of political competition was linked to access to 
rents. Along the lines of characteristics of a rentier state economy, 
liberalization was about allocation and tying interests to the state. 235 The 
state was also able to contain the Islamist revolt at the end of the 1980s 
partly by means of its fiscal capabilities. For example, in 1979 the state 
used restrictions on the private sector and 65% pay rises in the public sector 
230 Al-Ahsan, "Economic Policy and Class Structure in Syria: 1958-1980", p. 310 
231 Perthes, "The Bourgeoisie and the Ba'th. A Look at Syria's Upper Class", p. 36. 
Hinnebusch, "The Political Economy of Economic Liberalization in Syria", p. 126. 
232 Hinnebusch, Syria. Revolution from Above, pp. 232-233. 
233 Perthes, "The Political Economy of Syria under Asad", pp. 149-150. 
234 Hinnebusch, "The Political Economy of Economic Liberalization in Syria", p. 314. 
235 Perthes "The Political Economy of Syria under Asad", p. 62. The state also had 
autonomy to use liberalization to strengthen regime. Hinnebusch, Raymond. "The Political 
Economy of Economic Liberalization in Syria", p. 319. 
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as a strategy to contain political criticism by the Islamists. 236 In other 
words, the state had fiscal capabilities to contain the spread of criticism by 
allocation, although coercive powers were also used. 237 
Problems of the rentier state economy 
From the beginning of the 1980s, however, the rentier state economy began 
to face some problems. The external revenues from foreign aid began to 
decline due to the oil prices and the slowdown of aid from the Soviet Union. 
The economic crisis deepened because the oil prices started to decline in 
1986. The crisis was felt in all Arab countries in the 1970s-1980s due to the 
ISI-led planned development policy that was vulnerable to a decline in state 
spending. There was simply a gap in resources because of the heavy 
spending on allocation. The economic crisis was felt in Syria from 1982. 
There was a decrease in industrial production, lack of imported products, 
high inflation and a decrease in the value of the Syrian pound, and most 
importantly, a lack of foreign exchange. 238 The over-dependency on external 
resource extraction became apparent. The heavy spending that the 
allocation-oriented economy needed started to become too costly. In 
addition to co-option and allocation policies, the conflict with Israel was 
costly. As a result, the government resorted to borrowing and there was a 
severe debt crisis (see the table for debts), foreign exchange crisis and fiscal 
crisis that threatened to damage the regime's basic support base. 239 
236 Perthes, "The Political Economy of Syria under Asad", p. 53. 237 The state also had to resort to coercive resources to crush opposition. Al-Ahsan, Syed 
Aziz. "Economic Policy and Class Structure in Syria: 1958-1980", p. 318. 218 Perthes, "The Private Sector, Economic Liberalization, and the Prospects of 
Democratization: the Case of Syria and some other Arab Countries. " In Salame, Democracy 
without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World, p. 245. 239 More on the reasons of the economic crisis, see Hinnebusch, "The Political Economy of 
Economic Liberalization in Syria", p. 312, and Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria 
under Asad, p. 45. 
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In other words, as the level of rents declined, the state became less 
autonomous, and it had fewer fiscal capabilities. The rentier theory, the 
decline of rents, would serve to explain the economic crisis. However, the 
liberal theory also has explanatory potential . 
The state-led development 
simply exhausted itself and the state needed to resort to restructuring or 
accommodational measures. According to this line of thinking, the 
economic decline followed, because the economic policies had served as a 
tool for state-building and regime security rather than economic growth . 
240 
These two arguments combined explain the Syrian economic crisis at the 
end of the 1980s because Syria was not a pure rentier state and because 
lower level rentier features and ISI-led economy often came together. 
However, the liberal theory does not explain the long-term reaction of the 
Syrian state to the crisis. The reaction was more political than economic and 
the need for deeper changes was, to some extent, eliminated when the rents 
increased again in the early 1990s. 
There was no possibility for external extraction at the end of the 1980s 
because of the nature of the international politics and economics at the time. 
Nor was an intense domestic extraction in the form of taxation an option for 
the reason of retaining autonomy. So the immediate option available was to 
240 Hinnebusch, Syria. Revolution from Above, pp. 128-130. 
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borrow, which made the situation worse. The medium-term strategy used 
was to cut back spending and to gain resources for the economy from 
private capital. Without it, the state would have gone into bankruptcy. The 
second opening of the economy followed from 1985. The foreign exchange 
regulations were liberalized, the role of the banks was changed, some 
government monopolies were lifted, some restrictions for private sector 
investment were removed and mixed companies gained more privileges, and 
there was some privatization of state lands. This was all done in practice by 
the early 1990s241 
This economic policy change can be still called an accommodational 
strategy, although it led to an enormous increase in the role of the private 
sector and a turn from ISI to export orientation. By 1990, the private sector 
was for the first time larger than the public sector if measured in investments 
during the entire Ba'athist era since 1963. This was not unique to Syria as 
the same development took place in different Arab states. Common to all 
countries was that the growing private sector was very tied to the state and 
consisted of a new bourgeoisie that was state-dependent, enjoyed privileges, 
acted in mixed companies and benefited from monopolies. Some non-state 
dependent bourgeoisie also emerged, but they were not wealthy or 
influential in any way. 242 However, the economic change was not deep and 
it did not change the power balance because of the co-option element. 
Rather, it balanced the economy to some extent. The liberalization was not 
deep either because there was a consensus of the need to maintain a large 
private sector and balance the interests of the bourgeoisie with the main 
constituencies of the regime. Essentially, the private sector was only given 
more access to the state. 243 This has also been called selective 
liberalization244 According to Hinnebusch, the state autonomy was such that 
241 Perthes, "The Private Sector, Economic Liberalization, and the Prospects of 
Democratization: the Case of Syria and some other Arab Countries", pp. 246-247. 242 Ibid, pp. 249-251. 
243 Hinnebusch, Raymond. "The Politics of Economic Liberalization. Comparing Egypt and 
Syria. " In Hakimian, Hassan and Moshaver, Ziba (Eds. ). The State and Global Change. The 
Political Economy of Transition in the Middle East and North Africa. Richmond: Curzon 
Press, 2001, pp. 129-130. 
244 Perthes, "The Private Sector, Economic Liberalization, and the Prospects of Democratization: 
the Case of Syria and some other Arab countries", p. 251. 
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liberalism could still be used to stabilize the regime. 245 The role of the 
private sector remained and even increased in the following years. The 
Syrian example shows that it is possible to have a large private sector 
without deep economic liberalization. Indeed, a deeper liberalization would 
have threatened the position of the bourgeoisie. 246 At the turn of the 1990s, 
Syria had a combination of a rentier model and a large private sector. The 
state still led the economy and the private sector was tied to the state, and 
thus some aspects of the rentier theory - according to which the state is the 
main economic actor - were still valid. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, external revenues created sufficient fiscal capabilities for the 
state to pursue economic policies that enhanced state power and gave means 
to the authoritarian rule. The Syrian state had clear rentier features, such as 
the large role of the state in the economy, allocation and co-option. Rents 
and their allocation helped to create and maintain the authoritarian structures 
of the state, build a maximum coalition and gave means to engage in socio- 
economic designing that was used, for example, in economic liberalization 
in order to balance different political interests and tie them to the state. 247 
Despite the fall in revenues at the end of the 1980s, Syria maintained its 
rentier features. This also took place in spite of the expansion of the private 
sector to become bigger than the state sector. What is clear is that external 
resource extraction had a very significant impact on Syrian authoritarianism. 
Syria was, however, not even a clear semi-rentier state economy, as the 
reported external revenues were mostly lower than 20%. Furthermore, the 
war preparation costs were high as will be shown in the next chapter. 
Although the fiscal capabilities of the state were a powerful tool for creating 
state power, the low level of rents seems to suggest that the external 
revenues alone could not have been responsible for the state autonomy and 
245 Hinnebusch, "The Political Economy of Economic Liberalization in Syria", p. 319. 246 Perthes, "The Private Sector, Economic Liberalization, and the Prospects of 
Democratization: the Case of Syria and some other Arab Countries", p. 251. 247 On designing socio-economic interests, see Hinnebusch, "Calculated Decompression as 
a Substitute for Democratization: Syria", p. 226. 
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the authoritarian nature of the state. The following chapter on the effect of 
war preparation sheds light on possible additional reasons deriving from the 
external environment for increased state power and authoritarianism. 
3.3 War preparation and state autonomy 
This chapter aims to show how war preparation did not demand domestic 
extraction and political bargaining that would have lead to a democratic 
opening, but gave financial means to increase the coercive capabilities of the 
state by building a strong army and security services. War preparation also 
affected the political institutions, caused centralization of political power 
and contributed to the rule of the three pillars, the president, army and the 
party. War preparation enhanced the coercive capabilities of the state by 
improving the ability to allocate and co-opt social groups. War preparation 
also supported the strengthening of the institutional capabilities of the state 
and brought autonomy, efficiency and legitimacy to the regime. All these 
contributed greatly to authoritarianism. 
War preparation and fiscal capabilities 
The Middle East is the most war-prone region in the world. By global 
standards, war preparation in this region has been extremely intense whether 
measured by military spending, arms import or economic burden to the 
states. 248 Syrian war preparation began to intensify after the 1967 war as a 
direct reaction to the external threat environment. Israel won a victory over 
the Arab states and Syria lost the Golan Heights in the Six Day War. War 
preparation was advanced with the purpose of regaining the lost territory 
and to ensure a victory by a strategic parity in the possible future wars with 
Israel. War preparation was done by increasing the size of the army in 
manpower and sophistication and acquiring new weaponry. War preparation 
248 Cordesman, Anthony H. The Military Balance in the Middle East - An Analytic 
Overview: Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, Major Arms by Country and Zone, 
and Qualitative Trends. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D. C. 17 
March 2004, p. 29. 
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efforts intensified between the wars of 1967 and 1973. As the following 
tables show, with the exception of the war year of 1973, the highest war 
preparation measured by total military spending (military budget and arms 
imports) was between 1979 and 1983, when the spending amounted every 
year to at least 27% of GDP, reaching the highest figure, 38% of GDP, in 
1980. Generally, the total military spending remained very high in 1976- 
1988, when the figure consistently stayed over 18% of GDP. During this 
time, the expenditures grew first until 1980 and declined gradually 
throughout the 1980s. The overall military expenditure grew from 20% of 
GDP in 1976 to 30% in 1979 and again to 38% in 1980, falling thereafter to 
20% in 1985 and a little over 12% 1990 (see following table). Altogether, 
according to Clawson, between 1976 and 1988 there was a 50% expansion 
in the size of the army. 249 The reason for an increase in military spending 
from the end of the 1970s was the separate peace between Egypt and Israel, 
which necessitated a Syrian urge for strategic parity to confront Israel alone. 
Ten per cent of the Syrian army was also tied in Lebanon, which increased 
the need for military expenditure and arms imports. 250 
The intensity of war preparation did not, however, completely reflect the 
threat level. Moreover, it reflected the availability of funding for war 
preparation. The availability of the external revenues promoted the 
intensified war preparation. The decline in war preparation was 
simultaneous to the decline in military aid. As the preceding chapters have 
shown, aid declined towards the end of the 1980s. The military budget did 
not increase much between 1984 and 1988.251 The slowdown in military 
build-up took place after the Lebanon conflict. Syria's bad economic 
performance towards the end of the 1980s also contributed to cuts in 
spending. 52 
249 Clawson, "Unaffordable Ambitions: Syria's Military Build-up and Economic Crisis", p. 
3. 
250 Ibid, pp. 5-7 
231 [bid, p. 5. Manpower figures are from US Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, Annual 
World Military Expenditure and Arms Trust. For figures on military equipment, see 
International Institute for Security Studies, Military Balance. 
252 Ibid, pp. 7,11. 
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Table 19: 25; 
S. A. R. military expenditure in 1973-1989 (% of GDP) 
Source Clawson, 1989 (years 1973-1987) and SIPRI. 2005 (years 1988.1989) 
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Table 20: 254 
S. A. R. arms Imports in 1973-1989 (% of GDP) 
Source Clawson, 1989 (years 1973-1987) and World Bank, 2005 (years 1988-1989) 
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Table 21: 
S. A. R. total military expenditure In 1973-1989 (% of GDP) 
Source Clawson. 1989, SIPRI. 2005 and World Bank 2005 
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Clawson has estimated that between 1977 and 1988 Syria spent an average 
of 14% of GDP on war preparation excluding arms imports, which was 
mostly funded by foreign aid. The normal level for a Third World country 
would have been around 4%. Syria therefore used on average 10% more of 
its annual GDP to fund war preparation in comparison to other Third World 
states. These figures seem to be somewhat higher than those presented 
here. 2" War preparation burdened the government budget significantly. 
What kind of extraction strategies did the Syrian regime use to cover the 
financial burden of war preparation? The external revenue consisting mainly 
of external aid until 1990 appears to have financed most militarization. 
Much of this military aid was from the Soviet Union and the Arab countries, 
as mentioned in the previous chapter. Clawson has calculated that aid 
financed two-thirds of the military build-up that exceeded a normal level of 
military build-up of a third world state. 256 
In this research, to evaluate the burden of war preparation to state fiscal 
capabilities, an analysis is first made of the relationship between military 
spending and external revenues, secondly the domestic revenues and 
255 Clawson, "Unaffordable Ambitions: Syria's Military Build-up and Economic Crisis", p. 
19. 
256 lbid, p. 18. 
96 
military spending, and thirdly of overall revenues and military spending. 
The following tables show that at the minimum level, the external revenues 
were only 3.7% of GDP lower than total military expenditures including 
arms imports in 1976 and 0.3% lower in 1979. At the maximum level, the 
external revenues were 12.5% of GDP lower than total military expenditures 
in 1980 and 18.6% in 1983. As the tables show, domestic extraction would 
not have sufficed to cover military spending in the 1980s, not to mention 
spending for other governmental expenses. As a result of the external 
extraction, however, domestic extraction was not very high. 
According to these figures, on average, the annual military expenditure was 
25.9% of GDP between 1973 and 1989. During the same time period, the 
annual average revenues from taxation were 12.2% of GDP. 257 The share of 
military expenditure of domestic revenue was 94.5%. This most clearly 
proves how impossible the build up of the military might would have been 
domestically without the external funding. The external revenues were, 
however, not enough to fund war preparation entirely. Annually, military 
expenditure was accorded an average of 165% of the external revenues from 
1976 to 1989. Compared to total revenues, the military expenditure 
accounted for 55.8% annually between 1976 and 1989. 
Indeed, external extraction paid for most of the military build-up and 
domestic extraction was minimal. Furthermore, according to Clawson, the 
economic burden of war preparation domestically was not high. According 
to him, the build-up that was additional to a normal level of a Third World 
country cost tax payers only 5% of GDP. Should Syria have invested in the 
military at the level of a normal Third World county, the average burden of 
military to the taxpayers would have been 2.5% of GDP. Indeed, Syria did 
not increase taxation for war preparation purposes. After the aid began to 
decrease, Syria reduced military spending instead of increasing domestic 
extraction. 258 The low level of domestic extraction is remarkable in 
257 International Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics, October 2006. 
258 Clawson, "Unaffordable Ambitions: Syria's Military Build-up and Economic Crisis", 
pp. 13,18-20. 
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comparison. According to the figures of Clawson, when Syrian military 
build-up reached 39% of GDP, taxes covered only 13% of the spending. 
When military spending in Israel was 25% of GDP, taxes covered 45% of 
this spending. In both cases, most of the militarization was funded by 
foreign aid. This illustrates how large the extent was to which Syrian foreign 
aid covered its military spending. 259 
If one looks at all government revenues, both domestic and external, and 
relates the military expenses to it. the financial burden from war preparation 
does not indeed appear to be large. However, the tables show that military 
expenditure took the largest share of the state budget at least between 1979 
and 1981, most likely also few years later, but this can not be confirmed as 
the figures from those years are not available for this research. The 
decreased ability to spend on needs other than war preparation during those 
years coincided with the Islamist uprising of 1978-1983. culminating in 
l982. `60 This raises the question of whether the war preparation burdened 
the economy during that period in such a way that it could be a partial 
explanation for the increased opposition to the regime. 
Table 22: 
S. A. R. total military expenditure and domestic revenue in 1972-1989 (% of GDP) 
Sources: Clawson. 1969: SIPRI, 2005 and World Bank, 2005-2006 
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260 It should be noted however that the end of 1980s, years 1986-1987 also show very low 
ability to spend on other than war preparation. 
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Fable 23: 
S. A. R. total military expenditure and external revenue In 1970-1989 (% of GDP) 
Sources Clawson, 1989 SIPRI 2005 Works Bank, 2005-2006 and DAC/OECD 2006 
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Table 24: 
S. A. R. total military expenditure and government revenue in 1973.1989 (% of GDP) 
Sources Clawson 1989 SIPRI, 2005 World Bank 2005-2006 and DAC/OECD 2006 
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All in all, however, the Syrian government had the financial resources to 
promote war preparation without burdening the domestic public too much. 
Because the domestic extraction was very small, there was no need tier 
political bargaining in the form of changing economic structures of the state 
or political liberalization in order to broaden the power base of the regime. 
War preparation, therefore, did not lead to moves towards democratization. 
In comparison, in Egypt, according to Barnett, war preparation necessitated 
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so much domestic extraction, that this prompted the move to economic and 
political liberalization. 61 
In Syria, war preparation was overall a beneficial instrument for the regime 
to increase its financial capabilities. Financially, war preparation had a 
positive impact on the domestic economy; the build-up benefited the civilian 
sector and created jobs. 262 More importantly, military spending also brought 
more foreign aid. War preparation was not designed only for extracting aid 
but for defending national security, although war preparation did indeed 
help Syria economically. 263 It would seem that the war preparation was also 
necessary for the ability to extract foreign aid. Syria would not have 
obtained such a level of external aid had it not spent on military build-up. 264 
War preparation and coercive capabilities 
Military build-up also strongly enforced the coercive capabilities of the state 
through the expansion of weaponry, manpower in the security sector and the 
importance of the army. War preparation provided protection for the state 
and the regime against external enemies, but also provided means for 
building a strong authoritarian security state. 
The growth of the armies in Syria as well as in other Arab states started 
already in the 1950s and 1960s. Despite the birth of Arab sovereign states in 
the midst of the 1948 war with Israel, the war preparation need can be 
largely explained by the state-building need of newly independent states. 
New states needed to fulfil the function of a sovereign state by taking 
control of external security and "monopoly of violence" internally. 
Militarization of the first decades had very much a domestic function as 
well, as the regimes were continuously challenged by domestic opponents. 
261 Barnett, Confronting the Costs of War. Military Power, State and Society in Egypt and 
Israel, p. xi. 
262 Clawson, "Unaffordable Ambitions: Syria's Military Build-up and Economic Crisis", p. 
31. 
263 Perthes, "Si Vis Stabilitatem, Para Bellum. State Building, National Security, and War 
Preparation in Syria", pp. 158-159. 
264 Clawson, "Unaffordable Ambitions: Syria's Military Build-up and Economic Crisis", p. 
31. 
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Militarization served as a tool against criticism and a means for social 
mobilization that had an impact on the political support base and legitimacy 
of the state. 265 The regimes did not consolidate, however, but the army was 
politicized and involved in power struggles and consecutive coups. 266 The 
main effect on war preparation following the loss of the 1967 war was 
military disengagement, which helped to consolidate power and eliminated a 
significant source of challenge to the regime. Due to the external threat 
together with the consolidation of the Ba'athist rule by Asad in 1970, the 
military was disengaged from politics and it became more professionalized. 
Military involvement in politics decreased and the central concern of the 
regime was to eliminate the possibility of an army coup. 267 Gaining the 
upper hand with the army and centralizing the political decision-making 
clearly enhanced the consolidation of the state. Whereas military 
disengagement is often connected to democratization, in this case it was the 
military-born leadership that consolidated authoritarian rule by securing the 
regime through disengaged military forces. 
After Asad came to power in 1970, his main aim was to tie domestic 
resources to the war effort and create domestic unity and cohesion to 
confront the external enemy. 268 Repeated revolutions and power struggles 
were seen to have weakened Syrian ability to confront external enemies 
causing the losses of territory in the war. 269 The construction of a security 
265 Heydemann, War, Institutions and Social Change in the Middle East, pp. 14,18-19. For 
Role of the military in Syria as a result of the 1948 war see Owen, State, Power and Politics 
in the Making of the Modern Middle East, p. 180. 
266 Domestic instability level was extremely high before intense war preparation. See table 
by Hudson, Michael C. Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy. New Heaven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1977, pp. 405-410. 
267 This appeared in most of the Arab states to a certain extent. Owen, State, Power and 
Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, pp. 181-182. 268The Ba'ath party had been split between those who preferred focusing on domestic social 
revolution and those who preferred to recover lands as a first priority. Asad won the power 
struggle by 1968. Hinnebusch, Syria. Revolution from Above, p. 58. 269 Hinnebusch, Raymond. "Globalization and Generational Change: Syrian Foreign Policy 
between Regional Conflict and European Partnership". In Nonneman, Gerd (Ed. ), 
Analyzing Middle Eastern Foreign Policies and the Relationship with Europe. London: 
Routledge, 2005, p. 84. Domestic reasons for war preparation need are seen by some 
scholars to have been very decisive in addition to confronting external enemy. According to 
Clawson, military build-up was also motivated by enhancing the legitimacy of the Alawi- 
rulers. Clawson, "Unaffordable Ambitions: Syria's Military Build-up and Economic 
Crisis", pp. 5-6. 
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state and concentration of power was therefore widely seen as legitimate. In 
addition to disengaging and professionalizing the army, state and society 
were to be mobilized for war preparation. According to a statement from 
1971... "for the advancement of which all resources and manpower (would 
be) mobilized (was to be) the liberation of the occupied territories. "270 This 
policy further enforced authoritarianism. The importance of the external 
threat to state consolidation and the creation of authoritarian rule has been 
considered important in previous research. Hinnebusch concludes that "the 
need for a powerful state able to monopolize the country for development 
and defence was widely thought to take precedure over political 
liberalism". 271 State-society relations were structured to serve the national 
interest also according to Quilliam: "Asad's most immediate concern was to 
construct a durable state in order that Syria might fulfil its regional 
ambitions. "272 According to Volker Perthes, war preparation helped state 
consolidation because it allowed extraction of strategic rents and it gave 
means to organize a power structure and legitimate the regime. 273 War 
preparation indeed enhanced coercive and institutional powers of the state. 
The growth of the army, bureaucratization and a state-driven economy, were 
all enforced as a result of war preparation and the share of the population 
that was economically dependent of the state rose. Re-organization of the 
economy and state employment, made possible by an external rent-driven 
economy, created the means for socio-economic surgery that helped to 
contain and co-opt the Sunni bourgeoisie, and allowed the drafting of the 
politically loyal Allawis for the army and bureaucracy. All this 
fundamentally changed class structures in Syria. 
The increase in army manpower helped in the move to tie citizens' interests 
to those of the state. In 1970, Syrian armed forces had 80,000 men 
(13/1000), and in 1990 430,000 men (35/1000). This expansion in 
270 Hinnebusch, Syria. Revolution from Above, p. 65. 271 lbid, p. 38. 
272 Quilliam, Syria and the New World Order, pp. 68-69,100-101. 
273 Perthes, "Si Vis Stabilitatem, Para Bellum. State Building, National Security, and War 
Preparation in Syria", pp. 150-151. 
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manpower occurred mainly after 1974. `74 According to Clawson, the army 
employed 12% of the male population in 1984,21% of the male labour 
force and 90% of civil servants. `7 According to Perthes, in the beginning of 
the 1990s, almost 50% of state-employed workers were in the security 
sector. reaching 15 % of total workforce. 276 
Table 25: 277 
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Asad ensured the support of the army by appointments along personal, 
familial, regional, ethnic and ideological lines . 
278 Already during the French 
mandate, the army recruited significantly from minority groups. 279 From 
1963, the army recruits were mainly Allawis and Sunnis from rural areas. 
According to Zisser, by the year 2000,90% of officials occupying a rank of 
a general were Allawis. 28° In the early years of war preparation, the army 
provided a vehicle for inclusion. According to Ayubi, in its later years the 
274 Perthes, "Si Vis Stabilitatem, Para Bellum. State Building, National Security, and War 
Preparation in Syria", p. 152. 
275 Clawson, "Unaffordable Ambitions: Syria's Military Build-up and Economic Crisis", p. 
21. 
276 This estimate includes security apparatus, armed forces, nrkhabarat, civilians in 
Ministry of Defence companies, the army and the police. Perthes, "Si Vis Stabilitatem, Para 
Bellum. State Building, National Security, and War Preparation in Syria", p. 155. 
2" Data is not available for 1966-69,1971-79,1981-84 and 1986-1988. 278 Zisser, Eyal. The Syrian Armv: Between the Domestic and External Fronts. MERIA, 
Vol. 5, No. 1, March 2001, pp. 1-12, p. 5. 
279 Ibid, p. 3. 
280 Ibid, p. 5. 
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army also became a vehicle in constraining demands in alliance with upper 
bourgeoisie. 281 
To ensure the loyalty of the army, in addition to favouring the Allawi sect, 
economic benefits ensured that the army was kept out of politics. First of all, 
army appointments were personal and political, not professional, and 
positions were held for a significantly long time. 282 The army also 
guaranteed some economic benefits. In Syria, the military gained most from 
Syria's presence in Lebanon. Military officials took unofficial tax or bribes 
from smuggled goods between Syria and Lebanon. 283 However, the 
economic activities of the army in Syria have not been as developed as for 
example in Jordan or Egypt, because the actual war preparation need in 
284 Syria was larger. One of the main tools for the state to maintain 
legitimacy among the highest officials in the army was the access to 
political influence. The army also bore influence within the party, and high 
officers had access to high levels in the power hierarchy, which guaranteed 
channels for wealth creation. 85 Army officers were often also appointed to 
high positions in the Ba'ath party. The army had many members in the 
Central Committee and the Regional Command. 
The security sector was broadened to include a large intelligence service 
network. The loyalty of the army was also guaranteed by security apparatus 
inside the army. Specific forces were also designed to guarantee regime 
security, to defend the regime against both internal and external threats. 
These forces have been most well-equipped and almost solely Allawi. They 
have been directed by the president, not by the army command. After an 
internal power struggle within the regime in 1983, new forces, the 
Republican Guard Division, took care of the security of the regime - most 
281 Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State. Politics and Society in the Middle East, p. 277. 282 Zisser, The Syrian Army: Between the Domestic and External Fronts, p. 6 283 Clawson, "Unaffordable Ambitions: Syria's Military Build-up and Economic Crisis", p. 
29. Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, p. 29. 284 Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State. Politics and Society in the Middle East, pp. 277- 
276,185. 185. 
285 Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, p. 185. On 
similarities to Latin America, see Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State. Politics and Society 
in the Middle East, p. 278. 
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importantly the president. The loyalty of these forces was guaranteed by 
family and sect appointments: for example, three sons of Hafez served in 
this unit. The army stayed loyal. The best proof of this was the crushing of 
the Islamist rebellion in 1982 and the handling of the challenge towards 
President Asad by his brother Rif at in 1983.286 
Despite the strong role of the army in the Syrian power structure, Syria has 
never been a military dictatorship but "a dictatorship in which the military 
wields strong influence", as Perthes puts it. The president is from the army 
ranks. The army personnel occupy high positions in the government. The 
army is supreme to government in decisions of military budget and state 
security. However, the army is subjected to the regime leadership and it 
could not challenge the regime. 287 Indeed, military regimes have proved 
very long lasting in the Middle East. As the military rule provides coercive 
mechanisms for the ruling regime, there have been no coups and no need for 
greater legitimacy or participation. 288 The war preparation of the 1970s and 
1980s indeed created powerful coercion capabilities for the state. This 
enhanced state power and added to the authoritarian nature of the state. 
War preparation and institutional capabilities 
War preparation also affected the institutional capabilities of the state and 
the creation of the political power structures that made Syria authoritarian. 
War preparation affected the centralization of political power, the formation 
of the political system along the three pillars of the president, the party and 
the army, and organizing the political power relations between them in a 
hierarchical, army-like manner. The need for strong leadership increased the 
importance of the institution of the presidency and affected the 
personalization of the presidency so that the institutional powers and the 
person acting as the president were intertwined. 289 The three pillars of power 
286 Zisser, The Syrian Army: Between the Domestic and External Fronts, pp. 4-5. 287 Perthes, "Si Vis Stabilitatem, Para Bellum. State Building, National Security, and War 
Preparation in Syria", p. 153. 288 Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State. Politics and Society in the Middle East, p. 265. 289 Perthes, Syria under Bashar Al-Asad. " Modernization and the Limits of Change, p. 7. 
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were reflected in the institutional powers of the president. The president was 
the president of the republic, secretary-general of the party and general 
commander of the army. 290 In addition to the president, the strong role of the 
party and the army in decision-making over the government was to some 
extent caused by war preparation. The twin roles of the party as a political 
organization and as a security apparatus overlapped. 291 Similarly to the 
army, the Ba'ath party had a mobilization, control and decision-making 
function. From within, the Ba'ath party was also structured in a quasi- 
military manner. 292 In general, the external threat and war preparation 
affected political culture by legitimating these hierarchical structures. The 
political decision-making culture was very personalized, and included top- 
down commands. 293 
War preparation also increased the legitimacy of the state. It affected 
political culture by enhancing nation-building, promoting national unity, 
enhancing national identity and socialization to Ba'athist ideology. 94 The 
external threat helped to boost national identity and there was a break down 
of local, ethnic, religious and tribal loyalties. 295 The external threat was used 
for legitimacy by constantly reminding the population of the need for war 
preparation. Until this day, there continues to be an annual day of unpaid 
voluntary labour and a special tax from business profits for defence. There 
are regular military parades. High schools and universities have had 
mandatory military training programs and schools have special combat 
courses. Military uniforms were worn until 2005 at schools. 296 The need for 
war effort is repeated in numerous school books. Most notably during 
domestic unrest, the primacy of fighting the external enemy has traditionally 
290 Zisser, The Syrian Army: Between the Domestic and External Fronts, p. 1. 291 Perthes, "Si Vis Stabilitatem, Para Bellum. State Building, National Security, and War 
Preparation in Syria", p. 154. 
292 Hinnebusch, Syria. Revolution from Above, p. 65. 293 Perthes, "Si Vis Stabilitatem, Para Bellum. State Building, National Security, and War 
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294 Quilliam, Syria and the New World Order, p. 68. 
295 Perthes, "Si Vis Stabilitatem, Para Bellum. State Building, National Security, and War 
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been highlighted to the population. Indeed, this method had often increased 
regime legitimacy. As an example, Perthes points to how events in Lebanon 
in 1982 helped Syria to silence its domestic opposition. 297 
As a conclusion, during the studied era, the Syrian regime became very 
authoritarian, stable and able to confront challenges. Hinnebusch 
emphasized the domestic structures, the three pillars of the political power 
and the socio-economic structures as the main reasons for Syrian 
authoritarianism. This chapter has shown that the external security and fiscal 
environment greatly contributed to the formation of these structures. The 
external environment gave strong fiscal, coercive and institutional 
capabilities to the state, which enhanced state power by increasing the 
autonomy, efficiency and the legitimacy of the state. The enforcement of 
these capabilities took place simultaneously with the consolidation of the 
regime and the build-up of the authoritarian state. Once the authoritarian 
structures were created, the state only had to assure the continuity of 
sufficient fiscal, coercive and institutional capabilities to maintain the 
political status quo. 
3.4 Conclusions 
From the 1970s until 1989, external security and the fiscal environment 
greatly contributed to the building of the authoritarian state. The security 
environment was defined by the Cold War and the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
which provided both military pressures and opportunities for maximizing 
security and economic gains. Alliance with the USSR and the pan-Arab 
commitment that deepened relations with the Gulf states offered the means 
to dilute the military pressure from Israel and maximize economic benefits 
to secure the state and the regime. In practice, the alliance with a 
superpower gave security guarantees for Syria, as did the joint pan-Arab 
front, although to a much lesser degree. The alliance with the USSR and 
other Arab states brought with it the financial means for war preparation, 
297 Ibid, pp. 156-157. 
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which was forged to secure the state militarily. The military alliances also 
secured the regime. 
The security needs are argued to have been the most important foreign 
policy goal, but as a side product the "fiscal or budget security" of the state 
grew significantly. The external extraction affected the regime profoundly 
because the availability of the external revenues shaped the economic 
structures and policies of the state that benefited the regime. In practice, 
Syria received USSR arms generally worth from over $500 up to $3500 
million annually (1976-1990), and economic aid from the Arab states worth 
from $400 up to $1600 million annually (1974-1987). Although a detailed 
analysis of the determinants of Syrian foreign policy during the time period 
does not feature in this research, and although the security aspects can be 
assumed to have been more important than the economic at the time, one 
could suggest based on this research that the economic gains must have held 
an enormous weight in foreign policy, as these revenues were needed both 
to confront Israel and to increase regime stability. 
The external security and fiscal environment boosted the fiscal capabilities 
of the state. Syria bore features of a semi-rentier state economy from 1970 
because of the high levels of foreign aid and oil-related revenue. The annual 
average share of external revenues of total revenues was 39.1% of GDP 
during this study period, overall rents varying between 9.7% and 29.9% of 
GDP in 1974-1989. An important finding of this research is also that the 
aid-related revenue seems to be over-emphasized in comparison to oil 
export revenue already during the Cold War. The average annual oil export 
revenue was actually higher (8.7% of GDP) than aid (7.7% of GDP) during 
the entire study period (1974-1989). Towards the end of the 1970s and at the 
beginning of the 1980s, when aid income is highlighted as being very high, 
the average annual fuel export revenue was very close to the same level. 
From 1981, fuel export revenues were constantly higher than aid income. 
The analysis in this chapter has shown that the external revenues covered 
much of the war preparation, external revenues being only 0.3% - 18.6% of 
GDP lower than the military expenses. 
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The main conclusion related to the fiscal capabilities, therefore, is that the 
Syrian public did not pay much for the war preparation through higher 
taxation, which would have demanded necessary bargaining with the public 
by participation. The second conclusion is that because of the increased 
fiscal capabilities, the state was able to consolidate the restructuring of the 
economy, and it gained features of a rentier state economy. The 
restructuring meant the abolishment of the entire liberal economic order 
through nationalizations and land reform and the construction of a state-led 
economy, which became the foundation of the rule of the regime. The state 
led and controlled the economic development, there was extensive state 
ownership and a large public sector. The economy was based on allocation 
rather than production. The state spent on investments, services and 
subsidies and employed over 30% of population by the 1980s. Finally, the 
co-option policy, especially the creation of the dependent bourgeoisie that 
supported the state, guaranteed that the power base of the regime was broad 
enough, so that there would be no need to share power by increasing 
participation. 
The external security and fiscal environment also boosted the coercive 
capabilities of the state. With almost no extra cost to the state or the public, 
the external revenues used for war preparation built a military might that 
also provided the coercive capabilities for the state. Already the share of the 
population employed by the security sector helped to tie interests to the 
state. By the 1990s, this was almost 50% of the state-employed and 15% of 
the total workforce. The socio-economic design, involving army recruitment 
and appointments was perhaps the most important tool for strengthening the 
power base of the state. 
The external security and fiscal environment can also be argued to have 
affected the institutional capabilities of the state and the political system of 
authoritarianism. The state institutional capabilities that became rooted in 
the political system of three pillars: the army, the party and the president, 
were influenced by the external environment as the war preparation gave the 
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presidency its supremacy and as the role of the army rose in political 
importance. 
The increased fiscal capabilities attributable to external extraction alone 
would most likely not have been able to stabilize the authoritarian regime, 
but in addition to war preparation, without much war-waging, they created 
authoritarianism. It is important to note that Syria did not experience enough 
costly war-waging to become more democratic, as Israel and Egypt did. This 
was because Syria had greater external revenues. 
The Syrian foreign policy during the Cold War supported state-building. 
The 1970s sealed the consolidation of the state and the regime of Asad. As 
in any state-building process, the Syrian state gained the means to control 
society. This chapter has demonstrated how much of the means derived 
from the external environment. The external security and fiscal environment 
gave the means for increasing the coercive capabilities through war 
preparation and increased fiscal resources and made the state the dominant 
economic actor responsible for employment, investment, welfare allocation 
and services. Typical to the consolidation of a state in a state-building 
process, the Syrian state also used coercion and central control for 
eliminating rivals and supporting parties that supported their rule. Creating a 
state-led economy and the socio-economic change that came with it was the 
main example of this. The old power structures were destroyed by 
nationalizations and new rules of allocation were put in place, which 
supported the social groups behind the regime. The pan-Arab, pro- 
Palestinian and anti-Western discourse and the discourse about military 
threat from Israel also forged nation-building, creating unity in the face of 
perceived and actual external aggression. This benefited the legitimacy of 
the state and its regime, particularly its ruler Hafez al-Asad. Syrian foreign 
policy therefore supported state-building and nation-building and in this 
process benefited the state with respect to civil society. Following this 
consolidation, as the Syrian state had external resources, it did not move to 
extract resources from the population, which would have required it to 
compromise its rule and increase participation. 
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The state had founded its pillars of power against the society. After 
consolidation, despite problems related to state spending, there was no 
opening of the political space as the following chapters show. This is again 
argued to be attributable to the gains from the external environment. 
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4 External influence on Syrian authoritarianism 1990-1999 
4.1 International and regional gains and pressures 
This chapter analyzes the gains and losses for Syria from the external 
security and fiscal environment after the Cold War. The end of the Cold 
War seriously weakened Syria's regional and international position after the 
fall of the superpower ally and strengthened the position of the United States 
and its allies, mainly Israel. The balance of power shifted strongly to the US 
and its allies and left the remaining Syria, Iran and Iraq without the ability to 
build strong regional alliances. Another important factor defining the Syrian 
external environment was the shift from war preparation to regional peace- 
making and the practical end to pan-Arab commitments. Although Syria was 
included in the peace efforts, in the end Syria and Lebanon remained alone 
without a peace accord with Israel. Despite these fundamental changes in 
the Syrian external environment, there were significant gains from the 
external environment, which explain why Syria adapted well to the changing 
international and regional order. 
External security environment in the context of regional peace-making 
During the 1990s, the Arab-Israeli conflict was reduced for the most part to 
the Israeli-Syrian conflict, since the PLO and Israel signed an interim 
agreement in 1993 and Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1995. The 
overall commitment of the Arab states to the Palestinian issue declined. The 
reduction of regional tension was partly attributable to the end of the Cold 
War, but was primarily caused by changes within the region itself. 298 The 
agreements by Jordan and the PLO with Israel further isolated Syria, leaving 
Syria the only "front-line" state without a peace agreement, with only 
Syrian-dominated Lebanon joining the non-peace camp. After the PLO 
recognized and negotiated with Israel, both the Arab cause and the 
298 Sela, The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Middle East Politics and the Quest for 
Regional Order, p. 350. 
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Palestinian cause lost their legitimacy within Syrian foreign policy and the 
Syrian conflict with Israel over the Golan Heights was somewhat 
marginalized from the broader Middle East security context. This position, 
both an outcast from the peace camp and a state outside the US sphere of 
alliance, can be argued to have been most defining in shaping Syria's 
regional and international position from the 1990s. Particularly at the 
beginning of the decade, Syria was able to reposition itself, despite the 
deteriorating external environment. 
Syria started to lose its superpower ally already before the Soviet Union fell. 
Soviet policy changed as of the implementation of perestroika. The Soviets 
were particularly frustrated by the Syrian lack of moderation in regional 
affairs. 299 The USSR reduced its military aid to Syria significantly from 
1985, continued to refuse to sell long-range missiles and demanded arms 
sales for immediate payment. 300 Syria could therefore not fully count on 
political, military and economic support of a superpower at the end of the 
1980s. The loss of superpower protection exposed Syria to influence of the 
new regional order dominated by the US. 
The end of the Cold War did not eliminate the penetration of the external 
powers in the Middle East, quite the contrary. The US hegemonic position 
required that the regional states lean on the US in any significant quest for 
political power in the region. Globalization also increased the vulnerability 
of the Middle Eastern states to their external environment. Although the 
Cold War lent its specific mark to the manner in which local powers pursued 
their interests of security and financial benefits from the Cold War rivals, 
after the Cold War, the dynamics between external actors and local powers 
did not really change. States in the region still aimed to maximize their 
security and financial benefits from the external patron. Local powers still 
used penetrating external powers to achieve their own interests. However, 
the forms and rules of benefits changed. Instead of subsidized arms supplies 
299 Karsh, Soviet Policy towards Syria since 1970, pp. 175-177. 
300 Ma'oz, Moshe. Syria and Israel. From War to Peacemaking. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995, p. 205. 
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and unconditional economic aid, the external actors now mainly offered full- 
price arms purchases, cooperation in arms development, trade, economic 
incentives and investments. 
The Syrian strategy was to simultaneously ally against and bandwagon with 
the US. 301 This is because Syria had two conflicting aims: to diminish the 
influence of the US and its allies in the region, and to gain from the 
hegemony particularly in terms of pressuring Israel. A significant example 
of such "bandwagoning" was Syria's participation in the Gulf war against 
Iraq and the peace process. 302 Syrian relations with Iraq during UN 
sanctions, alliance to Iran and a continuing policy of support for the 
Palestinian rejectionist movements and Hizbollah serve as examples of 
balancing the US and the Israeli power in the region. 
Syria participated in the Gulf war along the side of the US and Israel 
because it felt increasingly isolated in the Arab world. Syria needed to 
position itself on the map of the new world order, in which Syria found itself 
more vulnerable. The Gulf war provided a chance for regional re- 
engagement, particularly with the Gulf states. This was important for 
economic reasons and for regaining their political backing following the 
deterioration of relations after the Syrian rejectionist policies to peace 
initiatives and support for Iran. According to Hinnebusch's analysis, this all 
should be seen in the light of the Syrian need to recover its position of 
power in the conflict with Israel. This it also managed to do. The Gulf war 
coalition was instrumental in gaining political commitment from the US, 
Cairo and Riyadh for Syria's struggle with Israel. 303 Syria also managed to 
conduct this strategic u-turn without compromising its Arab nationalist 
agenda. 304 In return for its participation in the war against Iraq, Syria 
managed to gain Arab support for its cause. More concretely, Syria managed 
30' Hinnebusch. "Globalization and Generational Change: Syrian Foreign Policy between 
Regional Conflict and European Partnership", p. 93. 302 Hinnebusch, Raymond. "The Foreign Policy of Syria" in Hinnebusch, Reymond A, 
Ehteshami, Anoushiravan (Eds. ). Foreign Policies of the Middle East States. Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, pp. 141-167, pp. 160-162. 3o Hinnebusch, Syria. Revolution from Above, p. 160. Quilliam, Syria and the New World 
Order, p. 161. 
304 Quilliam, Syria and the New World Order, pp. 3-4. 
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to obtain acknowledgement of its role in Lebanon, which enhanced Syria's 
role regionally vis-A-vis Israel. Syria also gained promises of a peace 
process305 and economic rewards. Although Syria's position may have 
weakened significantly following the Cold War, the Gulf war shows how 
Syria was able to adapt and re-position itself, and balance the losses with 
some new gains. 
The main gain could be seen as the positive signals from the US for the 
understanding of Syria's position in its conflict with Israel. The Syrian and 
the US position on basic parameters for negotiations seemed to be relatively 
aligned, which demonstrates that Syria was able to gain US understanding 
for its position. The US aimed for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab- 
Israel conflict based on US Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and 
the principle of territory for peace. 306 This happened simultaneously with the 
change in Syria's position towards peace negotiations, influenced by the 
US's wishes. According to Moshe Maoz, a more pragmatic approach was 
developed from 1988 following recognition of the inability to gain a 
strategic balance with Israel and the loss of a superpower ally - in other 
words, after the loss of a viable military option. Syria conveyed messages of 
its readiness to negotiate throughout the year of 1990.307 Around the middle 
of 1991, Syria was ready for negotiations. Indeed, Asad replied positively to 
the invitation of President Bush to the Madrid peace conference, held in 
October 1991.308 This did not mean that Syria abandoned the military 
option. Syria resorted to it when the negotiations did not seem to generate 
any gains for Syria. The military option included continuing with 
militarization. 09 The most visible strategy in the struggle against Israel, 
however, was still the use of a proxy, namely Hizbollah, and support for 
Palestinian rejectionist movements. 
'03 Ibid, pp. 159-163. 
306 Ma'oz, Syria and Israel. From War to Peacemaking, p. 207. 307 These included for example the meeting between Asad and Carter 14. March 1990. 308 Ma'oz, Syria and Israel. From War to Peacemaking, p. 207. 309 Ibid, pp. 202,208. 
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Although Madrid did not bring any results, it opened the way for 
negotiations between Syria and Israel that continued until the 1996 Likud 
victory in Israel. Prime Minister Shimon Peres continued the negotiations in 
1996 after the death of Yitzhak Rabin, but they were suspended during the 
Israeli elections. Under the new prime minister, Benyamin Netanyahu, 
official negotiations did not restart, but unofficial contacts were made. 
Although Netanyahu did take some initiative towards Syria, the talks 
resumed only after the Labour prime minister, Ehud Barak, took office in 
1999.110 
Syria made subsequent moves towards reaching an agreement during this 
negotiation period. Syria moved from not accepting negotiations at all to 
accepting indirect and multilateral negotiations at an international peace 
conference under the UN, on the condition that Israeli fully withdraw from 
all of "the occupied lands". In Madrid, Syria accepted direct negotiations 
without reference to prior Israeli withdrawal, but was not willing to accept 
full peace for entire Israeli withdrawal from Golan and other "occupied 
lands", but rather referred to non-belligerency, without recognizing Israel 3 11 
In March 1992, Syria showed signs of readiness to recognize Israel on the 
condition that Israel withdraw from Golan and other "occupied lands" and 
was considering a peace agreement. Later the same year, Syria gave 
statements accepting Israel for the first time and noting its security needs. 3 12 
In September 1992, Syria was ready to accept `a total peace' with Israel, but 
peace was still to be based on full withdrawal from all "occupied lands" and 
it should include all Arab parties, including the Palestinians. 3 13 In May 
1993, Syria stated that peace agreements with different Arab parties can be 
made separately and bilaterally. 314 At the beginning of 1994, Syria indirectly 
expanded the meaning of `peace' to include full normalization and 
diplomatic relations. 315 Negotiations did not, however, bring results. 
"o Ben-Yehuda, Hemda and Sandler, Shmuel. The Arab-Israeli Conflict Transformed. 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002, p. 159. 311 Ma'oz, Syria and Israel. From War to Peacemaking, p. 209. 312 Ibid, pp. 216,217. 
31 Ibid, pp. 226,231. 
314 Ibid, p. 233. 315 Ma'oz, Syria and Israel. From War to Peacemaking, pp. 242-243,245. 
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Similarly to the Gulf war, this strategic turn to negotiations was done while 
maintaining consistency with foreign policy goals and Pan-Arab rhetoric. 
This meant that Syria preferred multilateral negotiations and a 
comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 316 Syria had some 
strategic power over Lebanon and also the PLO, who declared in 1991 that 
Syrian and Palestinian needs are identical317, lending Syria some level of 
control over the Madrid multilateral negotiations between Israel and Syria, 
Lebanon and the Jordanian-Palestinian teams. Indeed, one of Israeli Prime 
Minister Rabin's considerations regarding negotiations with Syria was to 
keep them going in order that Syria would not interrupt the Israeli- 
Palestinian rapprochement. 318 After Israel opted for secret bilateral 
negotiations with the PLO and the surprise agreement in 1993, Syria's 
position was badly damaged. In public, Asad did not object to the 
agreement, and did not wish to obstruct it 319 Syria's position was further 
weakened after the Israeli-Jordan non-belligerency declaration in July 1994, 
although publicly Syria considered it as part of the implementation of the 
comprehensive peace negotiations. 320 A peace agreement between Israel and 
Jordan followed October 1994. Syria was clearly left behind. 
Syria kept its military option, but clearly counted on the political option. It 
used confrontational tactics to pressure Israel if the negotiations did not 
advance, 321 or if Syria objected to Israeli policies. For example, after Israeli 
Prime Minister Rabin announced that he would first opt for the Israeli- 
Palestinian peace and leave negotiations with Syria for a later stage, and 
after Rabin refused to agree to withdraw from the entire Golan, Syria 
activated Hizbollah in July 1993 to hit Israeli targets and provoked Israel 
into a week-long war against the guerrilla group in South-Lebanon. 322 Syria 
also used Hizbollah to demonstrate its unhappiness in November 1993 to the 
316 Quilliam, Syria and the New World Order, p. 4. 317 Ma'oz, Syria and Israel. From War to Peacemaking, p. 207. 318 Ibid, p. 225. 
319 Ibid, p. 238. 
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Israeli pressure and preference for the Palestinian track after the Oslo 
agreement. Another week-long bout of fighting between Hizbollah and 
Israel took place in February 1994. On the other hand, Syria also used its 
control of Hizbollah as a positive signal to the Israelis, as happened later in 
1994.323 Very similarly to the 1993 conflict with Israel and Hizbollah, the 
fighting resumed again in April 1996 during the election campaign in Israel 
and a halt in Israeli-Syrian negotiations. 324 
During the 1990s, Syria also continued war preparation in addition to peace 
negotiations. Syria did not abandon militarization, although the intensity of 
militarization diminished from the moment that foreign aid ceased to fund a 
cheap war preparation strategy at the end of the 1980s. As noted earlier, 
Syria aimed to gain new sources of arms supplies and partly managed to 
satisfy its military needs. According to Maoz, Syria gained a major boost for 
its military build-up as it was able to use the aid from the Gulf that it 
acquired after the Gulf war for arms imports. Syria reportedly bought 
SCUD-missiles from North-Korea and tanks from Czechoslovakia. 
325 
Otherwise, the arms imports to Syria ceased. According to figures provided 
by SIPRI, arms imports indeed declined from 3% to less than 0.5 % between 
1991 and 1994 and remained below 0.5% during the end of the decade. 
General military expenditure also remained below 6% for most of the 
decade. 
Syrian relations with the US continued to be relatively good, considering the 
general US strategy to contain what it called the confrontational states of 
Iran, Iraq and Syria, and to engage with the moderate Arab regimes 326 Syria 
also actively built alliances to counter the US hegemony and to balance 
against it. Globally, Syria turned to old and new partners. Syria imported 
cheap arms from the former Eastern Bloc and continued relations with 
323 Ibid. pp. 244,250. 
324 Ben-Yehuda and Sandier, The Arab-Israeli Conflict Transformed, pp. 159-169. 
325 Ma'oz, Syria and Israel. From War to Peacemaking, p. 208. 
326 Indyk, Martin. "Back to the Bazaar. " Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 1, January/February 
2002, p. 77. 
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Russia, which forgave Syrian loans. 327 Arms were also exported from China 
and North-Korea. 328 
Syria also formed relations with the EU. The European policies towards 
Syria from 1990 were somewhat similar to the US. Since the EU was 
established in 1992, it was slowly considered as a relatively significant actor 
in the Middle East. However, it could not counterbalance the US. 329 The 
proximity to the region was manifested in the Barcelona process, or the 
Euromed cooperation, from 1995. The main aim was to promote economic 
development and a framework for interdependence by means of a free trade 
area by 2010. The EU's policy towards Syria was based on integrating Syria 
through the Euromed, and helping Syria to prepare for globalization, 
economic restructuring and peace with Israel. 330 Syria did not, however, 
begin serious negotiations on the association agreement with the EU during 
the 1990s like several other Arab states. 
Regionally, Syria also continued to seek a power balance through its 
alliances, and it managed to continue engaging with two opposing regional 
alliances. Syria continued its alliance with anti-US Iran and opened relations 
to Iraq at the end of the 1990s, despite the UN sanctions. As regards the pro- 
US alliance, Syria allied with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, during the 
era of negotiations, Syria drew significantly closer to these US-allied, 
moderate regimes. 331 This balanced the deteriorating relations with Turkey, 
and increasingly warming relations between Turkey and Israel. 332 Later 
towards the end of the decade, Syria strengthened its ties to Turkey, Jordan 
and the PLO. 
327 Hinnebusch, Syria. Revolution from Above, p. 161. 329 Quilliam, Syria and the New World Order, pp. 131-132. Hinnebusch, Syria. Revolution 
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External fiscal environment in context of regional peace-making 
The most significant change related to the external fiscal environment was 
the decline of aid. Generally, the average level of aid fell by half from the 
Cold War period of 1970-1989.333 Not only did aid diminish in the 1990s, 
but it also became tied to peace-making as opposed to the war preparation of 
the previous Cold War era. Aid was given to side with the moderate Arab 
governments in regional affairs. The aid to Syria peaked in 1990-1991 
during the Gulf war and the Madrid peace conference. Another peak in aid 
to Syria was in 1994, during the era of negotiations between Israel and the 
PLO, when the prospect of peace with Israel and Arab governments seemed 
possible. Much of this aid came again from the Arab governments, but most 
came from Japan, a new source of aid in the region. Japan became a large 
contributor of aid also in other years to Syria. Notable was also that the Arab 
aid decreased towards the end of the 1990s. EU aid stayed small, although 
economic relations with Europe became more important. 33' The peaks did 
not, however, reach the levels of the intense war preparation era of 1974- 
1986. Then the aid peaked at $1800 million, whereas the peaks in the 1990s 
reached only up to around $700 million. Otherwise, aid remained around the 
level of $200 million, compared to around $600 million from the end of the 
1970s to the end of the 1980s. 
333 The average annual ODA for years 1990-1999 was 342.42 million US dollars and for 
the years 1970-1989,672.77 million dollars. Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, Development Assistance Committee. International Development Statistics 
(2006). 
"a EU became the main trade partner and donor of economic aid already in the early 1990s. 
Hinnebusch, Syria. Revolution from Above, p. 161. 
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Fable 26: 
Total net ODA (OA) to S. A. R. In 1990-1999, in millions USD 
Source OECDIDAC 2008 
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The losses from aid revenues were substituted by a significant increase in 
fuel export revenues. Syrian crude oil and natural gas production and export 
revenues from fuel (crude oil exports is used here as another indicator) 
increased significantly from 1989 as the following tables show. The crude 
oil and NGL production more than tripled between the end of the 1980s and 
the mid-1990s. 
Table 27: 
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S. A. R. crude oll and NGL production according to IEA In 1971-2005 (1000 b/d) 
Source lEA 2006 
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Table 28: 335 
S. A. R. fuel and crude oil export revenues according to different calculations In 1970-2005 
(in millions USD) 
Sources World Bank 2006. OPEC 2006 and IEA, 2006 
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  World Bank, 2006: Fuel exports  OPEC, 2006: Crude oil exports (Values calculated using Brent prices from lEA, 2006. ) 
The higher production meant higher export levels and revenue. The 
crude oil export revenues increased from an annual average of $807.4 
million in the 1980-1989 period, to an annual average of $1942.5 
million in 1990-1999, marking an increase of 241% in the annual 
average. 336 The fuel exports were significant compared to overall 
exports, varying between 40% and 80% from the middle of the 1970s 
to the end of the 1990s. 
35 World Bank values are not available for several years. OPEC values are available for 
1982-2005. 
j"' Note that the lack of figures for several years may cause inaccuracy. The annual average figures 
are therefore only tentative. 
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Table 29: 337 
Composition of S. A. R. merchandise exports in 1970-2004 (in millions USD) 
Source World Bank 2006 
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Although the increase in oil production was significant for Syria's economy, 
Syria did not gain in significance as an oil producer on a global scale. 
Therefore, there was no effect on the strategic importance of the country to 
the external powers, for example. In comparison. Syrian fuel exports were 
only around 1% of world total exports and between 2-2.5% of Middle 
Eastern exports, as the following tables show. 
Table 30: 338 
S. A. R. fuel exports' share of merchandise exports in 1974-2004 (%) 
Source. Work? Bank 2006 
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3'7 Only total export values are available for 1970-1973,1988,1991 and 1993-1994. "'ý Values not available for several years. 
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Table 31: 
S. A. R. shares of world crude oil exports in 1980-2005 (%) 
Source OPEC, 2006 
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Table 32: 
Crude oil exports of major Arab exporters and Iran in 1980-2005 (1000 bid) 
Source OPEC. 2006 
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Compared to the Cold War era, Russian trade diminished to almost zero. 
Syria continued to import a little less than during the Cold War from Eastern 
Europe, although trade relations intensified significantly with Europe 
overall. Compared to the Cold War figures on imports and exports, 
however, the intensification does not appear to be significant, but the EU 
remained clearly the main trading partner to Syria. Trade with the Gulf 
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states and Turkey intensified, while Japan became a new trade partner in the 
import sector. Imports from the US also increased somewhat. The volume of 
trade rose clearly. 
Table 33: 
Imports from selected countries to S. A. R. In 1990-1999 (%) 
Source IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. 2006 
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Table 34: 
(%) Exports from S. A. R to selected countries in 1990-1999 
Source IMF Direction of Trade statistics, 2006 
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Table 35: 
S. A. R. exports and Imports to the world in 1990-1999 (In millions USD) 
Source IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, 2006 
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Foreign direct investment (FDI) could also be considered as important gains 
from the external environment. Generally. FDI to the Arab countries outside 
of the Gulf region was small in worldwide comparison. Between 1987 and 
1992, Arab countries received 1.3% of all world FDI flows, and the situation 
did not improve greatly in the 1990s. From 1993 to 1998, Arab countries 
received 1.8% of world FDI flows. 339 By regional comparison. Syria was 
among the lower recipients of FDI flows, while Saudi Arabia and Egypt 
received the most investments. Morocco and Tunisia received the next 
largest shares of FDI, with for example FDI flows of around $5 billion in 
1998. Algeria, Oman, UAE and Yemen received around $2 billion, followed 
by Syria and Jordan with a little above $1 billion in FDI flows, leaving 
Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Lebanon as the smallest recipients. 40 Annually. 
Syria received between $62 million and $263 million in foreign investments. 
Generally, annual investments remained below $100 million. 341 
'3'9 Sadik, Ali T. and Bolbol, Ali A. ýtlohili_ing International C'upital /i r Arab Economic 
Development: With Special Reference to the Role oI'FDL Abu Dhabi: Economic Policy 
Institute, Arab Monetary Fund, 2000, p. 71. Figures are based on United National 
Conference on Trade and Development. World Investment Report 1999. 
340 Sadik and Bolbol, Mohili_ing International Capital f. r Arah Economic Development: 
With Special Reference to the Role o, 'FDI, p. 73. 341 United National Conference on Trade and Development. World Investment Report 
1993-2004. 
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Conclusions 
The external security environment changed fundamentally for Syria. The 
prompting factors behind the change in Syria's position vis-ä-vis its external 
environment are the loss of a superpower ally after the Cold War, the US 
hegemony, the diminished importance of Arab-Israeli conflict and pan-Arab 
credentials. Syria consequently lost some of its regional prestige. However, 
Hinnebusch and Ehteshami note that in 1996 that Syria occupied a specific 
"middle power" position in the Middle East, holding significant regional 
importance. 342 Syria was able to adapt to the changed environment and the 
losses from the external security sphere were not as dramatic as one could 
have imagined, although Syria remained without an extra-regional 
superpower patron and isolated from regional peace-making. The losses 
include the deterioration of a degree of Syrian influence in regional affairs 
and a major deterioration in its military power and importance. In spite of 
this, Syria was able, rather successfully, to adapt to the post-Cold War 
environment. The external security environment after the Cold War posed 
some challenge to the legitimacy of the Syrian regime domestically, due to 
the fall of socialism, lower need for war preparation and the launch of the 
342 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch,. Syria and Iran. Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional 
System, pp. 6-7. 
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S. A. R. FDI inflows in 1987-1999 (in millions USD) 
Source UNCTAD WIR 1993-2004 
peace process. The external fiscal environment challenged the fiscal 
capabilities of the state after the loss of most of its foreign aid. This was, 
however, substituted by new gains from the fuel export income that can be 
considered the major reason for which the effects of the enormous external 
changes did not touch the domestic political system or its authoritarian 
nature. This will be demonstrated in the following chapters. 
4.2 External resource extraction and state power 
This chapter aims to evaluate how external resource extraction affected state 
power between 1990 and 1999. I will consider how the rentier nature of 
Syria changed after the Cold War, when the revenues from the superpower 
patron and Arab countries decreased drastically. The main sources of rents 
after the Cold War, the amount of rents of the total government revenue and 
the importance of specific rents to the fiscal capabilities of the state will also 
be identified. I will accord particular consideration to the ways in which the 
fall of aid revenues and increase of fuel export income affect the fiscal 
capabilities, placing it in the context of the economic strategies of the state 
to see how the fiscal capabilities affected the regime's power base and the 
strategies to pursue co-option through economic liberalization. 
Level of rentierism 
The following tables provide data on Syrian external revenues from 1990 to 
1999. The first table includes aid as a percentage of GDP, the second fuel 
exports as a percentage of GDP, and the third worker remittances as a 
percentage of GDP 343 
a' Due to different editions of World Bank World Development Indicators used as sources 
for workers' remittance values, there are differences between the percentages above 
(Edition: April 2006) and the percentages used in the study (Edition: September 2005). 
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Table 37: 
Total net ODA (OA) to S. A. R. In 1990-1999, (% of GDP) 
Source World Bank. April 2006 and OECD/DAC, 2006 
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Table 38: 344 
Fuel exports of S. A. R. In 1990-1999, (% of GDP) 
Source World Bank, 2006 
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344 Values are not available for 1991 and I993-94. 
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Table 39: 
Workers' remittances to S. A. R. In 1990-1999 (% of GDP) 
Source World Bank. 2006 
12% 
10% 
8% 
6% 
4% 
2% 
0% 
The increase in oil revenues in the 1990s was significant in relation to other 
rents. 4 After the Cold War, fuel export revenues had clearly taken the 
place of aid revenues as the major source of external income and even 
substituted the decline of aid revenues. The annual average income from 
fuel exports was 16.3% of GDP, ranging between 10.9% in 1998 and 19.8% 
in 1996.46 The increase in annual averages in fuel export revenues 
compared to the Cold War era was close to one-third. The aid revenues 
declined significantly, the annual average being only 2.8% of GDP ranging 
between the lowest level at 1.0% of GDP in 1998 and the highest at 7.4% in 
1994. The workers' remittances were an annual average of 6.3% of GDP, 
ranging between 4.2 % of GDP and 10.9% of GDP. 
The significantly higher fuel export revenues in the 1990s have been noted 
in previous research, but not well enough. The peak of aid related to the 
Gulf war in 1990 in particular is often emphasized, but according to these 
figures, the aid was less than a half of the fuel export revenue the same 
year. 347 For example, Perthes evaluates that the Arab aid was still significant 
345 This is also noted by Perthes. According to his estimation, in the 1990s oil was the 
largest single source of government revenue. Perthes, The Political Economy (J. Svt'iu tinder 
Asad, p. 64. 
346 The figures for the years 1991,1993 and 1994 are not available, however. '" Hinnebusch notes new rents from oil production (500 million dollars in the early 1990s) 
as one major source of revenue. The aid received from participation in the Gulf war was 2 
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in the 1990s, comprising 25% of all Gulf aid. According to him, although 
; 4x the aid levels were decreasing, they were nonetheless substantial. 
However, Syria received significantly less aid than Egypt and Jordan. the 
annual average of Syrian aid being 2.8%, Egyptian 5.8% and Jordanian 
9.6%. It is also of note that according to these figures, the worker 
remittances were more than double the aid that Syria received in the I990s. 
The following table shows the fuel export revenue and aid income combined 
as a percentage of GDP. 
Table 40: 3 49 
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Surprisingly and significantly, the overall external revenues contributing to 
the state were almost at around the same level in the 1990s as they were in 
the era of high aid revenue levels at the end of the 1970s and beginning of 
the 1980s during the Cold War. The annual average of fuel export and aid 
income was 18.6% of GDP, varying between a minimum of 11.9% and 
maximum of 22.7%. The external revenues contributing to the state were 
over 20% for only a few years, but they were always over 15%, with the 
billion dollars. Hinnebusch, Raymond. "The Political Economy of Economic Liberalization 
in Syria", p. 313. 
"" Perthes, The Political Economy qt Syria under .4 sad, p. 65. 349 Fuel export values are not available for 1991 and 1993-94. 
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exception of 11.2% of GDP in 1998. During the high aid levels of the Cold 
War, the average annual external revenue was 20% and 11.4% during the 
lower levels towards the end of the 1980s. 
Again, as during the Cold War, these figures do not demonstrate that Syria 
would have clearly qualified as a semi-rentier economy as the external 
revenues did not rise over 20% on average, although from the end of the 
Cold War they seem to have reached very close to it, certainly closer than 
during the Cold War. Yet, as the aid levels are suspected to he higher than 
reported to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
Syria can be considered a semi-rentier state. Syrian external rents consisted 
mostly of fuel export revenues in the 1990s, and based on this observation. 
Syria can be considered a semi-rentier state economy during this era. 
The following table analyses the amount of external revenues compared to 
domestic revenues and gives an indication of the fiscal autonomy of the 
state. 
Table 41: 3'0 
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After the Cold War in the 1990s, the share of external revenues of the 
overall total seems to have increased. On average, the annual external 
revenues were 18.6% of GDP as the domestic revenues were an annual 
average of 22.8% and the overall revenues were 41.5% of GDP. The 
external revenues constituted between 34.2 % and 49.7% of GDP of total 
revenues, on average 44.3% of GDP of total revenues annually. This annual 
average is some 5% more than during the Cold War era. This finding is 
important considering the fiscal autonomy of the Syrian state since the end 
of the Cold War. According to these figures, the fiscal autonomy would 
have increased despite the sharp decline in aid. This analysis thus 
demonstrates that the oil revenues have maintained the external revenues at 
an exceptionally high level since the end of the 1980s and given the regime 
the means to maintain the balance of political power. 
The shift from war preparation to peace negotiations altered the ability of the 
Syrian regime to use external extraction strategies. Unlike the war 
preparation of the earlier years, the peace negotiations did not bring aid to 
Syria. 35 ' The striking difference from the 1970s and 1980s to the 1990s was 
also the decline in state spending on militarization. Therefore, the external 
revenues contributed even more to the fiscal autonomy of the regime. A 
significant decrease in overall military expenditures followed in the 1990s 
after a small peak of 13.4% during the Gulf war 1990/1991. The slowdown 
appears to have been primarily due to the end of arms imports. From 1990, 
Syria has invested only a few per cent of its GDP in arms imports. Indeed, in 
the 1990s, Syrian military expenditures fell to a level somewhat typical to 
that of third world states. The difference to the Cold War era is highly 
significant, as the decline from an annual average of 25.9% to 8.4% marks a 
decline of 17.5% of GDP. 
More specifically, the annual average military expenditure was only 36.8% 
of domestic revenues and 45.2% of external revenues. All in all, the military 
expenditures accounted for as little as 20.2% on average annually of total 
351 Hinnebusch, Raymond. "The Politics of Economic Liberalization. Comparing Egypt and 
Syria", p. 122. 
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revenues as a percentage of GDP during 1990-1999. There was, theretore, 
even less need to bargain with the domestic constituencies because of war 
preparation. The following tables present the figures of the military 
expenditure and arms imports as well as calculations of the relation between 
military spending and external revenues, domestic revenues and total 
revenues. 
Table 42: 
S. A. R. military expenditure in 1990-1999 (% of GDP) 
Source SIPRI 2005 
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Table 43: 
S. A. R. arms imports in 1990-1999 (% of GDP) 
Source Word Bank, 2005 
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Table 44: 
S. A. R. total military expenditure in 1990-1999 (% of GDP) 
Source SIPRI, 2005 and World Bank 2005 
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S. A. R. total military expenditure and exterrnal revenue in 1990-1999 (% of GDP) 
Sources SIPRI, 2005. World Bank. 2005-2006 and DAC/OECD 2006 
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The state of course was obliged to spend much of the new wealth on 
stabilizing measures and debt repayments after the disastrous economic 
climate of the preceding decade. Considering that the debt stocks were 
continuously higher than the GDP from the mid-1980s to 2003. there was a 
pressing need for extra revenues. The need fier extra resources also increased 
as a result of population growth. At least some of the external revenues 
appear to also have been deposited as foreign assets. These foreign currency 
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reserves were likely to increase the regime's ability to have a financial 
putter for regime security. The following table illustrates the debt stocks in 
relation to GDP and the increase of' foreign currency reserves 
simultaneously with the increase of oil exports. 
Table 48: 
Total debt stocks and GDP of S. A. R. In 1990-1999, In millions USD 
Source World Bank April 2006 
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Table 49: 
Net foreign assets of S. A. R. in 1970-2003 (% of GDP) 
Source World Bank 2006 
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The regime's fiscal autonomy and ability to manage the debt crisis and 
spend elsewhere increased significantly, considering the lower military 
commitment and the increase in external revenues and tax income from the 
1990s. If the external revenues increased by 5% of GDP as an annual 
average, and military expenditures declined by 17.5% of GDP as an annual 
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average, and taxation brought an extra 5% of GDP as an annual average, this 
theoretical estimation would have resulted in almost 30% of GDP of extra 
revenue compared to the Cold War era. Much of this increase, of course, 
should have gone to debt repayments. These figures are also naturally only 
very tentative, but the result is nevertheless important. It is possible to 
conclude that external resource extraction in the 1990s succeeded in 
returning the fiscal capabilities to the state that it had had during the 1970s 
and beginning of the 1980s. 
Fiscal autonomy and economic policies of the state 
The increase in fiscal capabilities and the endurance of the autonomy of the 
state becomes highly important if placed in the context of the emergence of 
the era of liberal hegemony, fall of the Cold War and the intense debt crisis 
experienced by many countries in the region. The fiscal capabilities allowed 
Syria to maintain its socio-economic structures and authoritarianism intact 
despite the external pressures of liberalization. This provides a powerful 
explanation as to why Syria - unlike many other Arab states - was able to 
maintain its political system intact after the end of the Cold War and afford 
to defend its sovereignty vis-ä-vis international creditors 352 This external 
extraction policy in Syria deferred Syria from resorting to domestic resource 
extraction strategies. In comparison, for example, Jordan had to resort to 
wider economic liberalization directed by the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank in return for loans to survive the debt crisis. Iraq is an 
extreme example of a country that rejected the idea of increasing domestic 
extraction because of regime stability, as Iraq resorted to an attempt to 
increase external extraction by occupation of neighbouring Kuwait 353 
Considering the debt of the acute economic crisis, Syria survived better 
compared to other Arab states as a result of its ability to extract by means of 
increased fuel exports. Indeed, the argument here is that the external 
352 Hinnebusch, Raymond. "The Politics of Economic Liberalization. Comparing Egypt and 
Syria", p. 122. 
's' Tripp, Charles, A History of Iraq. Second Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000, pp. 251-252. 
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revenues explain the endurance of a high level of authoritarianism in Syria 
since the Cold War. 
The economic policies of the state included external resource extraction with 
minor economic liberalization for managing the debt crisis. The fiscal 
autonomy was sufficient for the state not to pursue further liberalization 
policies on a larger scale, but due to the debts, they were insufficient to 
completely avoid the pursuit of liberalization policies. 354 The revenues and 
some liberalization were just enough for the state to maintain its basic 
functions, and to continue with a number of features of a rentier state- 
economy, the state led-economy, allocation and co-option policies. 
The Syrian economy in the 1990s was a mixed economy of an authoritarian 
state, as Hinnebusch calls it ass The state was not taking care of the major part 
of the economy as would have been the case in a pure rentier state economy, 
but the state controlled the economic activities. The interests of the 
bourgeoisie were not apparent in the policies of the state, but the state was 
driving its own interest, typical to rentier state economies. Compared to 
Egypt, where the state had to share power with the bourgeoisie from an early 
stage, Syria was still able to avoid this in the 1990s. 356 By 2000, Syria was a 
rentier state economy with a large private sector. This was clearly due to the 
external resource extraction option that Syria had at its disposal. 
The liberalization measures that began at the end of the 1980s continued 
into the 1990s, but no major steps were taken. The limited economic 
liberalization was an act of bargaining with the private sector to balance the 
economy and to continue with the classic policy of co-option. 357 The 
economic accommodation revolved around giving the private sector greater 
responsibility for the economy. By the end of the 1990s, the state no longer 
had a monopoly over foreign trade, price controls were relaxed, there was 
354 Hinnebusch, "The Political Economy of Economic Liberalization in Syria", p. 313. ass Hinnebusch, "Calculated Decompression as a Substitute for Democratization: Syria", p. 
233. 
356 Hinnebusch, "The Politics of Economic Liberalization. Comparing Egypt and Syria", p. 
130. 
337 Hinnebusch, "The Political Economy of Economic Liberalization in Syria", p. 317. 
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new concessionary investment, new tax laws and more mixed sector 
companies. 358 At the beginning of the 1990s, the private sector had a 90% 
share of agriculture, half of the foreign trade, most of the domestic trade and 
close to 75% of surplus from industries. 359 By 2001,65% of GDP was 
produced by the private sector. 360 As a result, taxation revenues to the state 
also increased. In 1990s, the taxation was an annual average of 17.3 % of 
GDP, which is around 5% more than during the Cold War era. 361 
Limited economic liberalization was pursued for regime security; in other 
words it was defensive. 362 Economic liberalization was therefore not deep: 
although the private sector share increased significantly, the reforms did not 
affect its dependence. Secondly, the private sector was happy with the 
marriage with the state. It had no interests in opposing the state. Although 
there was a need to bargain with the bourgeoisie, this had no effect on 
politics, because the bourgeoisie did not oppose the state. 
The state became more dependent than before on the private sector in the 
economy, 363 but the private sector was more dependent on the state, due to 
the continuing co-option strategies and ability to keep the interests of the 
private sector tied to the state. For basic activities, the bourgeoisie still 
required state licenses and protection. 36' The bourgeoisie did not have 
organizational strength and had no interest in challenging the state. The 
regime was not promoting the interests of the bourgeoisie, but the state. 
365 
Liberalization did not constitute a change in the balance of power, only an 
increase in emphasis on business people. There was an exhaustion of 
358 Hinnebusch, "The Politics of Economic Liberalization. Comparing Egypt and Syria", p. 
121. 
359 Perthes, "A Look at Syria's Upper Class: The Bourgeoisie and the Bath", p. 31. 
360 Perthes, Syria under BasharAl-Asad: " Modernization and the Limits of Change, p. 30. 
361 International Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics, October 2006. 
362 Perthes, "The Private Sector, Economic Liberalization, and the Prospects of 
Democratization: the Case of Syria and some other Arab Countries", p. 267. 
363 Leverett, Inheriting Syria. Bashar's Trial by Fire, p. 31. 
364 For more on the role of the state and bourgeoisie, see Perthes, Syria under Bashar Al- 
Asad: Modernization and the Limits of Change, pp. 28-29 and 30-31. 
365 Perthes, Volker, The Private Sector, Economic Liberalization, and the Prospect of 
Democratization: The Case of Syria and Some Other Arab Countries. In Salame, 
Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Policy in the Muslim World, pp. 243-269, 
259-261. 
methods of co-option however. The limits of liberalization were faced and 
further reforms would have compromised too much of the regime's 
security. 366 Thus far, however, the state had sufficient fiscal capabilities to 
use some liberalization measures to co-opt and to strengthen the regime 
without compromising state autonomy. 
Syria's economic reforms were carried out domestically, although many of 
the measures were according to the Washington consensus. 367 There was 
therefore very little external influence on Syrian economic or political 
liberalization. Hinnebusch claims that had Syria been allied with the US, 
there would have been pressure to reform. 368 In comparison, states with a 
similar economic structure but allied with the US and the EU, Egypt and 
Jordan, have made relatively significant progress with economic and 
political reforms. Syria limited the external influence and maintained as 
much sovereignty as possible, also on the economic front. Although there 
was a clear understanding of the need to integrate into the global economy 
from the Cold War369 onwards, there was very little foreign investment and 
Syrian industry was protected from international competition. 370 Compared 
to other Arab states, Syria seemed to manage even better than others in 
limiting the effects of globalization. The economic liberalization also had a 
purely domestic logic, as the increased role of the private sector was seen as 
a boost to economic growth. Hinnebusch, however, writes that liberalization 
was also partly due to the understanding that Western alignment requires 
liberalization. 71 Although the external influence existed as a spirit of the 
`liberal era' and there was some diffusion of values, in practice the 
economic reforms were due to domestic needs and they were executed with 
the logic of domestic power balance, without external interference. 
366 Hinnebusch, Syria. Revolution from Above, p. 113. 367 Perthes, "The Private Sector, Economic Liberalization, and the Prospects of 
Democratization: the Case of Syria and some other Arab Countries", p. 248. 369 Hinnebusch, Syria. Revolution from Above, pp. 103-104. 369 Hinnebusch, "The Politics of Economic Liberalization. Comparing Egypt and Syria", p. 
115. 
370 Perthes, "The Private Sector, Economic Liberalization, and the Prospects of Democratization: the Case of Syria and some other Arab Countries", pp. 248,251. 371 Hinnebusch, "The Political Economy of Economic Liberalization in Syria", p. 316. 
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4.3 Regional peace making and state autonomy 
This chapter analyzes how the prospect of peace making and decreasing war 
preparation affected the state autonomy. The chapter argues that the effect 
of the external environment regarding peacemaking did not diminish state 
powers, although military spending decreased. On the contrary, the prospect 
of peace making increased legitimacy and there were greater revenues to 
spend elsewhere while maintaining the same level of coercive capabilities. 
The fiscal capabilities still allowed the maintenance of the structures and 
status quo in the 1990s created by allocation and co-option during the Cold 
War. It is for this reason that the major events in Syria's international, 
regional and domestic environment from the end of the Cold War did not 
have an effect on its domestic political system. As the political structures 
were firmly created and steady, there was very little knock-on effect from 
the changes in the external environment and the same level of 
authoritarianism remained. 
The external changes, end of the Cold War and regional peace negotiations 
affected the level of war preparation. Some level of war preparation was 
retained both for external and domestic purposes. The big difference was 
that war preparation was no longer pursued for actual war-waging, 
according to Perthes. From the early 1970s militarization was an end, not a 
means, for actual war-waging. 72 "Preparedness to conduct, let alone begin, 
a war with Israel was not even the central objective of war preparation. 
Instead, regime stability and control seem to have been much more 
pivotal. "373 He proves this by showing that arms imports to Syria were 
primarily defensive in nature, that military strategies were focused on the 
security of the capital and the regime, and that there was no development of 
a war economy and almost no domestic production of arms. In addition, 
Syrian foreign policy shows a need to avoid both war and peace. 374 This 
372 Perthes, "Si Vis Stabilitatem, Para Bellum. State Building, National Security, and War 
Preparation in Syria", p. 151. 
33 it id, p. 160. 
374 Perthes, "Si Vis Stabilitatem, Para Bellum. State Building, National Security, and War 
Preparation in Syria", pp. 159-165. 
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would lead to suggest, as Perthes does, that war preparation served a 
domestic aim, although the external threat was real. 375 
Similarly to Perthes, I would argue that war preparation was both for 
external and domestic purposes, but there were limits to the extent to which 
domestic security would have been sacrificed for external purposes in the 
1990s. The lack of a war economy is explainable thus. Proof of this is also 
found in the reduced effort for war preparation after the decline in rents. 376 
Syria cut on arms imports, but maintained the extent of the army for 
domestic reasons. Also, the limited war preparation effort served the 
regional purposes of Syria. War preparation was about reaching a maximum 
level of deterrence. There was no reason to prepare for actual war. In 
addition, there was no realistic option to win a war. Therefore, the war 
preparation was limited to serving the external purpose of deterrence. 
The effect domestically was such that the state had the fiscal capabilities to 
maintain its security sector at a level that made it possible to maintain the 
coercive capabilities domestically. There were no significant changes made 
in the army or security sector. The coercive capabilities of the state can be 
expected to have remained the same. The numbers employed by the army 
declined somewhat from 1989. Altogether in the 1990s, the decline of 
persons employed by the army was from close to 12% to close to 8%. 377 
However, the amount of staff in the domestic security apparatus is not 
included in this figure, and there are no reliable figures or estimations on 
this. The small decline in army manpower itself had no large impact on the 
coercive powers of the state. Thus although peace negotiations had some 
effect on war preparation, it can be assumed that it did not have any effect 
on coercive powers. With the same fiscal and coercive powers, the 
autonomy of the state was similar to that of the Cold War period. 
375 See also Zisser, The Syrian Army: Between the Domestic and External Fronts, p. 6. 376 Clawson, "Unaffordable Ambitions: Syria's Military Build-up and Economic Crisis", p. 
7. 
377 The World Bank: World Development Indicators (Edition: September 2005). 
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There was no need for bargaining with the public on spending on war 
preparation, and neither was there any need to bargain with people on 
peacemaking. First, the president had autonomous powers on foreign policy 
decisions. Second, there was no opposition to peacemaking - on the 
contrary. Unlike in Jordan, for example, where the large Palestinian 
population negatively affected opinions on peace with Israel, in Syria, peace 
according to Syrian demands would have been a sign of national greatness 
and a great success of Asad's foreign policy. 378 Peace has also been viewed 
as attracting new investments. 379 
There were no significant changes to the institutional capabilities during the 
last ten years of Hafez al-Asad, 1990-1999. Limited economic liberalization, 
although it created a very large private sector, did not lead to political 
liberalization or democratization. Having said this, there is a need to analyse 
the small changes at the beginning of the 1990s in the political sphere and 
their potential to be defined as acts of political liberalization or 
democratization. First, there were public reactions by the president to the 
fall of communism and the emerging hegemony of liberalism. Some rhetoric 
on pluralism increased. Asad insisted that Syria has a "multi-party system" 
and because of the large private sector, Syria was not a socialist country. 380 
This can be seen as addressing the international and domestic audiences by 
very modestly acknowledging that the Ba'ath ideology was outdated. This 
was also apparent in Asad's manoeuvres in giving private sector 
representatives public attention, by showing alliance with important 
businessmen. 81 This rhetorical flirtation was done without ever 
undermining the party as one of the foundations of the state and regime. The 
rhetoric and manoeuvres can therefore be seen as nothing but defensive. The 
rhetoric was used to rally support for the regime by showing adaptation to 
the new world. 
378 Hinnebusch, Raymond A. "Syria: The Politics of Peace and Regime Survival". Middle East 
Policy, Vol. 3 No. 4, April 1995, pp. 74-87, p. 85. 
379 Perthes, Volker. "From Front-Line State to Backyard? Syria and the Economic Risks of 
Regional Peace". The Beirut Review, No. 8, Fall 1994, pp. 81-95, p. 90. 380 Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Asad, p. 138. 381 Perthes, "The Private Sector, Economic Liberalization, and the Prospects of 
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144 
At the same time, by the turn of the decade, there was an important move to 
increase the number of seats in parliament and allowing independents to run 
as candidates. In the elections of 1991, independents won 30% of the 
seats. 382 The new parliamentarians were mostly businessmen, but also 
traditional leaders and urban middle class professionals. 383 This meant that 
the balance was shifted so that the bourgeoisie and other middle class rose in 
importance in relation to the bureaucracy and the traditional Ba'ath party 
members. Although this was an important move in the otherwise stagnant 
Syrian political scene, the effect on liberalization or democratization was 
minimal, or close to none. The independents worked along the party line and 
did not bring any opposition to the parliament. The true competition that 
reportedly appeared among independents did not increase political 
competition in any liberal sense. Rather, the competition was about access to 
allocation by the candidate and his voters. Also, according to Perthes there 
was no true activation of the parliament. The role of the parliament did not 
change from "a quasi corporatist forum". The parliament discussed, but had 
no power over decisions on economy, services, and local interests. There 
was still no criticism of the president or security, defence and foreign 
affairs. 384 According to many analysts, this move was indeed due to a fall in 
the external revenues of the regime. 385 However, as the preceding chapter 
shows, the external revenues did not fall. More correctly, the economic 
crisis ate more of the revenues, and there was therefore a need for private 
capital and co-option. The extension of the parliament can therefore be seen 
as nothing but a new added method of co-option of the bourgeoisie after 
economic liberalization, necessary to keep their interests tied to the state. 
Some political relaxation also appeared. Political prisoners were freed 1991- 
1992.86 Coercion was milder, press freer and the personality cult of the 
382 Perthes, "The Private Sector, Economic Liberalization, and the Prospects of 
Democratization: the Case of Syria and Some Other Arab Countries", p. 253. 
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president was reduced. 387 Parts of emergency law were also abolished 
related to economic crimes. In 1992 the president even hinted that new 
parties might be allowed. Although these moves are important in the Syrian 
context, they can not be counted as real moves to political liberalization, 
rather a relaxation from the previous intense coercion and repression 
suitable to a time of change internationally, regionally and domestically. 
Perthes also sees liberalization as a need to co-opt the losers of economic 
liberalization, yet again a method to strengthen the regime. 388 
The best indication of the lack of any true democratization or political 
liberalization was the fact that there was still no opposition, whose sphere of 
influence versus that of the state could have increased. There was no 
independent bourgeoisie. There was practically no civil society. Indeed, 
Syria was among the worst cases in regional comparison in this regard. The 
few associations and relatively important trade unions were part of the state 
sphere of influence. If any democracy demands were to rise from the public, 
they were not to be expected from the bourgeoisie, but from the middle class 
intellectuals, who had made such demands in trade unions in 1987. Because 
of the lack of civil society, if there was to be political competition for a 
change in the balance of power, that was not a competition between the state 
and the civil society but a competition within the state. 389 Within the state, 
the situation was stagnant and there was no power struggle. Participation 
within the state was also very limited. There was no Ba'ath party congress 
from 1985.390 The president held power as during the Cold War. 
The liberal thesis indeed seems to be wrong in the Syrian case. Even as the 
private sector increased, no political reforms followed. This has also been 
the case with other Arab states to a varying degree. There are indeed large 
variations between different countries in the amount of political 
387 Hinnebusch, Syria. Revolution from Above, p. 234-235. 
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liberalization and democratization although the level of economic 
liberalization would have been approximately the same. 391 
4.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has shown that despite the enormous changes in the 
international and regional environment, the Syrian state held its power and 
there was almost no effect on the authoritarian political system. The major 
changes in the external security and fiscal environment were the end of the 
Cold War, the loss of the superpower patron, the diminished importance of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict and a practical end to the pan-Arab commitment. In 
other words, the most defining features of the Syrian external environment, 
that were proven to have benefited the Syrian state consolidation in the 
preceding chapter, were gone. The security and financial gains from the 
USSR were substituted by the hegemonic position of the US, which did not 
give Syria many security or economic gains. War preparation was 
substituted by peace making. As a result, the availability of external 
revenues in form of foreign aid came down significantly and the lower 
threat level diminished war preparation. These should have affected state 
power if these external effects were as important as argued in the previous 
chapter. 
The effects on the Syrian political system, however, were minor. The main 
conclusion of this chapter is that the external resources did not indeed 
decline, as is often thought. This is attributable to the increased fuel exports 
that substituted the decline of aid. Actually, external revenues in the 1990s 
were almost at the same level as at the height of the large aid income years 
of the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, the annual average 
being 18.6% of GDP. The fuel export income constituted 16.3% of annual 
average of this figure. 
391 Perthes, "The Private Sector, Economic Liberalization, and the Prospects of 
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Because of these external revenues, the Syrian state did not lose its fiscal 
powers and did not, therefore, have to resort to extensive economic 
liberalization, which would have demanded some changes in the socio- 
economic or political structures of the state. Syria did not have to lose its 
sovereignty vis-a-vis external creditors, the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank, as Jordan and Egypt did, or follow any certain 
economic policy that would have been against the interests of the state. 
Therefore, no significant re-structural change occurred in the economy. A 
severe economic crisis was managed with limited liberalization that made 
the private sector larger than the public, but kept the state as the leading 
force in the economy. A small number of political liberalization measures 
also took place for the sake of co-option, but they did not affect the 
foundations of the political system or the power balance between the state 
and civil society. Indeed, the moves only enhanced the institutional powers 
of the state. 
It is possible to speculate that had the fiscal powers declined severely and 
had the economic crisis deepened, Syria would perhaps have been more 
interested in Western alignment and a peace deal with major economic 
benefits. Being in a surprisingly comfortable situation as Syria was, 
although deeply indebted, Syria could also avoid the Western opening and 
international creditors and the outside pressure for opening its political 
system. Therefore, practically no window-dressing of democracy appeared 
and unlike Jordan and Egypt, Syria did not take any steps in a semi- 
authoritarian direction. 
The lower level of war preparation did not reduce the extent, manpower or 
political importance of the army, police and other security organizations. 
Although war preparation expenses diminished by 17.5% of GDP as an 
annual average, much of this decline was from arms imports and did not 
therefore affect the spending on staff salaries. The co-option through the 
coercive institutions of the state therefore still held importance. The war 
preparation effort did not require domestic extraction, because of the 
remaining high levels of external revenue and declined levels of spending on 
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war preparation. Military expenditure was only 45.2% of GDP of external 
revenues as an annual average. The coercive capabilities were in place with 
no significant effect on them. 
Despite the demolishment of some of the foundations of foreign policy, 
there were no legitimacy problems for the regime, because of the successful 
adaptation to the new regional and international environment. The fall of 
communism and the failure in foreign policy orientation was addressed to 
the public without legitimacy problems. The turn to peace negotiations 
might even have increased the legitimacy of the state. 
Despite the enormous changes by the end of the Cold War, the emerging 
hegemony of liberalism, the regional shift to peace making and the 
economic crisis, the Syrian state had autonomy, efficiency and legitimacy 
and ability to maintain the power structures of the state without any political 
concessions on the level of authoritarianism 392 The state was firmly 
consolidated. 
The 1990s gave few indications of trends that became more apparent since 
the new president took up his role in 2000. There was an understanding of a 
need for economic integration and political engagement with the Western 
actors, hence the rhetoric on pluralism. There was an acknowledgement of 
the need for the enlargement of the private sector for economic growth, 
hence the economic liberalization moves. It was also clear that criticism 
would not arise from bourgeoisie but from the intellectuals, as happened in 
2000, and that the political power struggles would take place within the 
regime, as became clear with the arrival of the new president and his 
policies that challenged some of the status quo. The 1990s were, however, 
an era of continued stagnation and urge for maintaining the status quo for 
regime stability. The structures that were built during the Cold War 
continued to rule without interruption. 
392 The fuel export revenues have been argued to have been the main reason for continuing 
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5 External influence on Syrian authoritarianism 2000-2005 
5.1 International and regional gains and pressures 
Increasingly from the year 2000, pressure from the hegemonic superpower, 
the US, on Syrian foreign politics came to define the Syrian external 
environment. This rendered Syria's regional position increasingly 
vulnerable. Syria's regional position outside the US alliance made Syrian 
policies more confrontational and more problematic for the US, and the US 
used pressure and isolation policies against Syria. Moreover, the external 
threats became increasingly directed towards the regime, rather than the 
state. This had important consequences for the foreign policy of Syria. In 
addition, there was a looming threat from the fiscal environment, as fuel 
export revenues were predicted to fall drastically and be exhausted in the 
near future. 393 It is argued here that the domestic dimension in foreign 
policy, and the measures that could promote regime security and its fiscal 
capabilities, rose in importance from 2000. This is despite the fact that, in 
short term, Syria was indeed able to extract a significant amount of external 
revenues, particularly due to the high oil prizes. This chapter analyzes the 
external environment of the regime headed by the new president Bashar al- 
Asad from 2000 to 2005, and its abilities to dilute pressure and maximize its 
external gains in order to strengthen state power. 
New security environment in the context of US pressure 
The external environment of Syria from 2000 was mostly affected by the 
regional order defined by growing US hegemony. As Syrian interests were 
mostly contrary to the interests of the US in the region, there was evidently 
an increasing level of confrontation between the two. Syrian goals continued 
to focus first and foremost on its national interests concerning the return of 
the Golan Heights. Given the lack of prospects for negotiations (a reflection 
393 International Monetary Fund, Executive Board Concludes 2006, Article IV., 
Consultation with the Syrian Arab Republic. Public Information Notice (PIN), 7. August 
2006. 
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of a strong Israeli regional position and a weak Syrian one), Syria pressured 
Israel politically and militarily by supporting Hizbollah, using its presence 
in Lebanon, supporting Hamas and maintaining its alliance with Iran. Syria 
also deepened its relations with Iraq on the basis of its domestic economic 
needs. 394 The traditional regional aims of the US were related to securing 
Israel and diminishing the regional power of Iran and Iraq in the Gulf region 
for energy security. 395 From the US perspective, the Syrian confrontational 
strategies threatened Israeli security. Syria's alliance with the non-friendly 
Iran and Iraq also positioned Syria in a negative light. After September 11, 
the war against terrorism increased the pressure on Syrian support for 
Hizbollah and the Palestinian groups. Syria was against the war in Iraq and 
aimed to balance the US influence on its borders. Finally, Syria became a 
problem for the US because of its alliance with Iran. As an aftermath of the 
Iraq war, the increased Iranian aim to balance its security deficit by playing 
with nuclear ambitions and the rise in its regional strength made its Syrian 
ally an obstacle for the US in blocking Iranian influence in the region. 
Therefore, Syrian regional interests were contrary to interests of the 
hegemonic superpower in all important aspects. Despite understanding the 
need to re-position itself in a better light with the US, its focus on Golan 
placed Syria firmly on the losing side. Syria remained outside the US 
military, political and economic support that countries like Jordan and Egypt 
enjoyed, and became vulnerable to military, political and economic pressure 
and isolation by the hegemonic world power and its allies. 
As a result, the external environment had two defining levels for Syria from 
2000: the traditional level, which included the Syrian-Israeli confrontation 
and the related aspects of Syrian presence in Lebanon and support for 
Hizbollah and the Palestinian groups; and the broader regional level, 
affected by the US policy change. As a result of the change in US policies in 
the region - especially the war in Iraq - there was a major transformation 
in 
the regional security architecture, which ended the traditional divisions that 
were based on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and brought new divisions between 
394 Perthes, Syria under Bashar AI-Asad: Modernization and the Limits of Change, pp. 49,54,56. 
395 Indyk, "Back to the Bazaar", pp. 75-88. 
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Syria, Iran and their regional allies, Hizbollah and Hamas on the one side, 
and Israel and most of the Arab states on the other. 396 This worked against 
Syrian national interests in the Arab-Israeli conflict, because the policy of 
pressure and isolation by the US reduced Syria's ability to use negotiation to 
achieve peace. 
Because of this duality in the foreign policy environment, Syrian policies 
were also two-dimensional. On the one hand there were policies that were 
related to the national interests against Israel, and on the other hand policies 
that aimed to overcome the threats from the newly emerging security 
architecture and the US. These were very often conflicting and more than 
ever gave mixed signals, as Syria employed both confrontational and 
complying strategies and tactics. Based on this duality, there are also several 
schools of thought in the analysis of Syrian foreign policy. 397 In this 
research, the logic of Syrian foreign policy is analyzed to be such that unless 
the vital national interests related to confrontation with Israel were not at 
stake, Syria aimed to end its isolation and bandwagon with the new regional 
hegemony of the US. It is argued that security and fiscal threats for Syria 
were such from the external environment, that Syria was increasingly eager 
to turn to the West and end its isolation. First, the threat from the 
environment within these two contexts will be analyzed. I then move on to 
review the ways in which Syria aimed to overcome the effects of the 
pressure on its security and fiscal capabilities and state power. 
The broader regional context of Syria's external environment 
In the context of the changed regional security architecture, the most 
defining threats arose from the new Syrian position in the region in 
conjunction with the shift in US policies from supporting Arab-Israeli peace 
396 For the discussions related to emerging new regional trends, see for example Haas, 
Richard N. "The New Middle East". Foreign Affairs, November-December 2006, pp. 2-11. 
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into war against terrorism, isolation of "rogue regimes" and the policy of 
regime change. After September 11, the US aim to re-organize the Middle 
Eastern regional order became the important issue defining Syria's external 
environment. The war on terrorism meant that Syria was analyzed less 
through the prism of Israel-Palestinian or Arab-Israel conflict, but through 
perceived regional problems, causing direct threats to the US. 
The war on terrorism put pressure on Iraq, Syria and Iran, who were defined 
as state-supporters of terrorism by the US, and made their policies more 
problematic for the US. 398 Syria had been listed as a state-supporter of 
terrorism since 1979. After September 11, the US underlined that in 
addition to terrorist groups, there were threats rising from "the axis of evil" 
of Iraq, Iran and North-Korea. The US saw these states as state-supporters 
of terrorism with WMD capability. Therefore, they posed a threat to US 
national security. Without directly mentioning Syria specifically, in the State 
of the Union speech, President Bush said: "States like these, and their 
terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the 
world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave 
and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving 
them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or 
attempt to blackmail the United States. "399 Syria was never referred to as 
belonging to the axis of evil, but as a state "beyond the axis of evil", 
together with Libya and Cuba, causing concern because of their WMD 
capabilities. 400 The threat was directed particularly to the regimes. The new 
security doctrine advocating the use of pre-emptive force by the US to guard 
its security placed extra pressure on the state supporters of terrorism. 
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to the belief that Syria posed a threat to US interests, guidelines for possible 
ao2 US military operations against Syria were designed and updated. 
The regime change policy expressed the newly emerged threat to non-US- 
friendly regimes in practice. The policy of regime change, which was 
advocated by the US from the Clinton administration's stance towards Iraq, 
gained in importance from September 11, due to the doctrine of military pre- 
emption. 403 Although the policy of regime change was also suggested to 
apply elsewhere than in the Iraqi case, an aggressive Iraq-like regime 
change policy was never articulated by the Bush administration towards 
Syria. 404 The topic was widely discussed, however, and some officials 
seemed to have supported a regime change policy also regarding Syria. 405 
The war in Iraq in spring 2003 changed the Syrian security environment 
most concretely. The US had indeed executed its pre-emptive doctrine and 
acted against a state in "the axis of evil". The war also made the US a 
regional superpower. This, in addition to the fact that the US troops were 
just across the Syrian border, gave the US an unforeseen tool for political 
and military pressure against Syria. Syria became encircled by US allied 
countries: Israel threatening Syria militarily, Jordan holding a strategic 
alliance with the US, post-Saddam Iraq with a pro-US government and a 
significant amount of US troops and the NATO-member Turkey. The 
remaining strong regional ally Iran was similarly encircled by US troops in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. 
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After the war in Iraq and suspicions of the Iranian nuclear drive406 
increasingly came to define regional politics, US attention was tied to the 
Gulf regional sub-system, rather than the Arab-Israeli one. Eliminating 
Saddam's regime also opened the door for increased Iranian influence in the 
region. The buffer provided by Saddam's regime for Iranian influence in the 
Arab world was gone and Iranian relations with Shi'a communities across 
the region provided a tool to broaden Iran's sphere of influence. 407 Syria, as 
the only regional ally of Iran, was seen in an increasingly suspicious light. 
The most important implication of this was that this reduced the attention to 
and support for Syrian foreign policy needs with regard to Israel. 
From the onset of the Iraq war, the US increased its military, political, 
economic and rhetorical pressure against Syria and Iran. In Syria's case, the 
Syrian role in Lebanon was brought increasingly into question. The US 
increased its pressure policy on Syria by issuing sanctions against it in May 
2004, which banned all exports from the US to Syria, with the exception of 
food and medicine. 408 Syrian flights to the US were banned, assets of certain 
Syrians in the US were frozen and there was an investigation of the 
commercial bank of Syria related to money laundering. The effects of the 
sanctions were, however, small because US products were imported to Syria 
via third countries. 409 
Most of the pressure was executed by allowing US military power to speak 
for itself. In mid-2004, the U. S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was 
ordered by the Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, to conduct strategic 
planning for possible military attacks on Syria, more concretely defined as 
406 Recently there has been some corrections in American estimations of the Iranian nuclear 
drive after the Iraq war. According to the report by the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, Iran had actually suspended their nuclear programme in 2003. National 
Intelligence Estimate; Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities, Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence 3. December 2007. 
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"cross border operations to seal Syrian-Iraqi border and destroy safe havens 
supporting Iraqi insurgency, attacks on Syrian weapons of mass destruction 
infrastructure supporting the development of biological and chemical 
weapons, and attacks on the regime of Syria's President Bashar al-Asad. " 
The US forces operated close to Syrian border as of 2003, there were reports 
of clashes between the US and Syrian forces and US special operations in 
Syria. 410 
According to Leverett, the US was also exploring the possibilities for 
bringing down the Asad regime easily. From 2005, the US pursued a policy 
of "regime change on the cheap" . 
all In the State of the Union speech 2005, 
President Bush mentioned Syria as the first regime that needed to be 
confronted alongside Iran. "... we must confront regimes that continue to 
harbour terrorists and pursue weapons of mass murder. " He legitimized this 
confrontation by reference to terrorism. "Syria still allows its territory, and 
parts of Lebanon, to be used by terrorists who seek to destroy every chance 
of peace in the region. " "... we expect the Syrian government to end all 
support for terror and open the door to freedom. " The reform demand rose 
in importance on the US agenda regarding Syria, but it was very secondary: 
"And the victory of freedom in Iraq will strengthen a new ally in the war on 
terror, inspire democratic reformers from Damascus to Teheran... " 
412 
The "demands of democratization" by regime change was not on the US 
agenda, however. As the counter-terrorism policy widened to include 
tackling the root causes of terrorism, authoritarianism in the region became 
increasingly problematic for achieving the US goals. A comprehensive 
reform promotion policy was articulated by Bush first in February 2003 
413 
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Already before this, the Secretary of State Colin Powell had launched a 
Middle East Partnership Initiative. 414 The US used its close relations and 
cooperation with the regional allies to pressure them to open their political 
space. With the non-US-allied countries like Syria and Iran, the US used 
coercion to promote regime change. Particularly according to the 
neoconservative thinking, a change of regime would evidently lead to a 
change in foreign policy, as radical foreign policy has been attributed to the 
nature of the regime. A regime change would then bring both change in 
foreign policy and authoritarianism. 415 Although not solely guided by 
neoconservatives, some elements of this thinking have been apparent in the 
policies of the Bush administration. 416 
The American-allied Arab regimes therefore experienced pressure on their 
political systems, but Syria did not. Although democratization was at times 
high on the list of the priorities for the US administration with regard to the 
Middle East, in Syria's case it was hardly mentioned. 417 US interests 
regarding Syria were clearly linked to the question of regional security. The 
US time and time again emphasized a need for change in Syrian foreign 
policy. According to Western sources in Damascus, "Democratic reforms 
are not at the forefront in the US dialogue with the Syrians". There were no 
policies, nor indeed any policy tools for the promotion of political reforms 
in Syria either. Some human rights issues are taken up on a case-by-case 
basis, but not to any significant degree. Diplomats note that even if the 
strategy that left the domestic issues with regard to Syria aside were to 
change, the US has no policy tools whatsoever to push for domestic 
December 2002. Bush. George W, President Discusses the Future of Iraq, American 
Enterprise Institute, 28. February 2003. 
414 Powell, Collin L. The U. S. -Aliddle East Partnership Initiative. Building Hope for the Years Ahead. A Speech at the Heritage Foundation, 12. December 2002. 415 For example in Iranian case, US links Iranian nuclear drive to the nature of the regime. 
Chubin, Shahram. "Iran's Nuclear Ambitions. " Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, Washington D. C, 2006, pp. 1-2,82-84. 416 Heikka, Henrikki. "Uutta Etsimässä. Bushin toinen kausi ja transatlanttinen yhteistyö. " 
UPI Briefing paper, 3,12. October 2005, p. 4. atz The domestic reforms were only taken up in speeches after the Syrian withdrawal from 
Lebanon 2005. 
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economic or political reforms in Syria; the US could not even use 
development aid for leverage due to its own sanctions regime. 418 
At the practical policy level, the US pressured Syria on its presence in 
Lebanon, its support for I-Iizbollah, Hamas and other Palestinian groups, 
Syria's role in Iraq and WMDs 419 A defining factor for the new relations 
was that the US policies did not include very clear demand lists with 
priorities, but there was a "policy vacuum". According to the International 
Crisis Group, US policy had been reduced to "demands and threats". What 
was clear, however, is that the US viewed Syrian regional policies as more 
and more harmful to US interests, and no longer accepted Syria's dual 
behaviour, using policies that were both positive and negative to US 
interests. 20 The US wished Syria to permanently change its foreign policies 
on the abovementioned matters. 
Interestingly, although there was pressure on Syria because of its role as "a 
state-supporter of terrorism" and "a rogue regime" with WMDs, on a 
practical policy level, the US focused on the other context of Syrian foreign 
policy: the Israeli-Syrian confrontation, namely Syria's role in Lebanon, 
Hizbollah and Hamas. The US accorded less importance to the regional 
(Iraq and WMDs) context, although the issues became intertwined. An 
analysis of the speeches of the US President and the Secretary of the State at 
the time shows that, surprisingly, other issues such as WMDs were brought 
to the fore during the time between September 11 and the war in Iraq. Even 
after the war, this remained mostly the case. 421 Aside from the rhetoric, the 
US did not provide much new intelligence on Syrian WMDs, and a 
testimony by John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control, was 
418 Interview with a Western diplomat, Damascus, 10. August 2004. Interviews with several 
European diplomats, Damascus, August 2004. 
419 Interview with a Western diplomat, Damascus, 10. August 2004. 
420 Syria Under Bashar (I): Foreign Policy Challenges. International Crisis Group, 11. 
February 2004, pp. 3 and 7. 
421 This is evident in the speeches of the US President and Secretary of the state after 
September 11. See for example speech by Bush, George W. President to Send Secretary 
Powell to the Middle East, Washington D. C, 4. April 2002. 
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not seriously contrary to other analyses that stated that Syrian WMDs were 
not an offensive threat in the region. 422 
The US pressured Syria on its role in Iraq. Before the war, Syria was 
accused of shipping military equipment to Iraq. Syria was also accused of 
receiving Iraqi high officials after the war (and possible Iraqi WMDs outside 
Iraq, which later came to be proven wrong). Syria also turned a blind eye to 
the volunteers crossing the border to Iraq. A study based on information 
from a raid on the Syrian-Iraqi border indicates, however, that very few of 
the foreign insurgents were actually Syrian. 423 Syria also tried to expand its 
influence in Iraq by re-connecting with the traditional anti-Saddam allies. 
Furthermore, Syria was accused by the US of creating instability in Iraq, by 
allowing pro-Saddam former Ba'athists to reside in the country, and by 
directly supporting Iraqi insurgence or allowing the Iraqi insurgents to 
receive back-up from international jihadists travelling through Syria. The 
US pressured Syria considerably to abandon these policies. 424 
The Israeli-Syrian context of Syria's external environment 
In the context of Syrian-Israeli confrontation, the threat environment 
changed for the worse from 2000, as far as the possibility of peace 
negotiations with Israel and the role of Syria in Lebanon are concerned. 
Hafes al-Asad had negotiated for a peace agreement with Israel December 
1999 - January 2000. The last Israeli offer delivered by President Clinton 
was rejected by Syria in Geneva in March 2000 425 The peace process 
having collapsed in 2000 and the second Intifada having begun, after 
signalling a continued willingness to continue negotiations, Syria started to 
resort to more confrontational tactics against Israel. Syria supported the 
Intifada politically and began to use very hard-line rhetoric, for example 
422 Syria under Bashar (Q: Foreign Policy Challenges, p. 22. 
423 "Foreign Fighters in Iraq Are Tied to Allies of U. S. " The New York Times, 22. 
November 2007. Perthes, Syria under Bashar Al-Asad. " Modernization and the Limits of 
Change, pp. 49-50. Syria under Bashar (1): Foreign Policy Challenges, p. 18. 
424 Interview with a Western diplomat, Damascus, 10. August 2004. 
425 Perthes, Syria under Bashar Al-Asad: " Modernization and the Limits of Change, p. 53. 
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accusing Israel of Nazism. 426 Syria restated that a Syrian peace agreement 
must be part of a comprehensive settlement that includes a Palestinian state. 
Syria also continued its support for Palestinian groups, such as Hamas, that 
opposed Fatah and the Palestinian Authority. 427 
An important follow-up event to the failure of the peace process was the 
unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon only a few weeks before Bashar 
took office. This complicated Syria's presence in Lebanon and pressure 
increased slowly both from Lebanon and the US for Syria to withdraw and 
accept disarmament of Hizbollah 428 Syria was determined to keep its 
Hizbollah card to fight Israel as long as Golan remained Israeli, and rejected 
calls for disarmament. 429 
As there was less need for the US to keep its contacts to Syria to mediate 
peace, the US increasingly exerted pressure on the Syrian regime to change 
its confrontational policies. At the beginning, the wording was very 
supportive and somewhat optimistic for resuming peace talks and changing 
Syrian foreign policy to solve regional problems and opening up the country 
after the death of Hafez Al-Asad 430 From the onset of the Iraq war, the 
attempt to gain from Syrian isolation increased pressure on Syria, as far as 
its cards against Israel were concerned: Syrian presence in Lebanon and 
support for Hizbollah and Hamas. The US demanded that Syria close the 
offices of the radical Palestinian groups residing in Damascus and expel its 
leaders. The US also demanded that Syria restrain border activities of 
Hizbollah towards Israel, end its material and arms support and allow 
Lebanese troops at the border. The US further demanded that Syria 
426 President Bashar suggested negotiations in an interview to New York Times in 2003. 
Syria also accepted the Saudi-Arabian proposal at the Arab League 2002 summit. Perthes, 
Sfria under Bashar A! -Asad. " Modernization and the Limits of Change, p. 54. 47 Hinnebusch, "Globalization and Generational Change: Syrian Foreign Policy between 
Regional Conflict and European Partnership", pp. 89-90. 
428 About criticism in Lebanon, Perthes, Syria under Bashar Al-Asad. " Modernization and 
the Limits of Change, p. 54 
429 Perthes, Syria under Bashar Al-Asada Modernization and the Limits of Change, p. 58. 
430 See for example speeches Albright, Madeleine K. Interview on CNN's "Late Edition" 
With Wolf Blitzer, 26. March 2000 as released by the Office of the Spokesman, 27. March 
2000 and Albright, Madeleine K. Press Briefing, U. S. Department of State, Washington 
D. C, 12. June 2000. 
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withdraw its military and political presence from Lebanon. The pressure on 
Syria's presence in Lebanon received greater attention following comments 
by Secretary of State Powell and National Security Advisor Rice in March 
2003, stating that Syria must end its occupation and withdraw its troops 
stage-by-stage. 431 
In the midst of the hype of the US military presence in the region after the 
Iraqi war, as of August 2004 the US raised the call for withdrawal of Syria's 
presence in Lebanon to their top deniand. 432 This was significant as former 
demands by the US to end Syrian occupation of Lebanon were considered 
by all as insignificant, rather as a bargaining tool to achieve other aims. 
Syrian presence in Lebanon had been quite institutionalized in the Middle 
Eastern regional order, and it was perceived as promoting stability within 
Lebanon. The policy shift by the US to pressure Syria to withdraw seriously 
from Lebanon was a result of a combination of international unity on the 
need for Syrian withdrawal after a series of Syrian overtures in Lebanon, 
broadly seen as serious strategic mistakes, namely the reappointment of 
Emile Lahoud as president and the murder of Rafik Hariri, which Syria was 
accused of 433 Thus far, the EU had used engagement rather than coercion 
policy against Syria. In September, however, France joined the US in 
demanding Syrian withdrawal and ultimately led the EU also in changing its 
Syria policy. 434 As a result, a united position by the main international actors 
was put forward in UN resolution 1559 demanding Syrian withdrawal from 
Lebanon. The pressure increased from February 2005 after the murder of the 
Lebanese prime minister, Rafik Hariri, and the following UN investigation 
that early on suggested Syrian involvement. 43' As a result, Syria withdrew 
431 Syria under Bashar (1): Foreign Policy Challenges, pp. 9,13-14. 
432 Interview with diplomats Damascus, Summer 2004. 
433 Syria After Lebanon, Lebanon After Syria. International Crisis Group, No. 39,12. April 
2005, pp. 8-9. 
434 Leverett, Inheriting Syria. Bashar's Trial by Fire, p. 86. 
aas United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1636 (2005), 31 October 2005. United 
Nations Security Council. Resolution 1644 (2005), December 2005, p. 15. The UN 
investigator Mehlis has been reported to have said in 17. December 2005 to Al-Sharq Al- 
Awsat that Syria was guilty. Mehlfis said that after the second report, he was more 
convinced of the guilt of Syria. Biedermann, Ferry. "Mixed Reaction from Syria as UN 
Extends Inquiry". Financial Times, 16. December 2005. For UN report by Mehlis, see 
United Nations Security Council. Second Report of the International Independent 
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its army from Lebanon in April 2005. The pressure was indeed very 
effective. The withdrawal of the Syrian troops had illustrated Syria's 
regional weakness and the effectiveness of the policy of pressure and 
isolation by the US and the EU. 
The withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon was not enough to relieve 
the pressure. The Hariri case brought the serious threat of UN sanctions on 
Syria in the following autumn. The pressure also continued on Syrian 
support for Hizbollah, 436 several reports suggested that Syria still held 
intelligence officials in Lebanon and a spate of political murders that 
followed in Lebanon suggested a continued Syrian presence. 437 The pressure 
was such that the question of the durability of the regime was debated. 
During the most intensive time of the. UN investigation in late 2005 and 
early 2006, the US indeed seemed to prefer to see how far it could push 
Syria to weaken the regime and to promote a change from below without 
any further external interference. 
As a result, the external environment was very threatening to Syrian security 
and stability. The withdrawal from Lebanon had demonstrated Syria's 
weakness. Lebanon had been important for Syria's domestic sphere of 
influence by its political, economic and social function. Particularly Syrian 
businessmen and Syrian workers in Lebanon had benefited. Furthermore, 
Syria had lost important revenues to the economy. Politically, Lebanon was 
considered second after regime stability in the order of priorities for the 
regime. 438 The investigation posed a direct threat to the regime, as the 
inquiry suggested that several persons in the core decision-making elite had 
been involved with the murder, who were consequently vulnerable to 
charges at the international level. The entire Syrian regime would have been 
made accountable and a sanctions regime and international isolation were 
Investigation Commission established pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1595 (2005) 
and 1636 (2005). Commissioner: Detlev Mehlis. Beirut, 10. December 2005. 
436 US, Britain and France pushed for UN Security Council statement to condemn flow of 
weapons and personel from Syria to militia in Lebanon. Ghattas, Kim and Turner, Mark. 
"Syria Releases Opposition Politicians", Financial Times 18. January 2006. 
a" See for example Second semi-annual report of the Secretary-General to the Security 
Council on the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004), 26. October 2005. 438 Syria After Lebanon, Lebanon After Syria, p. 8. 
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suggested if Syria did not comply with the demands of cooperation. 439 As 
the Syrian regime's fragility was increasingly discussed in the context of the 
Hariri investigation, the US also stepped up pressure for domestic reforms in 
Syria. 440 From the end of 2005, the pressure decreased, and the policy of 
isolation, especially by the EU, became milder, most notably after the 
Lebanon war of 2006. 
As a conclusion, by 2005 the nature of the threat was arguably very different 
for Syria. These new threats were not so much directed towards national 
security in the traditional sense. Instead, they represented more direct threats 
to regime security. On top of these threats was a stronger external 
penetration in the region in the form of US hegemony, encompassing its 
changed military doctrine that would allow pre-emptive military action, 
lowered requirements for justification of the use of force, demands for 
regime change and political reforms in the region. The pressure on the 
regime was most manifest during the Hariri investigation. As a result, there 
were serious questions surrounding the survival of Bashar's regime. 441 
Importance of Western alignment, peace and fiscal gains for state 
power 
Due to the need to dilute the security threat for the regime domestically, 
regime security and securing the state's fiscal capabilities became 
increasingly important in foreign policy. A further important reason for 
focusing on the economic backbone of regime security was the fact that the 
external fiscal environment posed a prospective threat to the regime. There 
was a credible possibility that the external revenues from fuel exports would 
decline and eventually become exhausted. According to the International 
Monetary Fund, Syria would become a net oil importer by 2010, when the 
439"Top U. N. Envoy to Present Syria With Ultimatum", Washington Post, 11. March 2005. 
440 Condolizza Rice criticized Syria of human rights abuses, arbitrary detention of human 
rights activists. Mahdi, Mazen. "Forum Ends without a Declaration", Arabnews, 13. 
November 2005. 
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external revenues became exhausted. 42 This was a particularly unsettling 
prospect for the regime that had a new leadership, was increasingly worried 
about the rising activity of the Islamist opposition throughout the region and 
that closely followed the fall of a Ba'athist Iraqi regime and statehood. 
Indeed, it is argued here that this situation engendered significant policy 
changes to increase both external and domestic resource extraction. 
It is further argued here that security and fiscal threats for Syria were such 
from the external environment that Syria was increasingly eager to turn to 
the West and end its isolation. The peace deal with Israel and a welcome to 
the US camp of moderate Arab states and an association agreement with the 
EU would all dilute the external security threats, boost the state's fiscal 
capabilities and increase its autonomy, efficiency and legitimacy. Although 
returning the Golan heights to Syria, ending the state of war and its role as 
an outcast in the region had been the most important foreign policy goals 
from the end of the Cold War, it is argued here that because of the threat 
from declining revenues to the fiscal capabilities of the state, fulfilling these 
foreign policy goals became crucial in order to boost regime security. 
Therefore, the domestic considerations in an otherwise rational foreign 
policy increased. 
This does not mean to suggest that Syria would have abandoned its 
confrontationalist policies towards the US that were contradictory to the 
aims of Western alignment and peace, such as war preparation against Israel 
through Hizbollah and maintaining influence in Lebanon despite 
international condemnation and pressure. Syria also allied against the US 
both internationally and regionally to dilute US influence and pressure. 
443 it 
does, however, mean that there exist sufficient examples of Syria's desire to 
442 International Monetary Fund, Executive Board Concludes 2006 Article IV Consultation 
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end its isolation, to comply with some demands of international actors and 
pressure for peace negotiations to demonstrate that when the crucial national 
interests related to Syria's leverage against Israel (Hizbollah, Lebanon, 
Harnas, military alliance with Iran) were not at stake, Syria wished to 
change its regional position. Considering the list of issues that were crucial 
for Syria against Israel, it is quite clear why there has not been a Western 
alignment for Syria thus far, so contrary are its interests to those of the US 
in the region. Here I present only the policies that were compliant. 
The examples of the increasing importance of the urge for Western 
alignment, peace, and economic gains by external resource extraction in 
foreign policy are: 1) compliance to some of the US demands; 2) an urge to 
commence peace negotiations with Israel; 3) closer alliance with the EU for 
security, trade and aid; 4) buying Iraqi oil against UN sanctions; and 5) the 
increasing promotion of foreign investments and diversification of trade 
partners. 
Compliance to certain US demands 
There was significant compliance by Syria to US demands after the US 
started its war against terrorism, and even more so after Syria's regional 
position weakened significantly from the onset of the war in Iraq. In the 
short term, Syria wished to dilute US pressure (that it initially considered as 
temporary), while still keeping a firm hold on its bargaining cards. 
According to ICG, "The hope was that these would be read as positive 
signals and compensate for whatever was not being done". 
444 This was done 
by episodic compliance on issues related to cooperation in the war against 
terrorism, support for Palestinian groups and Syrian influence in Iraq and 
Lebanon. 445 The US did not recognize this compliance, however, and rather 
444 Syria Under Bashar (1): Foreign Policy Challenges, pp. 4,7. 
aas The Syrian reactions may have further been complicated by a divide within the elite on 
how to react to US pressure. Although all were highly suspicious, others wished for active 
engagement, others saw the US as permanently hostile to Syria, and for this reason, 
engagement and concessions would not improve relations but diminish Syrian regional 
influence, according to the US wishes. Syria under Bashar (I): Foreign Policy Challenges, 
p. 5. 
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than reducing pressure and noticing Syrian compliance, the US raised the 
pressure. 446 The height of compliance was the Syrian military withdrawal 
from Lebanon in spring 2005. Since the murder of Hariri and the growth of 
external pressure on Syria, Syrian compliance diminished. Nonetheless, 
despite the fact that Syria's policies became even more confrontational from 
that point in time, the peace overtures from 2004 that continued even during 
the Lebanon war suggest that in the long term, Syria wished to improve its 
relations with the US. 
After September 11, the Syrian need to bandwagon and comply with US 
demands increased. Syria reacted to the new circumstances with some 
suggestions of cooperation in counter-terrorism. Syria reportedly cooperated 
with the US on sharing intelligence on al-Qaida447, an issue which served 
Syrian interests well. The Syrian government separated international 
terrorism and the legitimate resistance activity of Palestinians and Hizbollah 
from jihadism 448 Preventing Islamist radical activity was important for the 
Syrian regime from a domestic point of view. This "bandwagoning" was 
effective in reducing the pressure on Syria temporarily and is most 
concretely reflected in the fact that President Bush postponed the signing of 
the bill forging economic sanctions against Syria following the intelligence 
cooperation between the countries. 449 This is also said to be the reason why 
Syria was not included in the "axis of evil". However, the US did not view 
the US-Syrian cooperation on al-Qaida as a substitute for compliance to the 
growing US demands regarding Hizbollah and Hamas. 450 
After the Iraq war, in 2004 Syria also partly complied with the demand to 
end its support for Palestinian groups residing in Damascus. Syria closed the 
offices of Palestinian groups in Damascus, but allowed individuals to remain 
446 Syria After Lebanon, Lebanon After Syria. 
aal See also Crauss, Clifford. "US Welcomes Thaw in Relations with Pragmatic Syria". 
New York Times, 2. January 2002. 
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in Syria. 451 Syria closed media offices, cut telephone lines and asked them to 
keep a low profile. 452 However, the US concluded that several Palestinian 
groups continued to conduct activities in Damascus and that Syria had failed 
to act against these groups. 453 Syria also seemed to have been involved in 
the negotiation of a ceasefire by Hamas and Islamic Jihad in July 2003. 
Then again, Syria was accused of disrupting ceasefire talks in December 
2003, and of providing material support for a terrorist attack in Jerusalem in 
January 2004.454 Similar suspicions of the involvement of an Islamic Jihad 
cell in Damascus arose in relation to a terrorist attack in Tel Aviv in 
February 2005, for example. 55 Although the duality of Syrian foreign 
policy behaviour is evident, the modest moves detailed above reflected 
Syria's need to show compliance to the US. 
Although Syria objected to the US war in Iraq and was accused of engaging 
in some confrontational activities, there were also overtures to accept the US 
hegemony and role in Iraq. After direct negotiations between the US 
secretary of the state, Colin Powell, and President Asad in Damascus, Syria 
promised to comply by improving surveillance of its borders with Iraq, but 
according to the Americans, Syria complied only partially. 456 Some 
tightening of border controls also took place. 457 
Syria also partially complied with demands relating to constraining 
Hizbollah after the Iraq war and also complied with the demand on military 
withdrawal from Lebanon. Regarding Hizbollah, it is perhaps most notable 
that Syria did not push Hizbollah to attack Israel after the Israeli missile 
45 1 Perthes, Syria under Bashar Al-Asad. " Modernization and the Limits of Change, pp. 56, 
58. "Interview of Bashar al-Asad". Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 19. January 2004. 452 Syria under Bashar (1): Foreign Policy Challenges, p. 9. 
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strike on Syria in October 2003, and that the general calm at the border 
prevailed for several years. According to some reports, Syria also hindered 
some arms shipments by Iran to Hizbollah. 458 The most important act of 
compliance was, nonetheless, the withdrawal from Lebanon. Syria withdrew 
first some 1,000 of its 18,000-strong troops from Lebanon in mid-2003.459 
In September 2004, the number of troops was reduced to 14,000. When the 
pressure on Syria increased after the murder of Hariri February 2005, Syria 
460 started to withdraw all the remaining troops in March. 
Peace overtures 
In the long term, a peace agreement with Israel was the only option for Syria 
to end its contradictory foreign policy position that caused it significant 
security threats and halted its economic development including its ability to 
extract from the external fiscal environment as a result of its political 
isolation and the military instability on its borders. With a peace agreement, 
Syria would theoretically gain Golan, Western alliance and large economic 
benefits in return for ending its confrontational policies. It is argued that 
urgency to reach a peace agreement with Israel rose with the increase in 
political pressure and approaching deadline for the end of fuel export 
revenues. To prove the point, the suggestions for peace by Damascus were 
not only directed at Israel, but they have been viewed primarily as a strategy 
to send positive signals to Washington. 461 The unofficial peace negotiations 
that were conducted from the summer of 2004 between Syria and Israel 
stand as a proof of this sense of urgency. The need for peace for regime 
security is best captured in the words of Syrian negotiators to an 
international mediator: "He said the Syrians told him that in a few years, 
they would lose their oil sources and need significant amounts of foreign 
currency to purchase energy from external sources. The Alawite regime 
realizes, the European mediator said, that in order to survive, it has to bring 
ass Syria under Bashar (1): Foreign Policy Challenges, p. 13. 
459 Ibid, p. 14. 
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foreign currency into Syria, and that no sane businessman would invest his 
"462 fortune in a country that is not at peace with its neighbours. 
If one analyzes Syrian behaviour towards Israel from 2004, one can easily 
see how keen Syria became about starting official negotiations. President 
Bashar seems to have done all he could to show Israel that he wanted to talk. 
President Asad urged Israel publicly to start negotiations without 
preconditions in December 2003,463 and reports of unofficial negotiations 
were leaked to the public in 2006.464 According to the Israeli unofficial 
negotiator, Bashar had asked Turkey to mediate between the countries and 
to send a message to Israel on Syrian willingness to negotiate in January 
2004. Unofficial negotiations followed in Turkey and in Europe, but Israel 
was reluctant to make them official. Syria, on the other hand, wanted official 
negotiations and a Syrian negotiator, as well as the unnamed European 
mediator, met with high-level Syrian officials, including Vice President 
Shara and Foreign Minister Muallem. 465 The author was also informed 
indirectly in December 2004 that Syria sought to push the negotiations 
further, and that Syrian counterparts had a direct mandate from the 
president, which was not the case on the Israeli side. 466 According to reports, 
Syria was ready to include Hizbollah, Hamas and Iran in the agenda, and 
demanded US presence in the negotiations. This signals Syrian interest in 
negotiating its entire regional position. The Israeli reluctance to continue 
negotiations seems to have also halted that peace track. Syria also demanded 
US presence in negotiations, which was unlikely. The unofficial debates 
ended in summer 2006 as Israel was reluctant to continue negotiations 
462 Eldar, Akiva. "Background: From Turkey via Europe, to Damascus. " Haaretz, 16. 
January 2007. 
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officially. 467 Again, as a sign of Syrian interest, public quests for reopening 
peace talks increased again in late 2006 after the Lebanon war. 468 
Engagement with the EU 
Perhaps the clearest signal of Syria's need to strengthen their Western 
alliance was the new interest in closer relations with the EU from 2000. 
Although other southern Euromed countries had engaged in the association 
agreement negotiations with the EU from 1995, Syria had shown little 
interest in this before, despite the fact that negotiations had started in 1998. 
This changed as of the year 2000. Bashar made significant trade promotion 
trips to European capitals in his first years in office and solved debt 
problems with France and Germany. 469 More importantly, Syria started to 
negotiate an association agreement with the EU in 2002. The negotiations 
advanced a great deal and despite a short pause related to controversy over a 
WMD clause in the agreement, the negotiations were finalized in October 
2004. Now the formal agreement only lacked ratification. 470 
The main rationale for enhancing these relations has been analyzed as being 
economic. 471 With the declining revenues in sight, Syria was interested in 
the EU in order to boost trade, investment and gain aid assigned to the 
structural reform programs in the association agreement. The EU indeed 
committed itself to strengthen its Syria relations especially in the field of 
trade. 472 The EU cooperation also brought tools and funding for the 
modernization of the Syrian economy, something that Syria would have had 
to engage in regardless. The EU provided a safe and profitable way to 
pursue structural change in the economy, especially when it looked as if 
467 Eldar, Akiva. "Background: From Turkey via Europe, to Damascus". Haaretz, 16. 
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Syria would still be able to secure some of its production from European 
products through tariffs and maintain the large public sector without major 
privatization, despite the fact that eventually EU open entry to Syrian 
473 markets and privatization were an EU demand. 
The political rationale was to ally with a Western partner to dilute the 
pressure from the US. Indeed, the EU strategy of engagement with Syria 
was in direct contrast to the US strategy of coercion. If not before, at least 
after the Iraq war, the EU's Syria relations fundamentally differed from the 
US-Syria relations. 74 Commissioner Chris Patten said on the eve of his visit 
to Damascus in September 2003, "1 intend to underline the message that it is 
urgent to speed up negotiations so that Syria, the only partner in the region 
that has yet to conclude an Association Agreement with us, is not left 
behind. "475 Also of symbolic importance was that after the Iraq war and 
when in need of allies, Syria attended a Euromed meeting in 2003 for the 
first time since the second Intifada. Syria hoped that the EU relations would 
at least ensure that Syria was not left behind in the event of a possible 
regional peace process, although there was a full understanding that only 
American goodwill would enable a deal with Israel 476 As noted earlier, the 
EU began to pressure Syria on withdrawal from Lebanon progressively from 
the end of 2004, following a full turn to support Syrian isolation after the 
Hariri murder. 477 The EU considered the UN investigation report as very 
serious and demanded that Syria cooperate with the investigation 
unconditionally. 478 The EU froze the process of signing the association 
agreement. In addition, separate EU sanctions were also reported to have 
been considered. 479 Unlike the US sanctions, these sanctions would have 
had an effect on Syria if put forward, due to the volume of EU trade. By the 
473 Perthes, Syria under Bashar Al-Asada Modernization and the Limits of Change, pp. 34- 
35. 
474 Leverett, Inheriting Syria. Bashar's Trial by Fire, p. 84. 
475 European Commission. Christopher Patten, EU Commissioner for External Relations, to 
visit Syria from 15 to 16 September, Brussels, 15 September 2003. 
476 Perthes, Syria under Bashar Al-Asad. " Modernization and the Limits of Change, p. 45. 
{" "Syria after Lebanon, Lebanon after Syria", pp. 6-7. 
478 EU Presidency Statement on Syria (27 October 2005: London); Summary, EU Council 
Conclusions - Syria and Lebanon (7 November 2005: Brussels); Summary. 479 Interview with European diplomats and researchers, December 2005. 
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end of 2005, Syria's road out of isolation was seriously blocked and even 
though the EU's basic policy approach towards Syria was different to that of 
the US480, which was certainly enforced by Syria's proven interest in EU 
relations, there was no end in sight to intense external political pressure by 
2005. 
Iraqi and other oil trade 
The purchasing of Iraqi oil during the UN sanctions from 2000 until the Iraq 
war is another example of the need to increase the fiscal capabilities of the 
state, even though this particular method would have been in contradiction 
to Syrian interests of closer Western alignment. 481 Iraqi oil was sold to Syria 
at low black market prices in the midst of the UN sanctions, and Syria 
exported it at higher prices. Syria gained external revenues from the 
increased ability to export fuel, while using the cheap Iraqi oil purchased 
illegally for domestic consumption. Syria therefore violated the UN oil-for- 
food program that allowed Iraq to sell oil only in a restricted manner under 
UN monitoring. Iraq and Syria opened a pipeline to Banias in late 2000, 
which Syria claimed was used only for testing purposes. An estimated 
150,000 barrels of Iraqi oil was sold for Syrian domestic consumption. 82 
The annual revenue for the regime is estimated to have been $1 billion, or 
5% of GDP. The oil exports from Iraq continued despite pledges from the 
US, for example, to end it. Indeed, Colin Powell took the issue up with 
Bashar al-Asad while visiting Damascus in 2001.483 To some extent, Syria 
compromised some of its security interests to increase its fiscal capabilities. 
This is demonstrative of the importance of the external economic gains. 
Although there was an urgency to find other sources for external revenue for 
future use, the years since 2000 were indeed very good for external fiscal 
extraction, mainly attributable to high oil prices. The share of fuel exports of 
480 An analysis by Anders Strindberg, at a seminar "Post-war Lebanon: Syria, [ran, 
Palestine Axis", the FIIA, Helsinki, 19. December 2006. 
481 Hinnebusch, "Globalization and Generational Change: Syrian Foreign Policy between 
Regional Conflict and European Partnership", pp. 91-92. 
482 Economist Intelligence Unit, Syria Country Profile 2001, p. 22 and 2002, pp. 29-30. 
483 Economist Intelligence Unit, Syria Country Profile 2003, p. 7. 
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Syrian total exports was around 70% and the revenue was over $3 billion , 
rising close to a record high of $7 billion in 2005 due to an increase in 
prices. Brent oil barrel prices rose from $24.46 in 2000 to $54.38 in 2005. 
The increase in fuel export revenues was from around $3.5 billion in 2000 
and 2003, to $4.7 billion in 2004, and as high as $6.7 billion in 2005.484 The 
amount of Syrian fuel exports remained very steadily the same during these 
years, although production declined slightly. The oil export revenues were 
high, but the exact figures are contested in this period however, because 
according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, Syrian official figures had to 
hide the Iraqi oil imports that started in 2000.48 There is a big difference 
between the export figures from the World Bank, OPEC and Economist 
Intelligence Unit as the following table shows. 
Table X0: 486 
S. A. R. fuel and crude oil export revenues according to different calculations in 2000-2005 
(in millions USD) 
Sources World Bank. 2006. OPEC. 2006 and IEA. 2006 
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" World Bank, 2006: Fuel exports 
  OPEC, 2006: Crude oil exports (Values calculated using Brent prices from lEA, 
48' International Energy Agency: Energy Prices and Taxes (Edition: 2006, Quarter: 2) 
OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2005. Syria produces mainly Syrian light and Syrian 
heavy varieties the price of which is determined by Brent prices. 
485 Economist Intelligence Unit, Syria Country Profile 2003, pp. 33-34. 
486 World Bank values are not available for 2005. 
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Table 53.487 
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Attracting trade and foreign investments 
Attracting foreign investments, increasing foreign trade and diversifying 
trade partners rose in importance in foreign policy from 2000 in order to 
4?; ' Estimate has been calculated by using Brent barrel prices. 
175 
L-ý-__ 
. _. _..... _........ __. __.. -__.. __ -.. _.. _.... _... _. _. _. _____-. 
__. __. _. __. _. __. 
--Arab Light ý Brent -@-Iranian Light Iranian Heavy 
boost the regime's fiscal capabilities. 488 In addition to the EU, attention to 
trade promotion was especially accorded in the case of the new emerging 
trade giants in the global economy, China and India, to which several 
significant official visits were made. 489 Although stronger relations with 
these powers and Russia was important to dilute isolation, in practice, the 
visibility and leverage of China and India particularly was still rather small 
in the Middle East, and thus the rationale for approaching them was more 
economic. There were concrete economic gains in sight and also the 
negotiations seemed to focus much on trade. 
Despite active Syrian efforts to attract investors, Syria did not manage to 
receive significant FDI immediately after 2000. In regional comparison, 
Syria still belonged to the lower category as a recipient of FDI flows. For 
example, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco received generally more than 
Syria. 490 From the year 2000 onwards, foreign investments to Syria actually 
declined, rising to the same level only 2004. During these years, Syria 
received between $110 million and $275 million in foreign investments. 491 
In 2005, there was an increase to $500 million that almost doubled the 
amount of investments. 492 The increase from 2002 was over 50% annually, 
488 Leverett, Inheriting Syria. Bashar's Trial by Fire, pp. 86-87. According to official 
Syrian figures in 2005 36% of all investments in Syria (licensed by the investment Bureau) 
were foreign. "Foreigners Represent a Third of All Investments", Tishreen, 18. March 
2006. 
489S yrian President visited China in June 2004 and in November 2004. There were several 
visits between Syria and China related to strengthening of economic ties. The Economic 
and Commercial Counsellor's Office of the Embassy of the P. R. C. in the S. A. R. and the 
Economic and Commercial Counsellor's Office of the Embassy of the P. R. C. in the S. A. R. 
Brief Introduction of China-Syria Trade and Economic Cooperation, 28. November 2004. 
Dr. Farouk al-Shara, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Syrian Arab Republic 
paid an official visit to India on August 12-14,2002. External Affairs Minister of India paid 
an official visit to Syria in August 1-4,2003, Indian Prime Minister made a 3-day state visit 
to Syria beginning on November 14 2003 and Indian Minister of State for External Affairs 
made a three day visit (September 26-28.2005) to Syria. Government of India. Ministry of 
External Affairs. Press Releases. 
490 Arab Human Development Report, United Nations Development Programme 2003. The 
figures used by United Nations Development Programme are based on figures by United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2002. 491 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2004- 
2006. 
492 According to different sources the rise was estimated to be even higher. In 2005 
however the annual rise in Syrian investment has been estimated to be 291%. "IAIGC 
reports indicate significant rise in Arab investments in 2005", The Syria Report, 5. 
September 2006. 
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but from 2004 to 2005 the increase was a significant 81.8%. 4`" The increase 
of FDI to other Arab countries was far more significant, however. The FDI 
increased to all Arab states in 2004 and 2005. For example, Egypt received 
$237 million in 2003 and $5,376 billion in 2005. In 2005, Syria belonged to 
the lower middle level of FDI receivers, and received now far less in 
absolute terms than most others. 494 
Table 55: 
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Reflecting the promotion of Syrian economic interests in the Gulf region. 
the investments came particularly from the Gulf. For example, in 2005 Syria 
was the 4"' largest recipient of Arab investment with $61.1 million in 
In addition to an active foreign policy, this increase in Arab 4 investments. `'' 
investments seems to have been due to more attractive Syrian markets. The 
promotion of an image of a growing economy succeeded well, considering 
Syria's isolated position in the region. Particularly the rise of investments in 
2005 is noticeable, notably because during that year, Syria experienced its 
most extreme isolation after the Hariri murder. Syrian regime stability was 
also considered to be weaker, in contrast to a previously very stable political 
climate. Of course these investments could have had some political logic to 
93 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2004 
and 2006. 
494 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2006. 
495 "IAIGC reports indicate significant rise in Arab investments in 2005", 5. September 
2006, "Arab Investments in Syria at USD 61.1 Million", The , vriu Report, 16. 
June 2005. 
S. A. R. FDI inflows in 2000-2005 (in millions USD) 
Source UNCTAD WIR 2004 and 2006 
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keep Syria politically stable, to support the regime and to keep Syria closer 
to the Arab countries in times when Syria seemed to be drawn closer to 
Iranian influence. However, there is no evidence of this political 
background. According to one Gulf based investor, the investments were 
mainly private and therefore they can be assumed to have been purely 
economically motivated, possibly a result of the materialization of long 
planned projects due to changes in Syria's domestic economic climate. 496 
Interestingly, the investors were not perturbed by the weaker regional and 
domestic position of Syria. 
Syria was, however, more successful in increasing foreign trade. 
Interestingly as well, after the Iraq war, during the height of the political and 
military pressure, Syrian trade increased significantly. This is argued to have 
been due to successful trade promotion in foreign policy. Both the exports 
and imports increased four-fold from 2003 to 2004. Although the trade 
decreased by 2005. it still remained around 2 to 3 times higher than in 2003. 
Indeed, the trade figures were at a record high from 2003. Since 1990, the 
trade figures had remained around $2.5 - $5 billion(with the exception of 
higher exports in 1996-1997 around $7500 million). Data used here by the 
International Monetary Fund show a sharp increase in both exports and 
imports in 2004-2005. According to the International Monetary Fund, 
Syrian exports increased from around 6,000 to over 23,000, falling to 
$14,000 million. Imports were even higher, at over $26,000 million in 2004 
and $20,000 million in 2005, increasing from over $8,000 million. There is 
a slight difference in data in an updated International Monetary Fund 
version. However, the data by the World Trade Organization does not show 
any such increase. In both 2004 and 2005, exports were a little over $5,000 
and imports $7,000 and $8.000 million. 497 There is no explanation for the 
difference in figures. It is not possible to verify which figures are more 
'96 Phone interview with a Gulf based businessman of Syrian origin, 3. November 2006. 
'`" The International Monetary Fund figures presented are from International Monetary 
Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, September 2006 edition. International Monetary Fund 
November 2006 figures differ and they are midway to WTO figures in 2005. The 
November edition corrects the latest 2005 export figure to around 10 000 million of US 
dollars and the imports to around 15 000 US dollars. The World Trade Organization figures 
are from World Trade Organization. Statistical Data Sets 2006, measured in USD current 
prizes. 
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reliable. According to both sources, however, there was a clear increase. 
This increase is very significant. because this was immediately after the Iraq 
war and during the most intense political isolation. It indicates that the 
political isolation and deteriorating regional position for Syria did not affect 
trade. This can be due to the high oil prices that increased exports and 
allowed Syria to import. Increase in trade with Iraq could also explain some 
of the increase. 
The politics of pressure were also reflected in the direction of trade. The EU 
was by far the most important trade partner. Since the Iraq war, Syria 
however diversified its trade partners, which is apparent in both import and 
export tables from 2004. From 2000, Syria had enhanced its relations with 
Europe and China in particular. 498 The EU trade dropped and exports to Iraq 
especially increased significantly. Trade also increased with the Persian 
Gulf and Turkey. Imports from Lebanon, Iran and Egypt also increased 
somewhat, and new trading partners Brazil and Argentina emerged in the 
import sector. 
498 Since 2000 official visits between Syria and China increased. In August 2000 Mr. Sun 
Guangxiang, Chinese deputy minister of foreign trade visited Syria. In October the Syrian 
vice premier Naji Otri visited China with a governmental delegation formed by the 
ministers of industry, house-building, planning, and higher-education. In January 2001, 
Chinese vice chairman Hu Jintao made his visit to Syria. In March 2003, the delegation of 
China State Revenue Bureau signed an Agreement on Exception of Double tariff with 
Syrian Finance Ministry. The Economic and Commercial Counsellor's Office of the 
Embassy of the P. R. C. in the S. A. R. Brief Introduction of China-Syria Trade and Economic 
Cooperation, 28. November 2004. 
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Table 56: 
S. A. R. exports and imports to the world in 2000-2005 (in millions USD) 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, 2006 
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Reflecting its isolated regional position, Syria did not manage to obtain 
significant aid. Aid after 2000 was of very small importance to Syria 
compared to aid in 1990-1999 or even more so in 1970-1989. The average 
amount of aid since 2000 was close to three times smaller than the average 
amount of aid 1990-1999 and around five times smaller than in 1970- 
1989.499 The aid from Arab countries was minimal. The aid from EU 
`'`'`' The average annual ODA for 2000-2004 was 131,59 million US dollars, whereas the 
same figure for years 1990-1999 was 342,42 million of US dollars and for years 1970-1989 
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countries rose temporarily somewhat in 2001, marking the start of the 
association talks, but declined thereafter. The largest donors since 2002 
were the multilateral donors. 
Table 58: 
Total net ODA (OA) to S. A. R. In 2000-2004, in millions USD 
Source OECD/DAC 2008 
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To conclude, the first mentioned policies, compliance to some US demands, 
peace overtures and EU engagement all stand as examples of a need to 
strengthen ties with the Western powers and reach a more comfortable 
foreign policy position. In the end, despite overtures of compliance and the 
withdrawal from Lebanon, Syria was not successful in diluting military 
pressure or ending its political isolation by the end of 2005. Quite the 
contrary, Syria was perhaps never so threatened. Even the most important 
act of compliance, the Syrian military withdrawal, did not dilute the 
pressure. By the time of the Hariri murder, the threat was more and more 
directed towards the regime. 
The policy of the new president from 2000 was to increase external and 
domestic resource extraction and boost the fiscal capabilities of the state. 
The examples related to EU engagement, Iraqi oil trade and the increasing 
importance of trade and investment promotion show how the economic 
672,77 million of dollars. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
Development Assistance Committee. International Development Statistics (2006). 
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security of the regime became more important in foreign policy and how 
Syria was indeed able to extract significant revenues from the external fiscal 
environment. 
In the end, the economic environment was not so pressing for Syria, mainly 
due to the record high oil prices since 2004, trade that also increased from 
2003 and foreign investments that increased in 2005. On the contrary, the 
economic gains from the external environment seemed to be better than for 
years. This provides a powerful explanation as to why Syria was able to 
dilute the external military and political pressure from outside. Although for 
the first time there were questions related to the stability of the regime due 
to the pressure from the external security and fiscal environment and 
domestic intra-elite conflict, as chapter 5.3 shows, the fiscal capabilities 
helped the state to maintain its autonomy, efficiency and legitimacy. The 
following chapter will study how these external revenues added to the fiscal 
capabilities and rentier nature of Syria. 
5.2 External resource extraction and state power 
This chapter aims to evaluate how the external resource extraction affected 
regime autonomy 2000-2005. I will view how the increased fuel revenues 
played into the overall fiscal powers of the state and see what means the 
successful external revenue extraction gave for maintaining the state's fiscal 
capabilities and rentier nature. I will place this in the context of the regime's 
economic strategies and try to explain why the regime resorted to intense 
domestic revenue extraction, and economic liberalization that was deep 
enough in spirit to lead to structural adjustment rather than a minor 
adaptation. I will review the new economic policies and consider how the 
new strategies affected state power, its fiscal autonomy, efficiency and 
legitimacy. 
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Level of rentierism 
The following tables provide data on Syrian external revenues from 2000 to 
2004. The first table includes fuel exports income as a percentage of GDP. 
and the second includes aid as a percentage of GDP. The worker remittance 
data as a percentage of GDP is presented in the third table. ý°° 
Table 59: 
Fuel Exports of S. A. R. In 2000-2004, (% of GDP) 
Source World Bank. 2006 
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s°" Due to different editions of World Bank's World Development Indicators used as source 
for workers' remittances values, there are differences between the percentages in the table 
(Edition: April 2006) and the percentages used in the text (Edition: September 2005). 
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Table 60: 
Total net ODA (OA) to S. A. R. In 2000-2004, (% of GDP) 
Source World Bank April 2006 and OECD/DAC. 2006 
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Table 61: 
Workers' remittances to S. A. R. In 2000-2003 (% of GDP) 
Source Works Bank, 2006 
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The first conclusion is that as a result of the illegal Iraqi oil import and high 
oil prices after the war in Iraq, the fuel export income was by far the main 
source of external revenue at the beginning of 2000. On average, the annual 
revenues from fuel exports were 19.2% of GDP, varying between 13.9% 
and 22.2% of GDP. This means that there was an increase of almost 6% of 
GDP since the 1990s. These figures are again a little higher compared to the 
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figures by Perthes, according to whom more than 12% of GDP consisted of 
fuel export income, 60-70% of exports and 50% of government revenues. 501 
However, the figures presented here seem to match with the estimations of 
Leverett. According to him, the oil revenues were 20% of GDP, 50% of 
government revenue and 75% of all exports. 502 There are insufficient figures 
available to verify how much these fuel export revenues constituted of the 
overall revenues of the state, but according to the Syrian Minister of Finance 
Khaled Al-Mahayni, oil revenues were expected to be 50.2% of expected 
state revenues for the year 2002.503 
The effect of the Iraqi oil imports is noticeable in the figures from 2000- 
2003. Syria exported oil that it had imported from Iraq by violating the UN 
oil-for-food program. The pipeline was opened in late 2000. Daily, around 
150,000 barrels of Iraqi oil were sold for Syrian domestic consumption, 
which again enabled Syria to export around the same amount of its own 
oil. 504 The estimated price according to Economist Intelligence Unit was $10 
per barrel, which would have meant oil worth around $550 million of 
imports from Iraq in 2001 and 2002. Based on this, the import would have 
been an estimated $91 million during the first three months of 2003 until the 
US invasion of Iraq. 505 If around the same number of barrels was added to 
Syrian exports, a very rough estimation would be that Syria gained an 
additional 1.3 billion from fuel exports in 2001 and 2002 and 0.2 billion in 
2003.506 This would have lifted the fuel export revenue to around 7% of 
GDP in 2001 and 2002 and 1.2% in 2003. However, the real gain after the 
reduction of the price paid to Iraq was around $800 million in 2001 and 
2002 and $170 million in 2003, equalling around 4% of GDP and 0.7% of 
GDP. This would mean that the impact of the Iraqi oil imports to Syrian fuel 
50 1 Perthes, Syria under Bashar Al-Asad. " Modernization and the Limits of Change, p. 29. $02 Leverett, Inheriting Syria. Bashar's Trial by Fire, p. 34. $03 Al-Mahayni, Khaled. "Oil Revenues Will Cover over 50% of Budget income. " Syria 
Report, December 2001, p. 3. 
504 Economist Intelligence Unit. Syria. Country Profile 2002, pp. 29-30. 
505 Economist Intelligence Unit. Syria. Country Profile 2004, p. 40. According to Syrian 
Central Bureau of Statistics, the annual worth of oil imports from Iraq was 406 000 million 
USD. 
506 This calculation is based on Brent prizes, that gives only a very rough estimation of the 
prizes of Syrian fuel. 
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export revenues was noticeable. According to Economist Intelligence Unit, 
Iraqi oil was important for the Syrian state budget. The extra Iraqi oil helped 
to fund the budget and used new resources to boost the economy. 507 
According to the International Crisis Group, some of the revenues from 
Iraqi oil imports were used to increase the salaries of state employees, and 
the trade benefited certain members of the elite, as well as Syrian foreign 
reserves and the budget. 508 
The high oil prices from 2003 kept the share of oil-related revenues high. 
The decline in oil income in these tables can be partly explained by the 
source for fuel export income used here. 509 In revenue, the World Bank 
revenues show a decline in 2004-2005, but OPEC and the International 
Energy Agency show an increase that would seem to match the risen prices 
from 2003 after the Iraq war. 51° It is possible that in reality there was no 
decline from 2003. This would seem logical considering the enormous rise 
in oil prices that substituted some of the losses of the Iraqi oil sales. 
According to OPEC, measured in barrels, production decreased slightly in 
2004, but exports remained the same . 
51 For the sake of consistency to other 
time periods studied, the World Bank figures are used also in this chapter to 
indicate the external extraction from fuel exports. 
Again the oil revenues seem to be somewhat underestimated in previous 
research. Hinnebusch refers to them as "periodic rent windfalls" that acted 
as a buffer to economic crises, but sees otherwise the fall of aid and 
507 Economist Intelligence Unit. Syria. Country Profile 2002, pp. 29-30. 
508 "Syria Under Bashar (1): Foreign Policy Challenges", p. 16. 
509 According to the World Bank the GDP also grew 12.8% between 2003 and 2004. Were 
Syria to produce Brent, the increase in revenue estimates were from 3.5 billion 
of USD in 2000 and in 2003 to 4.7 billion of USD in 2004 and to 6.7 billion of 
USD in 2005. International Energy Agency: Energy Prices and Taxes (Edition: 
2006, Quarter: 2). OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2005. 
sio According to the World Bank, fuel exports in 2004 was 13,9% of GDP. A rough 
estimation of figures by International Energy Agency and OPEC would give a figure of 
19.6% for crude oil exports. 
511 According to Economist Intelligence Unit, Syria overstated the domestic oil production 
figures especially since 2001 in order to hide the Iraqi oil imports. Economist Intelligence 
Unit. Syria. Country Profile 2003, pp. 33-34. 
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population growth as the main reason for the fall in GDP per capita. 512 
According to this research, oil revenues were relatively constant rather than 
periodic and clearly high in importance. 
Alarming from the future point of view was the fact that the oil-related 
revenues were almost the sole external revenue for Syria. The aid revenue 
had exhausted almost completely. The aid revenue was only an average of 
0.7% of GDP, varying between 0.4% and 0.9% of GDP. Regionally, this 
was very little, and surely reflected Syrian political isolation. Syria received 
a significantly small amount of aid compared to Egypt that received around 
a half more. Jordan received aid between 4% and 12% of GDP. The worker 
remittances also declined. From 2000, the worker remittances were on 
average an annual 3.3% of GDP, varying between 2.9% and 3.6%. 
The following tables show the fuel exports and the aid revenues combined 
in 2000-2004 and during the entire period of this research. 
Table 62: 
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512 Hinnebusch, Raymond A. Syria after the Iraq War: Between the Neo-con OJfensive and 
Internal Re/brm. DOI-Focus Nr. 14, Deutsches Orient-institute, March 2004, p. 
5. 
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Fuel exports and ODA to S. A. R. In 2000-2004, (% of GDP) 
Source World Bank, April 2006 and OECD/DAC 2006 
Table 63: 513 
Fuel exports and ODA to S. A. R. In 1970-2004, (% of GDP) 
Source World Bank, April 2006 and OECD/DAC 2006 
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The second conclusion is that the external revenues were higher than ever 
between 2000 and 2005 as an annual average, if compared to the periods of 
1990-1999 and 1974-1989. On average, the fuel exports and aid were 19.8% 
of GDP annually, varying between 14.3% and 22.6%. The increase in the 
1990s seems to be 1.2%. The amount of external revenues is very much the 
same as during the high levels of external revenues at the end of the 1970s 
and beginning of the 1980s. 
As the annual average of external revenues is so close to 20%, Syria can be 
more clearly defined a semi-rentier state economy from 2000 than in 
previous years. Although GDP figures for 2005 and 2006 are not yet 
available, one can assume based on the data on fuel export revenues by 
OPEC and the International Energy Agency, that mainly as a result of the 
high oil prices, the fuel export revenues also as a percentage of GDP were 
very high. 
513 Fuel export values are not available for 1971-73,1988,1991 and 1993-94. 
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Table 64: 
Total domestic and external revenues of S. A. R. in 2000-2004 (% of GDP) 
Source World Bank. 2006, OECD/DAC, 2006 and EIU. 2004-2006 
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As was the case in the 1990s, military expenditure was not significant and 
the external revenue was largely free for other use. The military expenditure 
was annually on average 6.9% of GDP, declining again by 1.5% from the 
1990s. The total decline from the annual average of the Cold War era was 
19%. This is despite the fact that the external threat environment worsened 
for Syria from 2000. The fact that military spending did not increase is 
logical, because the threat was not primarily military but political, and even 
if there had been a military threat to Syria, the threat was not to be countered 
by military means in any case. The amount of military personnel also 
declined from around 7% in 2000 to less than 6% in 2004. Note that this 
does not include intelligence, only army personnel. The following tables 
illustrate the decline in overall military expenditure and decline in the share 
of military expenditure of external, domestic and total revenues. 
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Table 66: 
S. A. R. military expenditure in 2000-2003 (% of GDP) 
Source SIPRI. 1005 
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'Fable 67: 
S. A. R. total military expenditure in 2000-2003 (% of GDP) 
Source SIPRI 2005 and World Bank 2005 
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Table 68: ' 14 
S. A. R. total military expenditure and external revenue in 2000-2004 (% of GDP) 
Sources SIPRI. 2005, World Bank 2005-2006 and DAC/OECD 2006 
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514 Value is not available for military expenditure in 2004. 
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Fable 69: ý1ý 
S. A. R. total military expenditure and domestic revenue in 2000-2004 (% of GDP) 
Sources SIPRI 2005 Worid Bank 2005-2006 and EIU 2004-2006 
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"Fable 70: 'lß' 
S. A. R. total military expenditure and government revenue in 2000-2004 (% of GDP) 
Sources SIPRI 2005 'Nona Bank 2005-2006 DAC OECD 2006 and EIU 2004-2006 
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The tables indicate that the relatively low level of militarization did not 
demand domestic sacrifices from the state budget and therefore did not 
cause any necessity to bargain with the political status quo. As the external 
`'` Value is not available for military expenditure in 2004. 
`16 Value is not available for military expenditure in 2004. 
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revenues greatly added to the state budget and as the military spending was 
low, there was a relative increase in the fiscal autonomy of the state from 
2000. As proof of the role of the external revenues as buffers for the regime 
security and economy, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, Syria 
used much of the external revenues to enlarge its foreign assets. 517 
Fiscal capabilities and economic strategies of the state 
Despite the stable fiscal capabilities, Syria had large budget deficits and was 
heavily indebted. 518 Contrary to earlier decades, the regime urgently aimed 
to increase its fiscal capacities by both external rent seeking and domestic 
extraction by economic liberalization. Efforts were made to secure the fiscal 
autonomy in the longer run. There was also a need to secure the regime and 
economy concretely. 
Despite the achievements in external extraction in the short term, the long 
term focus was on domestic extraction. In great contrast to the earlier 
decades, Syria pursued a more substantial economic reform policy from 
2000. This change in policy was not due to an immediate fall in external 
revenues, which would have necessitated economic reforms along the lines 
of rentier theory. However, in the last years of the 1990s, the external 
revenues from fuel exports had declined. When this was added to the 
alarming message that Syrian ability to export fuel could exhaust in but a 
few years, the possibility of a decline in external revenues may have 
contributed to the decision to pursue a domestic extraction strategy. 
519 In 
2002, Syria's deputy prime minister had acknowledged that fuel export 
income would not be enough in the medium term to maintain the stability of 
the Syrian economy. 520 In other words, there was a fear that the fiscal 
autonomy of the state would diminish in the future due to the fall of external 
revenues. Therefore, the domestic extraction strategy was pre-emptive for 
517 Economist Intelligence Unit. Syria. Country Profile 2002, p. 41. 
518 In 2003 the budget deficit was estimated to be an alarming 12.8% of GDP, some of 
which was probably funded by loans. Economist Intelligence Unit. Syria. Country Profile 
2003, p. 27. 
519 Leverett, Inheriting Syria. Bashar's Trial by Fire, p. 34. 
520 Perthes, Syria under ßashar A! -Asad. " Modernization and the Limits of Change, p. 
30. 
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securing the fiscal capabilities of the state. Considering the stage of the 
Syrian economy, they were long overdue. 
The change in economic policies was not due to an acute immediate 
economic crisis as in the case of the earlier economic liberalization at the 
beginning of the 1990s. The long term imbalances in the economy 
constituted, however, one of the main reasons for the start of a deeper 
economic liberalization policy. Thus the liberal theory would appear to 
explain the change to some extent. The economic growth was limited as a 
result of the large spending on state-led economy and the inefficiency of the 
public sector, producing heavy losses. 521 At the same time, Syria should 
have tripled its annual real growth to keep up with the population growth. 
Syria had a chronic threat of increasing unemployment rates due to the 
rapidly growing population producing some 200,000 - 250,000 new entries 
to the labour markets annually. 522 The general unemployment level is 
estimated to be around 20%. 523 There was a consensus surrounding the need 
to liberalize and integrate better with the world economy. 524 
An immediate reason for the timing of the reforms is related to the change in 
the highest position of power, as Bashar al-Asad succeeded his father as 
president. Bashar's concept of economic reforms was also somewhat 
different to his father's, at least inasmuch as Bashar saw the economy as the 
main problem that the president had to react to, contrary to his father's 
preoccupation with foreign policy. The concrete difference was that in 
contrast to his father's small steps of adaptation, Bashar aimed to move with 
the reforms full-scale, starting with some that had been suggested already at 
the beginning of the 1990s, but never implemented. 
521 Perthes, Syria under Bashar Al-Asad. " Modernization and the Limits of Change, p. 30. 522 Leverett, Inheriting Syria. Bashar's Trial by Fire, p. 34, Perthes, Syria under Bashar Al- 
Asad: Modernization and the Limits of Change, p. 29. 523 Perthes, Syria under Bashar AI-Asad: " Modernization and the Limits of Change, p. 29. 524 Hinnebusch, Syria after the Iraq War: Between the Neo-con Offensive and Internal 
Reform, p. 5. 
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What was the concept of Bashar's economic reforms, then? The economic 
policy was motivated by one aim, the creation of prosperity. 525 The reforms 
were first of all pursued gradually, considering the need for regime stability 
and the balance between different social forces, excessively rapid changes 
could cause challenge to the regime or sectarian divides. In practice, 
gradualism was also realism, as the transformation of the state-led economy 
was to be slow due to the structures built during the Ba'athist era by 
patronage and co-option policies, namely the relationship between the state 
and the beneficiaries. Most importantly, the political power base built by the 
state-led economy had to be considered. This included forming policies that 
would not upset the large part of the population that was state employed and 
largely Allawi. The regime also did not wish to alienate the original 
supporters of the Ba'athist revolution still powerful within the party, the 
workers, salaried middle class and farmers, represented by trade and 
farmers' unions within the Baa'th party. 526 The regime had to ensure that the 
liberalization measures did not increase the number of poor, but most of all 
the regime had to think of the reactions of the - mostly Sunni - old and new 
bourgeoisie that benefited from the state-led economy, especially by doing 
business through monopolies and state contracts. On the other hand, the 
largest beneficiaries of private sector initiatives would be Sunnis, whose 
power would increase in contrast to that of the Allawis and the state- 
527 dependent Sunnis. 
Due to this complexity of socio-economic structures, the regime had to 
move cautiously to maintain its power and stability. Because the political 
legitimacy came from state spending, most concretely from subsidies on 
food, employment and spending on patronage and co-option, cutting down 
state spending was not an option. But in case there were fears of decline in 
the state's ability to spend and allocate, that is in fiscal powers of the state, 
then the restructuring of the economy slowly was all the more urgent. 
525 Leverett, Inheriting Syria. Bashar's Trial by Fire, p. 70. 
526 Perthes, Syria under ßashar Al-Asad. " Modernization and the Limits of Change, pp. 31- 
32. 
527 Hinnebusch, Syria after the Iraq War: Between the Neo-con Offensive and Internal 
Reform, p. 5. 
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The reforms indeed did not aim to bring down the public sector and pursue 
large scale privatization, but rather create a more viable private sector. 528 
This strategy was formed due to regime stability and socio-economic 
necessity. The state needed the private sector to grow in order to create tax 
income and increase exports to gain economic growth and increase state 
revenues. However, at the same time, the state sector could not be 
dismantled by privatization as this would compromise the social balance. In 
practice, a rapid privatization could cause large scale unemployment if jobs 
were not first created in the private sector. 529 
The focus on revitalizing the private sector is illustrated in Leveret's 
summary of the aims of economic reforms, "... trying to stimulate 
development of a more entrepreneurial private sector, reducing transactional 
costs in the local economy, and beginning to lower barriers to interaction 
with the global economy. , 530 In addition to revitalizing the private sector 
and promoting export-oriented industry, the aim was to create jobs, improve 
education and take greater advantage of information technology. 531 
In practice, during the years of 2000-2005, Syria aimed to reform tax laws to 
increase tax revenues, ease imports by cutting customs duties for domestic 
manufacturing industry and by releasing some import restrictions, 
promoting exports by easing export taxes and limiting foreign currency 
transactions. Efforts were made to attract foreign investment, by proposals 
for free trade areas. Private banks were established and banking secrecy was 
introduced. There was a reform of currency exchange policies, foreign 
currency exchange and trading was allowed, the education level was aimed 
to be increased through the creation of private universities and education 
sector reforms. Unemployment offices were established to promote 
528 Leverett, Inheriting Syria. Bashar's Trial by Fire, pp. 71,80. 
529 Leverett, Inheriting Syria. Bashar's Trial by Fire, p. 71. 
530 Leverett, Inheriting Syria. Bashar's Trial by Fire, p. 80. 
531 Perthes, Syria under Bashar Al-Asada Modernization and the Limits of Change, p. 32. 
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employment. 532 In the first year of Bashar's presidency, actions were taken 
aimed at increasing private consumption, such as salary increases in the 
public sector and allowance of credit cards. 533 Indicative of the extent of the 
initiatives for economic reforms is that, for example, in 2005,134 laws were 
passed to promote economic reforms. 534 
The initiatives suggest that the reforms were aiming for a more 
comprehensive restructuring of the state led economy rather than adaptation. 
In practice, however, the implementation of laws and initiatives was very 
slow due to lack of motivation in changing the economy because of an intra- 
elite power struggle that resulted from the lower level of legitimacy of the 
new president to pursue policies outside of his father's legacy, of which a 
structural change in the economy was definitely among the most important. 
As a result there was an inability of the president to pursue new economic 
policies, or indeed any reforms, despite the fact that the fiscal capabilities 
were in place. The president was simply unable to use the fiscal capabilities 
to balance the political power by patronage and co-option to his ultimate 
favour as Hafez had done, the divide in the elite was deeper and the reform 
policies too challenging for much of the existing political power base in the 
elite that Hafez had built. Much of the lack of efficiency to pursue new 
policies was due to Bashar's partial lack of legitimacy. The inability to use 
the institutional capabilities of the state for pursuing new policies was 
somewhat logical, as the particular policies were to affect the state apparatus 
itself. The intra-elite conflict will be broadly discussed in the next chapter. 
From the economic perspective, the intra-elite conflict related particularly to 
economic reforms can be seen as a structural opposition to deeper changes 
532 Leverett, Inheriting Syria. Bashar's Trial by Fire, p. 81. "Reform in Syria: Steering 
between the Chinese Model and Regime Change", p. 7. Perthes, Syria under Bashar Al- 
Asad: Modernization and the Limits of Change, pp. 32-33. 
533 Leverett, Inheriting Syria. Bashar's Trial by Fire, p. 80. 
534 "Reform in Syria: Steering between the Chinese Model and Regime Change", p. 7. 
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by the beneficiaries of the current system. 535 These include much of the 
major pillars of power of the president, the Ba'ath party, and the new 
bourgeoisie that was allowed to access the state benefits by patronage and 
co-option. Now these same structures that had served the stability of the 
regime and formed the basis of the power coalition of the president in recent 
decades were against policies that would affect their position. This does not 
mean that there would not have been a consensus surrounding the need to 
improve the economy. For example, in 2005 the Ba'ath party congress 
confirmed that Syria would aim for socialist market economy. It rather 
means that, under the surface, the structural tensions existed, sometimes 
more apparently, sometimes less. 
The structural opposition to economic reforms was evident in a split of the 
political elite to those promoting economic reforms alongside Bashar, 
mainly technocrats, and those opposing Bashar or at least some of his 
reform policies, mainly Ba'athists. Maybe the clearest example was the 
opposition from the Ba'ath party to the reformist ministers of Bashar. 
Bashar lost two major economic reformers, the Minister of Finance, Issam 
al-Zaim, and the Minister of Industry, Muhammed al-Atrash, in 2003 from 
the government because of the Ba'ath opposition demanding national 
consensus after the Iraq war. Bashar was also unable to secure support for 
his suggestion to install a technocrat government, which would have 
pursued reforms, instead of the party-led government. This example 
resembles how strongly the Ba'ath party, and the new bourgeoisie allied 
with the party, objected Bashar's economic reforms. Zaim was working 
against the new bourgeoisie that benefited most from the government 
monopolies and other means of state contracts. Al-Atrash on the other hand 
had acted against a recent takeover of power of the Aleppo chamber of 
commerce by the new bourgeoisie. 536 There were also major anti-corruption 
campaigns by the president, surely motivated by the need to eliminate 
opposition as well as to challenge the inefficient, unproductive state sector. 
535 Leverett, Inheriting Syria. Bashar's Trial by Fire, pp. 80-84. 536 Hinnebusch, Syria aj? er the Iraq War: Between the Neo-con Offensive and Internal 
Reform, p. 21. 
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The lack of efficiency in pursuing reforms was also partly due to the lack of 
capacity, skills, education and vision of the bureaucracy. Laws and 
initiatives were simply not implemented well enough, if at all. Bashar aimed 
to pursue an administrative reform, including foreign education and 
consultants. 
In this context, it is logical that Bashar limited his economic liberalization 
policies to supporting the private sector and maintained the main tools of 
allocation, patronage and co-option of the state that would be important in 
managing any liberalization. The features of rentierism, such as a large 
public sector, state employment, monopolies and state subsidies on basic 
commodities were still in place. Bashar manifested the importance of the 
large public sector for strategic and security reasons, 537 clearly indicating the 
reliance of the regime power base on state employment. The public sector 
still acted as a mobilizing and control mechanism. 
How could the new president, then, proceed with economic reforms that 
were to some extent against the interests of the bourgeoisie and 
bureaucracy? One explanation for the anxiety of Bashar to pursue economic 
reforms can be found in the need for the new president to create his own 
support base, distinct to that of his father, for legitimacy and to be able to 
use the state power sufficiently for regime stability. This will be discussed 
further in the next chapter. The larger question is why Bashar pursued 
economic reforms even though the external revenues were at their highest? 
Overall, thus far the economic liberalization in the Middle East had been 
due to either a fall in external revenues and/or immediate debt crisis, that 
had required entry of more private capital, or as a result of conditions placed 
by debtors such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank or 
the aid providers such as the US and the EU. Clearly in the Syrian case, as 
of 2000 none of these factors were at play. The reforms were domestically 
motivated, there was almost no influence by external actors in the decision 
to pursue liberalization and there was no immediate debt or other economic 
537 Perthes, Syria under Bashar A! -Asad. " Modernization and the Limits of Change, p. 36. 
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crisis, although there was a long term rationale for improving the economy. 
The influence of the EU was minor because the association agreement had 
not entered into force. In addition, the external revenues were so high that a 
policy of laissez-faire, or smaller scale adaptation would have been possible. 
It seems sensible that deeper economic liberalization is pursued from the 
position of strength by the state: that is when the economic conditions are 
not threatening regime security. The state was in need of deeper economic 
restructuring and now had more fiscal capabilities to pursue it and secure the 
regime against the possible losers of economic liberalization. In addition to 
the long term economic unbalances, this seems to be the best explanation for 
the timing of liberalization in early 2000. The approach of an end to fuel 
export revenues adds to the urgency of restructuring the fiscal capabilities of 
the state. The threats from the external security environment also made the 
economic reforms more urgent. Syria indeed pushed the reforms further 
538 more intensely after the pressure related to Lebanon increased. 
In practice, the lack of efficiency, the structural opposition to reforms and 
bad administrative implementation ensured that the effects of the changes to 
the economy were not dramatic. Gradualism was also an important reason 
for the lack of concrete effects. 539 
Despite the growth in importance of the private sector and businessmen, the 
old strategy of co-option seems to have been used. This time, however, the 
business interests were just co-opted to the presidents `modernizers' camp, 
not to the party, which resembled the old-guard. The economic reforms have 
not thus far incurred any deep changes in socio-economic structures or 
created an independent bourgeoisie or power bases. The interests of the 
businessmen who benefited from the economic reforms were tied to the 
ability of the president to continue reforms. 540 
538 Landis, Joshua. "Conflict with West Spurs Economic, Not Political Reform". Arab 
Reform Bulletin, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Volume 4, Issue 5, June 
2006. 
539 Perthes, Syria under Bashar Al-Asad: Modernization and the Limits of Change, p. 36. 
540 "Reform in Syria: Steering between the Chinese Model and Regime Change", p. 7. 
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As a conclusion, despite the tense security environment due to imports of 
Iraqi oil and high oil prices, the fiscal capabilities of the state were higher 
than ever from 2000. There were, however, serious concerns regarding the 
ability of the state to continue extracting external revenues in the long term 
because of the exhaustion of oil production and lack of other external 
revenues. Therefore, domestic extraction was increased slowly by reforming 
the economy. The reforms were aiming to be restructural. They aimed at 
increasing the input of the private sector to the economy and slowly 
dismantled the extensive public sector - at least partially. Still, little 
privatization took place at this stage. The economic reforms were put 
forward by the new president, who lacked the full personalized powers and 
institutional capabilities, further studied in the next chapter. Therefore, they 
can also be seen as part of a strategy to build a new power base, for the new 
regime based on the new president - in other words, as acts of increasing or 
securing the fiscal capabilities of the state, the institutional capabilities of 
the state and legitimacy of the new president and his state. The reforms 
themselves were domestically rooted, and not dominated by external debtors 
or other international actors. The high level of external revenues, however, 
explains why in the midst of the economic reforms, state-control, allocation 
and co-option still persisted. In other words, the rentier features were firmly 
in place. 
5.3 External pressure and state autonomy 
This chapter analyzes how the increased external pressure on Syria affected 
the domestic political system from 2000. It concentrates on the political 
system after the inauguration of the new president, and analyzes the changes 
that appeared in the legitimacy and efficiency of the state deriving from 
divides within the regime. It analyzes how the tense external security 
environment that delegitimized and threatened the regime as never before 
affected the state powers. 
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Institutional and coercive capabilities 
For the first time in the era of Syrian history under study, there were 
changes in political power structure, namely a change in the highest position 
of power. The issue of succession revealed a weakness in state power related 
to the institutional capabilities of the state. Because power was personalized 
to the ruler to an extreme, a successor was bound to have a weak 
institutional position to carry out his policies. Leverett has called this "an 
institutional immaturity". 541 Instead of an institutionally guaranteed power 
position, the political system in Syria requires the ruler to gain its position 
through coercion and power balancing within the core elite to gain 
legitimacy and efficiency for the regime. That is unless the legitimacy of the 
use of power should be personalized to the new ruler immediately without a 
contest. Should there be a lack of legitimacy, the efficiency of the ruler to 
use power would be undermined. 
The highly personalized power position of the president Hafez al-Asad 
created a legitimacy problem for his successor. Because of the possible 
vulnerability of the new ruler to a power struggle, president Hafez al-Arad 
was unable to nominate his successor institutionally and therefore rely on 
the institutional status of the successor. Because the competitors for power 
should be kept competing for the succession, the president kept power in his 
hands. 542 Outside of the institutions, however, there was an attempt to 
groom his first son Basil for the presidency, until he died in a car accident in 
1994. After that, there remained very little time for grooming the next son, 
Bashar, for power, in terms of creating a reliable core elite around him, 
ensuring that the power balance was in his favour and gaining legitimacy for 
him from the political and economic elite and the public. 
Hafez used his last years for transferring his legitimacy to his son Bashar in 
a grooming process that included gaining legitimacy particularly within the 
military and intelligence apparatus, as well as the public. Opposition from 
sal Leverett: Inheriting Syria. Bashar's Trial by Fire, pp. 27-28. 542 Ibid, p. 29. 
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the army to his succession was eliminated. He received important backing 
from defence minister, Mustafa Tlass. Bashar rose in the army ranks. He 
served in and rose to a status of a captain, and then to a staff colonel before 
his presidency. The challengers remained, but there was no opposition to 
Bashar when he became president. 543 To achieve public legitimacy, a careful 
attempt was made to create an image of a modernized Bashar. During the 
grooming process, he was heavily involved in an anticorruption campaign 
and in transferring Syria to the computer age. He also tried to place reform- 
minded people in important positions already before he became president. 544 
The grooming process of a son in a republic has also been witnessed in 
Egypt where the president's son Gamal Mubarak appears to have seized 
power. 545 
President Hafez al-Asad was successful in creating legitimacy for Bashar in 
the elite and public by his personalized power position and legacy. The 
institutional structures and personalized power base were united, when 
Bashar, assumed to continue the legacy of the family, took power and the 
formal process of grooming the president took place without a contest sah 
After President Bashar al-Asad took power in July 2000, he received 
institutional powers: the commander-in-chief of the army, general secretary 
of the Ba'ath party and President of the Syrian Arab Republic without a 
contest. There was wide support for Bashar within the inherited regime. 547 
As a consequence of the lack of immediate institutional powers, however, 
the new president had to continue his father's policies and rely on the power 
structures and the core elite created by his father, often called the old guard. 
The power resources of the president were therefore not complete and he 
was not an autonomous decision-maker. Instead "a collective leadership" 
543 Ibid, pp. 61,68. 
544 Ibid, pp. 62-65. 
sas See for example: Slackman, Michael. "Son of Mubarak Eyes Succession", International 
Herald Tribune, 19. September 2006. 
546 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "Reform in Syria: Steering between the 
Chinese Model and Regime Change", Carnegie Papers, No. 69, July 2006, p. 4. 
sal"Reform in Syria: Steering between the Chinese Model and Regime Change", p. 4. 
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was created with Bashar and the old-guard. 548 This meant, first and 
foremost, that he was bound to face difficulties if he was to conduct changes 
to the power structure of the core elite. Secondly, he had to consider that he 
was expected to follow his father's legacy in his policies. These constraints 
seriously undermined his ability to create his own power base and political 
vision. In other words, the president faced a weakness in efficiency. A 
weakness in legitimacy within the elite was also to be expected if the rules 
of the game were to be altered. 
If the president was to aim for changes in Syrian domestic or economic 
policies, inherent to his position was a natural need to create a power base of 
his own. Another inherited need was to create a new political vision, 
because the Syrian economy and society were facing pressures from high 
birth rates, globalization and decades of a lack of adaptation of the economy 
to the global needs. 549 The president therefore had a two-fold policy. On the 
one hand, he needed to keep up the legacy of his father, on the other he 
urged for changes. On the one hand, he built a power position of his own, on 
the other he relied on the old guard. This duality of the nature of his 
leadership also led various analyses of the new president as a leader. The 
analyses differ remarkably. 55° Some analysts see him as a reformer, who has 
had to struggle with the old guard. Some see him simply as a follower of his 
father's legacy. For others, he is a ruler without vision and experience. 551 
The need to rely on his father's legacy and to push for reforms 
simultaneously is apparent in the inaugural address of Bashar after he 
became president. He indicated that he would both maintain his father's 
legacy and make changes to it. This was also noticeable in his first 
interview, which reflected a wish to both pursue reforms and maintain old 
policies at the same time. 552 As proof of this complicated dualism, an 
advisor to Bashar has said that keeping the image of following the legacy of 
548 Perthes, Syria under Bashar A! -Asad: " Modernization and the Limits of Change, p. 8. sag Leverett, Inheriting Syria. Bashar's Trial by Fire, p. 33. 
550 Ibid, p. xii. 
551 Ibid, pp. 19-21. 
552 Ibid, p. 69. 
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Hafez al-Asad is the biggest problem of Bashar's presidency. 553 Later, 
Bashar has also said openly that the old guard and the political structure in 
Syria was a problem for pursuing reforms. 554 
The change in Bashar's policy in relation to that of his father was to 
gradually pursue economic, social and political change. The economic 
change was the primary goal. The initiatives for economic reforms were 
numerous and they aimed at structural change in liberalizing the economy 
and slowly changing the state-led economy to a market economy. These 
economic policies were reviewed in the last chapter in detail. On political 
change, the aim of the president seemed to be to carefully pursue social and 
political reforms without compromising state power, regime stability and 
without inflicting sectarian conflict. Despite optimism related to Bashar's 
wording on political reforms, it was apparent that he was not going to move 
far on democratization. The changes in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union 
and Algeria are often cited as examples that Bashar did not wish to 
follow. 555 There were clear signs of some initiatives for political change, 
however. Syria was about to accept free municipal elections first to be held 
around 2007.556 There were also attempts to reform the party law so that 
parties independent of the Ba'ath party would have been allowed to register 
and operate. This is clear from the debates of the working groups preparing 
for the Ba'ath party congress from summer 2004 onwards. 557 There were 
signs of intention to extend the reform also to the sphere of security. The 
length of the army service was seen to influence economic development, 
and the service period was cut down from two-and-a-half to two years. 558 
The discussion in public about the emergency law did not take place, but 
criticism was raised by the opposition and they were allowed to continue 
their activity. The Ba'ath party congress in 2005 also debated the emergency 
553 Ibid, p. 29. 
554 Ibid, pp. 31. 
515 Ibid, pp. 70-7 1. 
556 Interview with an international diplomat, Damascus, 6. December 2004. 
557 Interview with a Syrian journalist, Damascus, 26. July 2004 and 8. December 2004. 
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law. 559 This can be seen as a sign of the acceptance of some debate on the 
issue. 
In the field of political liberalization, according to Leverett, Bashar pushed 
for opening the domestic political debate and civil society, albeit slowly and 
carefully. As regards freeing the political debate, the president initially 
allowed greater freedom of the press. He appointed new directors to the state 
news agency SANA, state radio and TV and to the state-run newspapers of 
al-Bath, al-Thawa and Tishreen. The legal parties were also allowed to 
publish their papers. A license was also given to the first private newspaper 
al-Dommari. The president also allowed the human rights committee to 
restart their activities and allowed the establishment of a new human rights 
organization. Political prisoners were pardoned in significant numbers and 
the cult related to the president and his family was no longer supported. 560 
He also allowed some NGOs - although government-sponsored - to increase 
their activities from 2003. There was no legal framework for their activities, 
the groups acted as charities or their nature as a non-registered organization 
was ignored. Although most of the NGOs were government dependent, 
some were also independent. 561 
The accounts of Bashar's sincerity regarding social reform and civil society 
empowerment are divided, but there is enough evidence as Leverett 
concludes to suggest that Bashar initially aimed to revive civil society. He 
argues that this is because he believed that empowerment of civil society 
would foster social change, support economic reforms by growth of the 
private sector and avoid a growth of sectarian identities. 562 The analysis of 
George is somewhat different. He sees that the civil society movement 
evolved in spite of the regime, taking advantage of the new leader and the 
small moves towards political liberalization. 563 In the spring of 2000, there 
was a movement to create civil society forums that were allowed to operate 
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despite the emergency law that prohibits free gatherings without government 
approval. This era of a temporary liberalized political environment, often 
called the Damascus spring, produced two public calls for political reforms, 
called the statement 99 and the statement of 1000. Basher has been said to 
have supported the first declaration. He has also been reported to have said 
to the security apparatus that they are not allowed to stop the activities of the 
forums. 5 The second call for reforms has been widely seen to have been 
more directly challenging to the regime. 565 Indeed, in late autumn of 2001 
the civil society forums were crushed and their activities stopped. 
Because the new president was not only to follow the policies of his father, 
the lack of institutional efficiency was bound to become apparent and 
noticeable. The inefficiency was manifest in the struggle between Bashar 
and the Ba'ath party old guard and the bureaucracy. How did the President 
then counter the problem of inefficiency of state power and inability to put 
forth policies that would have changed society? First, Bashar used 
appointment and retirement policy to create his own power base, an inner 
circle, or as Leverett calls it "an alternative regime". 566 Bashar appointed 
highly-educated, often Western exposed academics, businessmen, 
specialists or technocrats often with no party alliance or political 
background to the position of advisors and ministers in the key fields of his 
reform agenda. 567 These personalities included Aymara al-Nur, who became 
the president's economic advisor, Samir Seifan and Sami al-Khiami, at the 
Syrian-European Business centre, Ghassan al-Rifai as a Minister of 
Economics and Foreign Trade, Issam al-Za'im, as Minister of State 
Planning, and Minister of Industry and the Chairman of the State Planning 
Commission, Sa'dallah Agha al-Qal'a as Minister of Tourism, Abdullah al- 
Dardari, the Chairman of State Planning Commission and head of Syrian 
Economic Society and Mahir al-Mujtahid as Secretary-General of the 
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Presidency of the Council of Ministers. 568 He also changed governments in 
December 2001, September 2003 and October 2004, although the 
nominations did not always succeed. In the end, the hard-liners moved out, 
such as Vice President Abdel-Halim Khaddam, who resigned in summer 
2005, head of the intelligence Bahjat Suleiman, head of military intelligence 
Hassan Khalil and head of political security, Adnan Badr Hassan. As a 
result, old party leaders lost power. At the same time, however, the 
opposition to Bashar broadened. 569 By 2002, an estimated 75% of the 60 top 
leaders within the political decision-making, administration and military 
were replaced. 570 
In the security sector, Bashar aimed to establish his power base by installing 
people loyal to him to the highest positions. Bashar had pushed several high 
ranking officers from the army for early retirement. He also placed Ghazi 
Kana'an in the position of the Minister of Interior and his brother-in-law 
Asif Shawkat to the position of Director of Syrian Military Intelligence. By 
this appointment policy, Bashar clearly built a power base of his own, 
differing from the old guard and the men loyal to his father. According to 
Leverett, the appointments in the security sphere also signify that Bashar 
wished to surround himself with people that were able to maintain stability, 
but who were moderate in their response and accepted the reformist agenda 
of Bashar. 571 This point is supported by the fact that the changes in the field 
of security took place after the violent crackdown of the civil society 
movement and personalities advocating freer public debate. 
Bashar also used a retirement policy in order to be able to release obstacles 
for nominations. In March 2002, the president ordered that all civil servants 
over 60 years should retire, altogether around 80,000 people. Replacing 
these helped in creating loyalty networks and created new neo-patrimonialist 
structures. However, Perthes emphasizes that the main need was to appoint 
people with expertise as part of administrative reform rather than create new 
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political loyalties by appointments. Appointments also acted as a reminder 
of anti-corruption politics, as they showed that the Ba'ath party was not an 
automatic path to significant positions. 572 This appointment and retirement 
policy has often been misperceived purely as a generational change. It was 
rather about a build-up of a new power base, assisted by a generational 
change. 
Bashar also aimed to limit the power of the Ba'ath party, and the existing 
old-guard and their followers. 573 The new president did not place much 
weight on the Ba'ath ideology, which was apparent from the economic 
reform initiatives that were contrary to the socialist ideology of Ba'athism. 
Bashar also admitted that Ba'ath party "no longer matters" in an interview 
with Leverett. 574 In summer 2003, there was an announcement that the party 
would no longer interfere in day-to-day politics. He was also attempting to 
reform the role of the Ba'ath party in politics by allowing new parties and 
through other reforms, issues that were debated before the Ba'ath Party 
Congress in 2005.575 
Bashar also limited the power of the party by using alternative channels for 
policy implementation. Some of the challenging personalities were 
eliminated by appointment policy, but a greater challenge came from the 
bureaucratic structures, which Bashar often tried to circumvent. The 
relationship between the new president and the bureaucracy truly revealed 
the inefficiency of state power in the hands of Bashar. The bureaucracy was 
mostly lead by old guard ministers, who held a decade-long tradition of 
running the business of the state, which included corruption, personal 
economic interests, political appointments, lack of effectiveness, capacity 
and expertise and a basic opposition to change. This was especially apparent 
in the field of economics, the key area of Bashar's reform policies. 
Economic decisions belonged to the Council of Ministers, and they were 
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tightly linked to the careful balance between the interests of the bureaucrats 
and the Sunni economic elite. Therefore, in addition to the slow and 
inefficient ministries, the politico-economic structures of power and 
benefits, carefully built during decades of Ba'ath party rule, became the key 
obstacle to reforms. This has been acknowledged by Bashar himself 176 
Therefore, there were problems in implementing the numerous economic 
reform initiatives. Despite this, many analyses consider the reforms in the 
economic sector as dramatic and real. 577 
One of the main strategies that Bashar had in his hands to circumvent some 
of these obstacles was the EU association agreement. According to 
interviews with Syrian policy makers and EU officials, Bashar's motivation 
to sign the association agreement was very much to gain legitimacy and a 
practical roadmap to pursue the reforms that he considered necessary. 
According to the interviews, Bashar pushed for the association agreement 
for domestic needs, to overcome the hard-liners. 578 Another clear example 
of circumventing the bureaucracy was the creation of so-called "parallel 
structures" including advisory boards, nominated implementers and contact 
persons between the grass-root and the president that worked on a broad 
number of issues directly under the president and outside of the ministries. 
The advisory board on economic reform initiatives was the clearest attempt 
to circumvent the traditional procedures of decision-making in economic 
affairs. Other examples can be found in family issues (youth and women's 
rights). 579 In a long term perspective, an important tool was also the 
administrative reform, including the building of capacity within ministries 
and training of civil servants. 580 
The dual nature of Bashar's policies created a duality of behaviour from the 
president. The resistance to new policies, as well as to the circumvention 
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attempts described above was clear and the new president had to take it into 
consideration. Bashar had no aim to seriously upset the power balance to 
such an extent that it would have upset his own power position. He 
continued to push for reforms and maintain power at the same time. 58' 
Views differ on the entire sincerity of Bashar in pushing reforms. The 
question is, however, mistaken. It is not a matter of sincerity. The question 
is: What was the motivation for his reform drive? A drive that, on the basis 
of all evidence, he undoubtedly had. According to the opposition, the 
interest of Bashar in pushing for reforms was rooted in the need to secure 
the regime. 582 Therefore, the reforms were not expected to go far. According 
to this logic, also adopted in this research, there was a long term rationale in 
the reforms to buy legitimacy through economic growth for the regime, and 
especially for the new president. The need existed despite the seemingly 
comfortable fiscal powers of the state. The capabilities to grow and 
distribute economic wealth to the people could not be developed without 
deeper economic reforms and "modernization" in the new globalized world, 
in which satellite channels showed every Syrian their level of economic 
development and the gap between them and the rest of the world. The 
motivation for reforms was indeed to strengthen the regime. Therefore, it 
was clear that reforms would have limits. 
Depending on the views of Bashar's "sincerity" or motivation to push for 
reforms, the evaluations vary concerning the extent to which Bashar in some 
cases gave up to the needs of the old guard, agreed with the positions of the 
old guard or was himself part of the old guard. It is clear, however, that in 
order to maintain his power position, Bashar agreed with some of the 
positions of the old guard - increasingly so after his first years in power. At 
times, the common position appeared to have come as a result of hard 
opposition to Bashar's policies, sometimes due to a commonly recognized 
need in the core elite to take a step back to guarantee regime security or to 
slow down the pace of changes. This is particularly evident in the 
Sg' Ibid. p. 35. 
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crackdown of the Damascus spring and repression of some newly granted 
liberties, appointments of governments, the results of the Ba'ath party 
congress 2005 and in the implementation of economic reforms. 
The civil society activism, the Damascus spring, was cracked down upon by 
the security agencies with full legitimation from the president. The forums 
were eliminated from February 2001, followed by waves of arrests by 
autumn of 2001. The newly granted freedoms in press liberties were also 
cracked down upon. There were new restrictions on the press, publishing of 
al-Dommari was prohibited and the director of al-Thawra was changed. 583 
Initially, Bashar seemed to have had a positive approach to the forums, but 
as their demands for political reforms hardened and the old guard took a 
very confrontational approach, Bashar moved closer to the position of the 
old guard and legitimized the repression of `the Damascus spring'. 
According to the Carnegie Paper, the main motivator for this change was the 
opposition of the old guard. 584 Most notably the powerful Vice President 
Khaddam seemed to be very unhappy about the policy to allow public 
debate. 585 
The appointments of governments were examples in which Bashar had to 
give up many of his own nominations to the old guard. In the first reshuffle 
in December 2001, Bashar appointed his ministers. In September 2003, 
however, he faced opposition to his wish to appoint a technocrat 
government. The Ba'ath regional command resisted this by referring to the 
regional pressures on Syria. As a result, for example Bashar's loyalists, al- 
Atrash and al-Rifai from the Finance Ministry and Economy Ministry were 
sidelined. 586 In October 2004, Bashar proposed to appoint considerably 
fewer reformists then before. 587 Bashar lost the struggle for nominations for 
the party, which was a sign that an alliance of the party and the old guard 
were still important in the bid to make headway. 
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Bashar also appears to have lost his ability to push forward changes in the 
Ba'ath Party Congress that took place in summer 2005. The preparations 
from 2004 seemed to promise significant changes, but the result of the 
Congress itself was very disappointing for those wishing to see greater 
reforms. The mood was positive for reforms during the last half of 2004.588 
However, the restlessness of the old guard is reported to have grown in 
autumn of 2004 as the external pressure intensified. 589 Already, the 
postponements of the Ba'ath party congress made it clear that there were 
serious disagreements. 590 During the Congress, the differences in position 
between the president and the old guard were clear, best illustrated by the 
fact that the Vice President Khaddam criticised Bashar openly and 
resigned. 59 t 
By 2005, Bashar seems to have shifted to the old guard position. The reform 
drive exhausted gradually as the political pressure for Syrian withdrawal 
from Lebanon intensified, after the Hariri murder in February 2005, and the 
Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. The increasing delegitimation of the 
regime by the international actors during the Hari ri"investigation and by the 
opposition of Khaddam from exile by the end of 2005 finally closed the 
political space and tightened domestic security and surveillance. 592 Bashar 
seemed to have moved to unite the political elite in the face of pressure on 
the regime and left reformist policies in the name of domestic stability and 
unity. 
The overall result of this dual policy of the new president and inefficiency of 
the state power was that the concrete political reforms were, in the end, few 
during 2000-2005. Therefore, the concrete impact of the reform initiatives 
for the political system and its authoritarian nature were none. None of the 
political changes had an effect on the distribution of political power, and 
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they were rather cosmetic. 593 Despite this, the proposed changes - had they 
been implemented - show that Syria would have taken a step in a semi- 
authoritarian direction. Syria would have slowly adopted more of an 
appearance of democratization without true changes at the core centre of the 
power structure. 
A second result of the inherited weakness in the power position of the 
president was that the core elite became smaller, power was exercised by a 
narrower coalition and there was an apparent power struggle between the 
closest core centre of power and the wider political elite. The smaller 
decision-making circle does not mean that Syria became more authoritarian, 
because the closest core had to consider the positions of the wider political 
elite. There was also no move towards greater political competition in 
democratic terms, because the emerged competition for power appeared 
within the regime and not between new competing groups and the regime. 
What it meant was that the presidential powers were somewhat limited. 
The new power structure was as follows: the new core elite was composed 
of the persons whose loyalty Bashar could count upon, namely the family. 
In addition to Bashar, the core included his brother Maher al-Asad, who was 
the head of the Republican Guard and brother-in-law Asef Shawkat, who 
was the head of military security. 594 Furthermore, Bashar gave power to new 
loyalists through the appointments and retirement policy. According to 
Perthes, the president indeed replaced almost the entire old elite. These 
"new guard" members were not a sign of a change in the power balance, 
simply a change in the balance inside the political elite to favour the new 
president. The new appointments were co-opted, and were equally interested 
in the benefits that the proximity to state resources offered the old guard. 
Bashar also still relied on some old guard members, such as Foreign 
Minister and later Vice President Farouq al-Shara. 595 The opposition 
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consisted of the old guard, secularist intellectuals, Islamists and some local 
leaders. 596 
Effects of the external environment 
The external environment affected the domestic politics in at least three 
notable ways. First, the external fiscal environment bore an impact by 
creating the need for economic reforms. The pressures of the external fiscal 
environment affected the political system because of the necessity to pursue 
economic reforms for guaranteeing the fiscal capabilities of the state in the 
medium and long term and for increasing the legitimacy of the state. This 
made it necessary for the president to move ahead with domestic reforms 
and therefore depart from the legacy of his father, which resulted in 
inefficiency connected to institutional powers. Secondly, the external 
security environment affected the legitimacy and inefficiency of the new 
president by accelerating the power struggle. Thirdly, although the 
economic reforms continued, the tense security environment from 2005 
directly impacted on the eventual end to political reforms. 
The first two effects of the external environment have been discussed in the 
preceding analysis. In addition, the external security environment had a 
clear effect on the overall conditions in which Bashar aimed to stabilize his 
rule and pursued the new policies. These conditions affected the legitimacy 
of Bashar more as a new president within the political elite and within the 
public at large. The external security environment, which was very highly 
pressured for Syria from spring of 2003, accelerated the existing power 
struggle and contributed to the narrowing of the core decision-making 
elite. 597 In other words, it served to diminish the efficiency and legitimacy of 
the presidency as the old guard felt uncomfortable with Bashar's abilities to 
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handle foreign policy issues. 598 There was wide criticism against Bashar 
among the political elite on foreign policy, which was most evident ahead of 
the Ba'ath Party Congress in 2005, held a few months after Syria withdrew 
from Lebanon. The congress experienced wide disagreement between 
Bashar's people and the old guard. 599 The Ba'ath party also referred to 
external pressure when they refused to accept Bashar's government in 
600 2003. 
The timing of the signs of the power struggle matches with the pressure 
from the external environment. External pressure was at least used as a 
means in the domestic power struggle. The signs of conflict were apparent 
from end of 2003 when the old guard objected to Bashar's government 
nominations. This correlates with the increasing fears for Syrian and regime 
security after the first phase of the Iraq war. From the summer of 2004, the 
struggle for results from the Ba'ath party Congress began and the 
expectations for major changes lowered as time passed . 
601 This tallies with 
the increasing pressure for Syria to withdraw from Lebanon after the EU 
turned to support the US in pushing Syria on the matter. 
Interestingly enough, although the trend towards a power-struggle and 
eventually towards Bashar's move to support the position of the old guard in 
halting domestic political and social reforms is clear, there is also evidence 
of an acceleration of intentions and initiatives for reforms during times when 
Syria's external environment was already highly pressured (not, however, 
anymore after the Hariri investigation). Perthes noted that in 2004 there 
were certain signs that Bashar would slowly dismantle his father's 
authoritarian structures. 602 He saw that the authoritarianism was becoming 
59s The criticism was also grounded in divisions on foreign policy approach towards the US, 
some proposing engagement, some preferring to rely on the policies that maintain Syrian 
regional influence, because they saw no chance for changing US policies towards Syria by 
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milder. 603 Furthermore, several interviews both in summer and in late 2004 
conducted by the author overwhelmingly indicate a very positive 
environment by diplomats and Syrian observers. 604 This can be explained 
precisely in terms of the external pressure. The reform initiatives were taken 
in order to show to the US and the EU compliance to the calls for 
democratization. Syria was shown to be different from Iraq, and a message 
was given that Syria was on the path to allaying the fears of the external 
actors. Domestic reforms were therefore used partly also as a tool to 
improve the external situation. This was possible because it was not in 
contrast to the agenda of Bashar. 
This changed soon after the external pressure rose. 605 It can be argued that 
the external pressure - particularly from 2005 after the Hariri investigation - 
halted domestic reforms. The pressure directly threatened Bashar's core 
regime. The domestic political environment had almost returned completely 
to the Hafez era with very little room for manoeuvre for the opposition. The 
external security environment hardened to such an extent that the move 
away from political reforms was logical. The state of war in the region had 
been the key motivator for the use of domestic coercion and maintaining the 
utmost stability for regime security since 1970. As the threats were now 
more directed towards the regime security than ever before, the worries 
were logical. In addition to the direct military pressure and military isolation 
after the Iraq war, the pressure on Lebanon and the humiliating withdrawal 
thereafter, the political elite, especially the old guard, was worried about US 
democratization calls in the region and their possible effects on the domestic 
public, especially as the calls were combined with images of the fall of a 
Ba'athist regime in Iraq. There are some evaluations, according to which the 
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external pressure indeed encouraged the opposition to act against the 
government. 606 
The old guard was also very concerned by jihadist and Kurdish activity. 607 
This must have also concerned Bashar. The need for strong coercive 
capabilities was more and more legitimized as a result of the Islamist threat, 
not by threat of invasion or a military conflict. The insurgency following the 
Iraqi invasion and the traffic of the foreign fighters from Syria was 
suggestive of a possible increase in Islamist radical activism also in Syria. 
Syria witnessed a handful of terrorist attacks for the first time since 1970 
under the Asad regime in 2004 when a bombing attempt was made on an 
empty UN building, and in 2006 when there was an attempt to bomb the 
American embassy. The security forces also clashed with Islamists in 
December 2005. 
The increasing ethnic and religious tension and violence in Iraq after the fall 
of the Ba'athist regime also increased worries for domestic stability in Syria. 
The core of the political power, that was Alawi by religion, faced a political 
challenge from the old guard that was Sunni by majority. The major 
opponents within the public were from the Sunni majority, who were 
increasingly finding moderate Islamism as the force for political 
mobilization. 608 This worry guaranteed that the core elite around Bashar 
must have also shared same worries for domestic stability. This seems to 
have contributed to Bashar's shift closer to the old guard and to the 
narrowing of the core elite around Bashar. Evidence of this is found in the 
government reshuffle of 11 February 2006 that has been seen as supportive 
of the hard liners in the face of foreign pressure. 609 The coercive capabilities 
were also in place. Bashar had secured his regime by appointments in the 
army and intelligence from the start of his presidency. The domestic 
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surveillance was further enforced by new technology. Indeed, a foreign 
observer analyzed in 2004 that Syria spent much of its military budget on 
high technology electronic surveillance systems to monitor domestic 
opposition 610 The coercive resources that would ultimately be in Bashar's 
favour in case of an attempt to bring down his regime were in the hands of 
the Alawi loyalists. 
The Hariri investigation was the final reason for halting the reforms and 
uniting the political elite and the public. The investigation posed a problem 
to Syrian sovereignty based on the over-powerful authority of the regime. 611 
In the worst case, Syria would have had to hand significant members of the 
ultimate core of the political power, exactly those that were closest to 
Bashar, over to the international court. Furthermore, Syria would have faced 
UN sanctions. 612 
New from the US side was more aggressive delegitimation and demands for 
regime change. According to diplomats, Syria took the US threats of regime 
change in Syria seriously. 613 The external delegitimation was not the only 
concern. At the same time, the former Vice President Khaddam challenged 
Bashar from exile and called for a change of regime, simultaneously with 
the American pressure. Khaddam sought to unite the exiled opposition and 
cooperated with the Muslim Brotherhood 614, which worried the regime 
severely. There was also open criticism of Syrian Lebanese policies by the 
domestic opposition. In releasing the so-called "Damascus declaration" in 
October 2005, signatories criticized the regime's destructive regional 
policies that have lead Syria to isolation. According to them, the policies 
were not guided by national interest. The declaration demanded Syria to turn 
from a "security state" and demanded free and regular elections, a 
democratic constitution, the rule of law, pluralism, individual rights, end to 
6'o Interview with an European diplomat, Damascus, 4. August 2004. 
611 Gresh, Alain. "Syria: a Concentrated Offensive". Le Monde Diplomatique, December 
2005. 
612 UN sanctions were suggested to include smart sanctions, aimed at the regime. For more 
on the estimated effects of possible sanctions, see Tabler, Andrew. "Can Syria Afford 
United Nations Sanctions? " The Daily Star, 6. December 2005. 
61 Interview with a European diplomat, Brussels, 10. October 2006. 
614 "Khaddam in Alliance Against al-Assad", Al-Jazeera, 9 February 2006. 
219 
emergency law, release of political prisoners, return of exiles and minority 
rights. Signatories came from the entire opposition - from the exiled Muslim 
Brotherhood, to leftist, nationalist, Kurdish, secular opposition and human 
rights activists. 615 
The insecure external situation combined with the confusion of the unity of 
the political elite under the new leadership of Bashar al-Asad aroused 
serious debate of the possibility of the fall of the regime in Syria. 616 This 
was particularly worrisome for those wishing the regime to stay in power 
because the external pressure came in conjunction with a domestic 
undermining of Bashar's legitimacy as a leader and an increase in domestic 
opposition activity. The death of the interior minister, Ghazi Kanaan, also 
indicated fragility in the security sector. 617 
These debates on the possible fall of Bashar's regime were, however, not 
particularly well-founded, as the domestic structures are very stable and the 
coercive abilities of the regime would have been able to counter domestic 
threats. Even the likelihood of an unstable regime was unforeseen before the 
US invasion of Iraq. Further proof of external influence on domestic 
changes was found in the reform demands from previously unheard 
directions, most importantly from the street level. 618 
Bashar was not going to move on political reforms. Reforms were halted 
and the domestic political environment became tense. Coercion and 
surveillance increased. There were also strategies for strengthening domestic 
unity and gaining legitimacy. The regime aimed to dilute criticism at home 
and rally for support in the face of the Hariri-investigation. Bashar rallied 
bis The signatories were the Democratic National Grouping in Syria, Kurdish Democratic 
Alliance in Syria, Committees for the Revival of Civil Society, Kurdish Democratic Front 
in Syria, Future Party and several individuals. English version appeared in the Syria 
Comment, 1. November 2005. 
616 See for example debate in internet blog SyriaComment. com: "Will Asad Fall", Syria 
Comment, 7. January 2006. Based on several conversations by the author, debate also 
occurred within diplomatic and research circles. 
617 Butt, Gerald. "Syria Struggles with New Realities", BBC, 13. October 2005. 
618 The criticism of the government became possible since Bashar took power and increased 
after the Iraq war. Perthes, Syria under Bashar Al-Asada Modernization and the Limits of 
Change, pp. 14,62. This was no longer the case on the streets since beginning of 2005. 
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for domestic support for the Syrian position and used the external threat for 
uniting Syrians behind the regime. The regime forged domestic unity with a 
massive propaganda campaign, and used external pressure to increase 
domestic support by using anti-Western rhetoric 619 This was done by a 
public propaganda campaign that accused the investigation of foreign 
interference, demonized the UN investigator Mahlis by providing evidence 
of Syrian innocence and by speeches addressing the public. 
Bashar blamed investigators of interference in Syrian domestic politics at a 
rare speech at the university. 620 Syrian media blamed Israel and the current 
Lebanese government for the assassination of Hariri and for scapegoating 
Syria. A Syrian satirical comedy `Standing... sitting... silence' appeared, that 
was critical of domestic policy but supported Syrian foreign policy. 
Propaganda films demonizing the UN investigator were circulated. The 
Houssam masked witness case was designed to impress domestically. 621 
Syrian newspaper rhetoric clearly illustrates this point: "And now at last the 
mystery witness has been unmasked. Hassam Taher Hassam, has told the 
truth and spoken out"622 The regime also released opposition figures from 
jail to gain support. 190 opposition figures were released in November 2005 
and five prominent activists were further released in January 2006.623 
Economic reforms were pursued to also maintain domestic legitimacy. 624 
These strategies worked and the regime gained the upper hand in handling 
the threat to domestic stability and regime security. In the end, as a Carnegie 
Paper argues, by 2006 the regime had succeeded in bolstering its strength by 
narrowing the core elite, repressing opposition and using anti-Western 
rhetoric. 625 
619"Reform in Syria: Steering between the Chinese Model and Regime Change", p. 3. 
620 Al-Asad, Bashar. "We Must Fight". Syria Comment, 10. November 2005. Bashar also 
gave an interview to French TV, Channel 3 "Fair and Objective Report is Imperative, Facts 
are Demanded and Truth is Syrian Innocence. " The Syria Times, 7. December 2005. 
621 Young, Michael. "Give Detlev Mehlis Six More Months. " The Daily Star, 1. December 
2005. 
622 "Opinion. " The Syria Times, 29. November 2005. 
623 Ghattas, Kim and Turner, Mark. "Syria Releases Opposition Politicians", BBC, 18. 
January 2006. 
624 Landis, Joshua. "Syria: Conflict with West Spurs Economic, Not Political Reform", 
Arab Reform Bulletin. Carnegie Endowment for Democracy, June 2006. 
625 "Reform in Syria: Steering between the Chinese Model and Regime Change", p. 3. 
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As a conclusion, during the first five years of Bashar's rule, there was first a 
momentum for a departure from old policies and new policies for reforms. 
This was caused partly by pressures from the external economic 
environment, and followed by a power struggle and inability to implement 
reforms, which was further impeded by a tense external environment. The 
pressure related to Lebanon finally moved Bashar close to the position of 
the old-guard. The regime reacted by means of repression in the domestic 
environment and abolishment of some liberties. As a result of the external 
pressure, by 2006 the Syrian regime was stronger and there was little 
motivation for domestic reforms. 
For the first time since 1970, there were serious questions related to the 
efficiency and legitimacy of the president and with it the entire regime. The 
problems related to implementing economic reforms shows that there was 
less motivation for change by the regime. However, the events since the 
increase in external pressure show that the regime was very capable of 
quickly maximizing its legitimacy. The regime also had autonomy. The 
fiscal powers were good and the coercive powers were in place. The fiscal 
resources of the regime would have been sufficient to guarantee political 
stability had the regime faced a concrete challenge. The high income from 
oil exports clearly indicates that the government fiscal resources were not at 
least drastically decreasing. The significant increase in trade also showed no 
signs of problems, although Syria faced political isolation and threat of 
broadening economic sanctions. The increase in foreign investments was 
apparent also at the street level, for example by the mushrooming of new 
fashion trademarks. This all gave an impression to the public that Syria was 
not affected by the political isolation. The signs of economic progress gave 
the regime the ability to buy legitimacy from the public. The fiscal powers 
were also in place to use traditional allocation and co-option means if and 
when necessary. The ultimate guarantee for regime security would have 
come from the army and intelligence that would have fought for the regime 
security, and in the end guaranteed the security of the Alawi president in the 
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event of a coup or sectarian conflict. As a result, although the Syrian regime 
was weaker in 2000-2005 than ever before, the state power still remained 
such that the authoritarian nature of the regime did not change, even if in 
general the authoritarianism appears to have become slightly milder. This 
can, however, only be properly analyzed if the end of external pressure is 
followed by a return to domestic reforms in the future. 
5.4 Conclusions 
The Syrian external security environment from 2000 was defined by 
pressure and increasing isolation. This was because the Middle East policies 
of the hegemonic superpower, the US, were in increasing contradiction to 
the Syrian policies in the region. Syria's focus on its regional influence and 
its sources of pressure to bring against Israel (namely, support for radical 
Palestinian groups and Hizbollah, presence in Lebanon, arsenal of WMDs 
and alliance with Iran) became of increasing concern to the US. This was 
particularly the case since the US had now shifted the focus of its Middle 
East policies to the war on terrorism, bringing down rogue regimes with 
WMDs, transforming the regional security architecture to limit the influence 
of the rogues and democratizing authoritarian regimes. There was a duality 
in Syria's foreign policy environment. First, there was a need to dilute the 
pressure of the US and adapt to its regional hegemony, manifested by a 
strong military presence in Iraq from 2003. Second, there was a need to keep 
hold of its national interests related to Golan. This produced conflicting 
foreign policies. 
It is argued here that when these key national interests were not in jeopardy, 
Syria aimed for closer Western engagement to dilute the pressure. This was 
done by complying with certain US demands, closer EU relations and peace 
overtures. Despite these policies and as a result of some strategic mistakes in 
Lebanon, Syria overwhelmingly failed to decrease the pressure emanating 
from its external security environment. On the contrary, by end of 2005 after 
having been forced to withdraw from Lebanon and being scrutinized 
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because of the Hariri investigation, Syrian pressure had turned into an 
extensive isolation. The threats to Syria had possibly never been as 
extensive, and significantly, these threats were not overcome by war waging 
or war preparation as the threats were directed more directly at the regime in 
Damascus. 
Further significant pressure came from the external fiscal environment. 
Because of the scenario of the falling fuel export revenues and an eventual 
exhaustion of them, the fiscal capabilities of the state were in serious 
danger, given that fuel export revenues had been close to 20% of the GDP as 
an annual average. The gravity of the threats from external security and the 
fiscal environment and the inability to change the situation aroused concerns 
of regime stability. In order to secure the regime, it is argued here that 
guaranteeing fiscal capabilities of the state became very important in foreign 
policy. President Bashar aimed to increase fuel export revenues through 
black market trade with Iraq, and placed importance on trade relations and 
attracting foreign investments at a completely unprecedented speed and 
intensity. In the end, the peace overtures were also aimed at increasing fiscal 
capabilities in the possible event of a peace agreement in the future. The 
urgency for filling the fiscal gap seems also to have been acknowledged by 
Syrian high officials. 
Despite the serious immediate pressure from the external security 
environment, and the looming crisis from the external fiscal environment, it 
can be concluded that the immediate economic gains for Syria were such 
that they very much explain why the seemingly fragile regime of Bashar 
remained solid and stable. Syrian external revenues had never been higher 
than 2000-2005. There was an increase in annual average external revenues 
by 1.2% of GDP compared to the 1990s, annual external revenues being 
19.8% of GDP in 2000-2005. The high level of revenues came almost 
totally from fuel export revenues (19.2% of GDP as an annual average). The 
increase was due to Iraqi fuel exports and high oil prices that increased 
drastically after the US invasion of Iraq. As the trade increased and there 
were some new investments, the gains from the external environment in the 
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short term seemed surprisingly good. Syria could be considered a semi- 
rentier economy to a greater extent than before. 
Although the external revenue extraction was successful in these years, the 
looming threat of drastic decline was one of the main motivations for the 
increase in domestic revenue extraction that was conducted by economic 
liberalization intended to be so extensive that it can be considered 
restructural rather than just adaptive. In spite of this, the structural change in 
the economy was defensive and selective - it was to be done in such a way 
that it would not upset the socio-economic balance. There was, for example, 
not to be serious cuts in the public sector or privatization in order not to 
upset the basic constituencies of the regime. Despite the caution, an intra- 
elite conflict still emerged partly due to the economic reform policies of the 
president, as the reforms put benefits of the state-dependent bourgeoisie and 
high officials in jeopardy. This feeling of restlessness was much also due to 
the lack of efficiency of Bashar in executing economic reforms and in 
balancing the losses with benefits by allocation and co-option. The higher 
level of rentierism, however, explains much of the ability to execute 
economic reforms by generally maintaining policies of state-control, 
allocation, and co-option. 
Regardless of the pressures from the external security and fiscal 
environment, the fiscal and coercive powers (in other words the autonomy 
of the state) appeared to be guaranteed. The institutional capabilities, 
however, were seriously questioned. This was because of change in the 
highest position of power by the presidency of Bashar al-Asad, and the 
problems of legitimacy and efficiency that followed, as well as the influence 
of external pressure. The institutional capabilities of the state were very 
much embedded in the three pillars: the presidency, the party and the army. 
Because of the highly personalized institution of the presidency with Hafez 
al-Asad, a new president was bound to have problems with exercising his 
power, although several manoeuvres were made that would increase the 
legitimacy of the new president. Since Bashar chose to change course and 
divert from the policies of his father by engaging in economic and political 
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reform initiatives, by deepening the economic reforms he somewhat 
departed from the legacy of his father and lost institutional capabilities with 
it. This aroused a need to gain more legitimacy and institutional powers by 
focusing on building a new power base in the immediate elite, by using 
economic and political reforms. As a consequence, there was an intra-elite 
conflict within the regime and there were problems with the execution of 
policies, in other words, problems of legitimacy and efficiency. 
These problems concerning the institutional capabilities of the state were 
caused by factors at the domestic level, but the external security and fiscal 
environment influenced the decline in institutional capabilities and intra- 
elite conflict as well. This was attributable to two reasons. First, the prospect 
of declining external revenues caused a policy change to economic reforms 
that again broke the legacy of Hafez and threatened some of the old elite. 
Second, the external security environment and the inability of Bashar to 
dilute the threats, together with some serious foreign policy mistakes 
threatened the legitimacy of Bashar's leadership. The third way in which the 
external environment directly affected Syria's political system was that as 
the security threats increased externally, the political reforms that Bashar 
had allowed were lost. The immediate reason for the back-track was the 
need to unite the domestic front and end the instability caused by the intra- 
elite conflict. 
In the end, the fiscal and coercive autonomy of the state persisted, but there 
was a continuing threat to the fiscal autonomy, which had been the 
backbone of state power since Hafez created the socio-economic power 
balance and political system in the 1970s. There was a serious lack of 
institutional capabilities that Bashar managed to dilute. The rentier nature 
and policies of state-control, allocation and co-option maintained the 
stability. All in all, from 2000, the state power was weaker but there was no 
instability in sight, and no change to the authoritarian nature of the state, 
although the level of authoritarianism may have become slightly milder. The 
initial moves towards some political reforms, however, showed that had 
Bashar continued with political reforms, Syria would have taken some steps 
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in a semi-authoritarian direction. The external pressure interrupted the 
domestic progress, and the willingness to execute political reforms can be 
adequately analyzed only if some political reforms should take place after 
the possible end of external pressure and deeper engagement with Western 
powers. 
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6. Influence of external actors and Syrian regime responses 
Within the context of the external security and fiscal environment, policies 
of powerful external actors, in this case extra-regional actors, have 
influenced Syria's political system. The influence has varied between direct 
or more indirect. For example, during the Cold War, the USSR secured the 
Syrian regime from external threats and from 2000 the EU association 
agreement discussions shaped the direction of domestic reforms. As noted, 
the previous chapters cover much of the influence of the main actors in the 
context of the general security and fiscal environment. However, there is a 
need to analyze how the external actors have influenced Syrian 
authoritarianism or reforms through their direct bilateral relations with Syria 
in greater depth. This is done by means of a few case studies of some 
relevant actors. Two issues will be analyzed. First, the influence of 
engagement policy versus that of coercion policy will be discussed, the main 
actors being the USSR and the US during the Cold War, and the US and the 
EU thereafter. Secondly, the effect of direct democracy promotion will be 
analyzed, the main actors being the US and the EU. The regimes generally 
aim to maximize their sovereignty and resist or dilute the influence of the 
external actor, in order to guarantee their state power, autonomy, efficiency 
and legitimacy. This chapter focuses also on reviewing the strategies of the 
Arab regimes in general and the Syrian regime in particular towards external 
pressures on the political system and reforms. At the end of this discussion, 
an analysis is given of the overall impact that these external actors have had 
on Syria's domestic political system and its authoritarian nature. 
6.1. Influence of engagement and coercion on domestic reforms 
The use of coercion or engagement towards a country by an external actor 
appears to be effective in influencing domestic politics of the particular 
country. A comparative study of Turkey, Egypt and Iran suggests that if the 
external actors and the particular country concerned are involved in a 
constructive engagement, then the external influence can contribute to 
modest, but not substantial, reforms to an authoritarian political system. 
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When coercive strategies were the main policy tool used with a particular 
state, this had a counter-productive effect on the advancement of reforms. 
However, a domestic motivation was needed for the external actor to have 
an effect. These external reform initiatives did not initiate or sustain the 
reform process if the internal political dynamics were not conducive to 
reforms. 626 This can be confirmed by an overview of the Syrian and 
comparative cases in other Arab countries. 
During the Cold War, neither coercion, nor engagement had a direct effect 
on domestic political systems. The bilateral relations of the superpowers and 
the local allies in the Middle East had very little direct influence on 
domestic political systems if one disregards aid revenues and security 
guarantees and their indirect influence. Elsewhere, the superpowers 
imported their liberal and socialist state-driven development models more 
actively along with their alliances to third world countries. In the buffer- 
zone of Eastern Europe, authoritarian Soviet-modelled socialist systems 
were installed. The authoritarianism of these states was clearly attributable 
to the Cold War security environment and the relationship with the USSR. 
The re-democratization of countries such as Poland and Hungary appeared 
after the Soviet Union fell, indicating that these were the main factors 
behind their imposed authoritarianism. 
In the Middle East, research has not found any such direct influence of the 
Soviet Union on political systems. This may be explained by the fact that 
the Cold War rivalry was not particularly significant in the Middle East, and 
therefore the involvement of the superpowers was not very intense. Also in 
this matter the regional security environment dominated, and the Cold War 
was only influential in the context of these regional-level factors. In other 
words, the war preparation against Israel had more influence than direct 
superpower influence on the political system. Countries like Iraq and Syria 
allied closely with the USSR, but the direct influence of the Soviet model on 
their state systems was very low, as can be seen for example by the religious 
626 Delacoura, Katerina. Engagement or Coercion? Weighing Human Rights Policies 
towards Turkey, Iran and Egypt. The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2003, p. xii. 
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nature of the Iranian regime since 1979. The liberal influence of the US was 
equally insignificant, and allies like Jordan did not create a democratic 
political system. The Cold War was mostly about a regional power balance 
in the Middle East between the pre-existing regimes, not about actively 
promoting revolutions. Foreign policy orientation was most important, and 
for this purpose the domestic political systems could be ignored. Indeed, 
there is a tradition of non-intervention with the domestic politics of an ally 
in the Middle East that continued after the Cold War. 
The direct influence of the USSR on the Syrian domestic political system 
was marginal. Adoption of socialism in Syria was linked to a nationalist 
struggle against external penetration. Capitalism was seen to lead to 
economic dependency and therefore not an option. The example of the 
Soviet Union, however, encouraged Syria as numerous other third world 
states to find alternative development models. 27 Regarding these gains from 
the external environment, Hinnebusch says that state-driven development in 
Syria was mainly the result of bi-polarity in world affairs. 628 Ba'athist 
socialism was nevertheless a particular Middle Eastern form of socialism, 
not imported. Ba'athists before Hafez engaged in tactical alliance with 
communism629, and adopted some Leninist features, "such as stifling of free 
expression, the emergence of all-powerful security services, the 
abandonment of political pluralism, the adoption of a one-party regime; and 
some of this at least was perhaps attributable to the Soviet model"630 The 
Ba'athism of Asad, that became dominant from the 1970s was, however, not 
to please the Soviets. On the contrary, Hafez was very sceptical of overly 
intimate relations that would have undermined Syrian national security as 
discussed in chapter 3.1. Syrian socialism and its state structure were very 
home-grown. 
627 Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above, p. 38. 
62' Hinnebusch, Raymond. "Syria". In Tim Niblock and Emma Murphy (Eds. ), Economic 
and Political Liberalization in the Middle East, London, New York: British Academy 
Press, 1993, pp. 177-202, p. 198. 
629 Seale, "Syria", p. 55. 
630 Seale, "Syria", p. 59. 
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However, the alliance with the Soviets gave means for the state to impose 
authoritarianism in the form of aid, trade, military assistance and military 
protection as noted in earlier chapters, in the context of influence on war 
preparation and the fiscal environment. The argument presented here is that 
direct influence of a superpower to Syrian political system was marginal. 
Neither does the lack of engagement with the US and the EU during the 
Cold War appear to have influenced Syrian authoritarianism significantly, at 
least not much more than the authoritarianism of other Arab countries. The 
US engagement during the Cold War did not prompt democratic 
developments in the Middle East. However, in a comparative perspective, 
the countries that had a similar strategic position to Syria in their opposition 
to Israel, such as Jordan and Egypt, proceeded further in their political 
reforms than Syria after their engagement with the US, and were slightly 
less authoritarian. Egypt, as the country that took most the substantial steps 
in economic reforms and opening the space for civil society already during 
the Cold War, took these steps primarily due to the domestic imperative. 
War preparation and particularly the war of 1973, were economically 
devastating to Egypt and balancing the economy required domestic resource 
extraction631 and a new approach to civil society and the private sector. The 
US engagement that followed and ultimately led to a peace agreement with 
Israel in 1979 further accelerated reforms. As demonstrated by the cases 
studied by Delacoura, the external influence was modest, but a domestic 
rationale was needed. In other Arab states allied with the US, the political 
openings were almost non-existent. 
After the Cold War, the US promoted the spread of democracy world wide. 
In the Middle East, the US achieved unforeseen hegemony after the Gulf 
war against Iraq. The global mission of spreading democracy did not, 
however, apply to the US strategy in the Middle East. The US policy after 
the Gulf war was to engage with Arab regimes, considered moderate, such 
as Jordan, Egypt and Saudi-Arabia to counter threats from non-US-allied 
631 Barnett, Confronting the Costs of {Var. Military Power, State and Society in Egypt and 
Israel, p. xi. 
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regimes considered "rouges", Syria, Iraq, Iran and Libya, against which 
coercion policy was used. This was done in order to safeguard the main 
interests, namely Israeli security, flow of oil and regional stability, 
particularly in terms of a rise of a regional hegemonic power that could 
challenge the US position. The regional stability considerations led to a pact 
with the moderate considered regimes, in which the US did not push 
domestic reforms in return for support for US regional aims. In return, the 
US pushed for peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Another 
consideration that influenced the lack of interest for democracy promotion 
in these Arab states was a fear of an increase in Islamist radicalization and 
threats to domestic stability. 632 Because of this policy, the US actually 
contributed to the continuation of authoritarianism in the Middle East. 
The engagement policy did, however, lead to some changes in the domestic 
economic and political systems that could be considered small moves 
towards liberalization. Most Arab non-oil producers experienced a debt 
crisis that led them towards more or less urgent economic adjustment or 
restructuring. Countries such as Jordan had no choice but to take the golden 
offer of economic restructuring packages offered by international creditors, 
the US and the EU. The conditionality of the aid provider together with 
domestic necessity for economic reforms created some moves of tactical 
liberalization. Some political liberalization also occurred, also because of 
the domestic necessity of seeking a new power balance after economic 
reforms and for the perception of the external actor. For example, as 
political relations deepened with the EU and association agreements were 
signed, the engagement also led to the adoption of a number of political 
steps in Jordan, most often however tactical, and often referred as "window- 
dressing" of democracy. Overall, steps were taken in the region from 
authoritarianism to semi-authoritarianism in the 1990s. 
The Arab countries that did not primarily engage with the US, such as Syria, 
Iraq and Libya, were mainly treated with a policy of coercion or with a very 
632 Indyk, "Back to the Bazaar", p. 77. 
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low level of engagement at the most. These states had similar economic 
needs as the other Arab states after the exhaustion of their state-driven 
development models, war preparation and war waging but they did not turn 
to the Western donors. Iraq moved to increase its revenues with Kuwaiti oil 
through the occupation, 633 and Libya survived on its own oil income as did 
Syria. 634 In Syria's case, expenses were cut in militarization and some short 
term reforms were executed without external interference. 
After the Cold War, the Syrian political system did not therefore experience 
a move from socialism to liberalism. Syria did not engage intensively with 
the US and the EU. The lack of deeper engagement was due to the fact that 
the security environment and need to keep the bargaining cards for the 
struggle with Israel dominated over Syrian economic needs to such an extent 
that no matter how necessary, deeper Syrian engagement with the US and 
the EU would not have been possible. Despite the peace negotiations, there 
was no peace that would have most likely have contributed to engagement 
with the Western powers. Although most Arab countries concluded 
association agreement negotiations, Syria remained outside the process, also 
on the basis of the need to maintain sovereignty over economic decisions. 
Syria did not take almost any steps towards economic liberalization or 
engage in any window-dressing for democracy as in many other Arab 
countries. 
From the end of 2002, as a result of the events of 9/11, the US Middle East 
policies witnessed a dramatic change. Promotion of democracy in the 
Middle East became an integral part of US policies in the region. 635 The EU 
joined the song and lifted democracy promotion higher up on the agenda, 
633 Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp. 251-252. 
634 St John, Ronald Bruce. "Book Reviews". Middle East Journal, Autour 93, Vol 47, Issue 
4, p. 711. 
635 See for example Burnes, William J, Rebuilding Hope: American Middle East Policy in 
the Years Ahead Remarks to the Baltimore Council on Foreign Affairs. Baltimore, 8. 
November 2002. Wolfowitz, Paul. Bridging the Dangerous Gap between the West and the 
Muslim World. Monterey, 3. May 2002. Haass, Richard N. Towards Greater Democracy in 
the Muslim World. Remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington D. C, 4. 
December 2002. Bush, George W, President Discusses the Future of Iraq. American 
Enterprise Institute, Washington D. C, 28. February 2003. Later the US democratization 
initiative got a form of the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). 
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especially with its Mediterranean partners. 636 The reform demands by these 
most powerful international actors had a clear effect on the allies, who were 
reminded of their right to sovereignty, along with their criticism for 
connecting democracy promotion with the military invasion in Iraq. In the 
end, however, they engaged in rhetoric flirtation with democracy and 
economic liberalization and undertook some reforms. All these reforms had 
a domestic rationale, but their intensification demonstrated a need to lend 
the appearance of reform-mindedness to the external actors. 
For example, Saudi-Arabia intensified its reform process. National dialogue 
conferences were set up in 2003, and first municipal elections held in 2005. 
Jordan held long-awaited elections in 2003. Egypt experienced some 
liberalization and allowed more than one candidate in the presidential 
elections. The reform moves in Egypt have been analyzed as a result of US 
pressure among liberal and Islamist opposition 637 Lebanon was also 
considered to have increased its democracy along with its sovereignty 
through the elections that followed Syrian withdrawal from the country. 638 
636 Much of the European policy change appeared in form of re-thinking of priorities within 
the Barcelona-process. In March 2003 EU however presented " Wider Europe" or the "New 
Neighbourhood policy", which gave new emphasis on democratization. In May 2003 the 
EU commission also published a paper called Reinvigorating EUActions on Human Rights 
and Democratization with Mediterranean Partners. A Paper entitled Strengthening the 
EU's Partnership with the Arab World, published in December 2003 continued the debate. 
European Commission. Reinvigorating EU actions on Human Rights and Democratization 
with Mediterranean Partners. Strategic Guidelines. Communication from the Commission 
to the Council and the European Parliament. Brussels, 21. May 2003. Council of the 
European Union and European Commission. Strengthening the EU's Partnership with the 
Arab World. Brussels, 9. December 2003. 
637 Interview with Hisham Kassem, Ghad-party member and editor-in-chief of al-Misrii 
paper at the time, Cairo, 28. November 2004. Interview with Saad Eddin Ibrahim, a 
prominent Arab sociologist and a political activist, director of the Ibn Khaldun Center for 
Development, Cairo, 23. November 2004. Interview with a civil society activist close to the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Cairo, 23. November 2004. However the regional concerns were far 
more important than pressure for reforms for the US. Interview with a Western diplomat, 
Cairo, 18. November 2004. For more on US pressure in Egypt, see Eluuhtanen, heidi, Role 
of the International Actors in Promotion of Political Change In the Arab IVorld:: Cases of 
Egypt and Syria. Report to the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs, 2005, pp. 20-21. 
638 Salem, Paul. Lebanon at the Crossroads. Building an Arab Democracy. Saban 
Center Middle East Memo V. The Brookings Institution, 31. May 2005. 
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Civil society became more active across the board, and calls for democracy 
clearly intensified from the public. 639 
Pressure from the US and the EU, combined with the Iraq war were viewed 
as having accelerated the political reform moves in general in the Arab 
world. 640 The engagement policy with democracy high on the agenda clearly 
managed to accelerate reforms, 641 but again domestic needs determined the 
moves. For example, in Saudi-Arabia the reforms were crucial for regime 
stability. Reforms were initialized already earlier for the sake of the need for 
economic restructuring. After 9/11, there was an urgency to counter the 
popularity of radical Islam in Saudi-Arabia by steps in state-society 
relations. 642 
Although the flirtation with liberal reforms continued for the external actors, 
the reform drive greatly declined soon thereafter. Many countries halted 
reforms or the political space was narrowed further still. This was because 
the regional security situation became tenser, there was an increase in the 
Islamist threat since the Iraq war, oil prices had risen and economic 
restructuring was less urgent. This happened, for example, in Jordan, whose 
fragile position neighbouring Iraq was compounded by the radical Islamist 
threat from across the eastern border and continuing Intifada across the 
western border. These factors prompted the regime to take steps back with 
their reforms that had begun in 2002, leading to a deteriorating situation as 
far as political freedoms and participation are concerned. 643 Saudi Arabia 
639 Shelby, David. Civil Society Groups Call for Reforms in Alideast, North Africa, 
USINFO, 9. December 2004. 
6400n effects of the Iraq war on reform debate for example in Egypt, see also The Challenge 
of Political Reform: Egypt after the Iraq {Var. International Crisis Group, 30. September 
2003. 
64' See for example The Experience of Political Reform in the GCC States: Evaluation and 
Analysis. Conference Report. Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, 16-17. 
November 2005. 
642 "Can Saudi-Arabia Reform Itself'. Middle East Report No 28, International Crisis 
Group, 14. July 2004. For example in Bahrain, the reforms were seen as a result of an elite- 
change. Wright, Steven. "Generational Change and Elite-driven Reforms in the Kingdom of 
Bahrain". Durham fiddle East Papers, University of Durham, June 2006, p. 25. 
643 Choucair, Julia. Illusive Reform. Jordan's Stubborn Stability. Carnegie Paper No. 76, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 2006. 
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was one of the examples of countries in which the increase in oil revenues 
was estimated to have reduced the need for reform. 644 
In Libya, the shift in foreign policy and US engagement did not yet produce 
any political reforms. 645 As the regional security deteriorated, Iraq failed to 
stabilize, Iranian influence increased, the nuclear drive continued to concern 
the US and its allies and the domestic situation in Lebanon deteriorated after 
the Israeli attacks, democracy promotion clearly became consigned to the 
background. 646 In the end, the few years of intense democracy promotion 
did not produce much more than rhetorical flirtation, window-dressing, and 
tactical liberalization - in other words, steps to semi-authoritarianism at best. 
In addition to the democracy promotion policy, the other major change in 
the Middle East strategy was that coercion policy in all its forms intensified 
against the "rogue regimes", leading to war against Iraq and US-alliance 
with the new Iraqi regime, a turn of course by Libya in 2003 leading to 
closer relations with the US, and intensified coercion against Syria and Iran. 
Again, coercion did not influence the political systems of these countries in 
a positive direction. Iraq is more democratic but experiencing a level of 
internal violence reflective of a civil war. Libya continued with the domestic 
status quo. In the Syrian case, the tougher the US coercion, the less Syria 
pursued reforms. 
The following table aims to map and conclude the linkage between 
engagement/coercion and the level of authoritarianism in the Arab states. 
The first table shows that during the Cold War, level of authoritarianism was 
high in general, regardless of the engagement partner. The notable exception 
is Egypt, in which some minor domestic reform drive appeared. The second 
table shows that after the Cold War, reflecting the hegemonic position of the 
US, if a country was engaged with the US, as Jordan, Egypt and Morocco 
were, there were domestic reform initiatives and moves in a scmi- 
644 Ottaway, Marina. "Tyranny's Full Tank". The New York Times, 31. March 2005. 
643 Country Report, Libya (2006). Freedom House, 2006. See also "Slow Change in Libya". 
The Economist, 9. March 2006. 
646 Interview with a European diplomat, Brussels, 9. October 2006. 
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authoritarian direction. Countries against which the US used coercion 
remained authoritarian. The last table demonstrates that from the year 2000, 
the reform drive accelerated in more Arab countries. Now also the Gulf 
countries had a domestic rationale and external pressure to pursue political 
reforms. The domestic rationale and EU engagement in Syria's case brought 
a modest reform pace to Syria. Notable exceptions are Tunisia and Libya, in 
which reforms did not appear, despite engagement policies by the US and 
the EU. Again, the domestic rationale there was lacking. 
Table 71: Alliances and authoritarianism in the Arab world 
Alliances and authoritarianism in the Arab world during the Cold War 
Country 
Traditional engagement 
partner 
U. S. U. S. S. R. 
Domestic Level of reform authoritarianism drive 
Syria -X - high 
Jordan x- - high 
Egypt x 847 - (X) semi 
648 
Morocco x- - high 
Iraq x 
649 X 650 
- high 
Tunisia x - high 
Libya -x 651 - high 
Saudi-Arabia x 852 - - high 
Small Gulf states x- - high 
Alliances and authoritarianism in the Arab world in the 1990s 
Country 
Traditional engagement 
partner 
U. S. EU 
Domestic 
reform 
drive 
Level of 
authoritarianism 
Syria -- - high 
Jordan xX X semi 
Egypt xX X semi 
Morocco xX X semi 
Iraq -- - high 
Tunisia xX - high 
Libya -- - high 
Saudi-Arabia xx (X) high 
6a' U. S. from 1972 onwards. 
648 Semi-authoritarian since the 1970's. 
649 U. S. during the 1980's (Iran War). 
650 U. S. S. R. during the 1970's and 1980's (Iran War). 
651 U. S. S. R. since the early 1970's. 
652 U. S. since the 1950's. 
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Small Gulf states xX (X) high 
Alliances and authoritarianism in the Arab world since 2000 
Country 
Traditional engagement 
partner 
U. S. EU 
Domestic 
reform 
drive 
Level of 
authoritarianism 
Syria - X X high 
Jordan x X X semi 
Egypt x X X semi 
Morocco x X X semi 
Post-Saddam Iraq x X X low 
Tunisia x X - high 
Libya x 65' X gu - high 
Saudi-Arabia x X X high 
Small Gulf states x x X high 
The Syrian case from 2000 is indeed a fascinating example of the effects of 
the use of engagement and coercion. First, Syria faced coercion from the US 
and engagement from the EU. The US exerted pressure on Syria through a 
combination of its regional military presence, political pressure and 
economic sanctions. EU-Syrian relations, on the other hand, were enhanced 
gradually and intensified by progress in the signing of the association 
agreement in autumn of 2004 655 From 2000, there was a drive for reforms 
in Syria, deriving from domestic needs. The positions of the transatlantic 
partners moved significantly closer, as the EU joined US efforts to demand 
Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon at the end of 2004. The EU slowed down 
the process of negotiating the association agreement, finally freezing the 
process of signing the readily negotiated agreement. From spring 2005 to 
winter 2005-2006, the coercion intensified to an unprecedented level. 
How did engagement and coercion affect the reform drive and the political 
system in Syria? In essence, between 2000 and autumn of 2004 (or at least 
by the end of 2005) the approaches of the US and the EU should have been 
653 U. S. allied from 2003 onwards. 
654 EU allied from 2006 onwards. 
655 The US was unhappy with the EU engagement with Syria all along. According to an 
interviewed Western diplomat, t he US wished the EU to adopt a tougher position to bring 
about changes in Syrian foreign policy and help force it to comply with US demands. The 
US didn't see the EU's association agreement with Syria as the best interest of the US. 
Interview with a Western diplomat, Damascus, 10. August 2004. 
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pushing domestic reforms in different directions. However, it can be argued 
that this combination of pressure and engagement was beneficial to 
domestic change. The EU policy of engagement has worked in Syria 
precisely because of the existence of US pressure. Syria was interested in 
EU cooperation mainly for economic reasons and because it was in need of 
allies. The US coercion pushed Syria to engage more deeply with the EU. 
The progress on the association agreement itself between the EU and Syria 
appears to have significantly contributed to reforms. It seemed to be 
beneficial for the reformists and the president in pushing through economic 
and political reforms. 656 President Bashar used the agreement as a tool to 
push through changes that would otherwise have been subject to an intense 
domestic power struggle. The agreement was also used as a roadmap with 
specific steps and plans. The association agreement was indeed the only 
concrete tool for, and declaration of principles and aims of, reforms. As a 
Syrian foreign ministry official put it: "The new leadership found that the 
association agreement is a very good instrument for reforms economically 
and politically. That is why efforts were accelerated. "... "The association 
agreement is a medicine... a way to enter a new phase in the modern 
"657 world. 
Still, the simultaneous coercion prior to autumn of 2004 from the US 
appears to have accelerated the reforms. According to some Syrian and 
international analysis, the general political pressure for reforms in the 
Middle East accelerated the process of change in Syria. External pressure 
seemed to work and things seem to have moved at a faster pace in Syria 
since the Iraq war. 658 There seemed to be a clear awareness that the world is 
watching. As one European ambassador put it, "Nobody is saying that we 
will turn a page from authoritarianism to democracy, but it will happen. " 
According to the ambassador, developments will proceed without a clear 
strategy or even an announcement that former principles arc to be 
656 This is a widely-held view among European diplomats, Syrian officials and Syrian 
intellectuals. 
657 Interview with a Syrian official, Damascus, 3. August 2004. 
651 Interviews with international observers and Syrian civil society activists, Damascus, 6. 
December 2004. 
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abandoned. 659 There was still a positive mood regarding domestic reforms 
as late as the end of 2004, although the EU association agreement talks had 
already halted, but the EU still maintained constructive relations with Syria. 
It seems that the halt of reforms came fully into being from the Ilariri 
investigation at the end of 2005 when the relations with the EU entered a 
temporary freeze. 
The Syrian responsiveness to engagement was clearly due to the domestic 
needs for reform. 660 The regime pushed for top-down reforms. However, the 
coercion policy of the US hindered the agenda of reformists in the 
government, and allowed hardliners room to manoeuvre. As already 
concluded in the previous chapter, the coercion policy caused an 
intensification of intra-elite conflict. In addition, the tense external 
environment also affected the situation of Syrian reformists in civil society. 
For example, as a result of the Iraqi war, the situation for civil society in 
Syria deteriorated and the movement was isolated. 61 The greater the 
regional turbulence, the less space there was for civil society actors. 
Gradually, from 2005 and certainly from December 2005 as the pressure on 
Syrian foreign policy intensified and coercion policy was exercised both by 
the US and the EU, the process of reform halted. 662 External pressure 
seemed to demand domestic stability and coherence at home to maintain 
regime security. As regional pressures on Syria intensified, domestic 
reforms were halted or postponed. 
In conclusion, it seems that external actors can promote indeed 
democratization if they use constructive engagement. There must exist a 
domestic rationale and drive for reforms, however, in order for the external 
actors to have influence. Engagement dilutes foreign policy pressures and 
gives a more comfortable position for the regime to concentrate on risky 
659 Interview with a European diplomat, Damascus, 8. December 2004. 
660 Ibid; also interview with a European diplomat, Damascus, 4. August 2004. 
661 Interview with a Syrian intellectual, Damascus, 18. August 2004. Interviews with 
European diplomats, Damascus, 4. August 2004 and 18. August 2004. 
662 Al-Taqi, Samir. Member of the Syrian Strategic Committee. An interview on the Finnish 
TV channel YLE, 16. March 2005. Tabler, Andrew. "Lebanon's Crisis is Harming Syria's 
Difficult Reform Effort. " The Daily Star, 12. March 2005. 
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domestic reforms. Engagement also provides tools for concrete democracy 
promotion. Combined with reform initiatives of the regimes, the external 
actors have the ability to offer conditional aid and raise issues in dialogue. 
This is of course only applicable in cases where the external actor wishes to 
promote democratization. The USSR had little influence on domestic 
orientation in the Middle East. During the Cold War and after there was no 
real interest by the US or the EU to promote democratization in the Arab 
countries. During this time, US policies actually had the effect of promoting 
authoritarianism in the Middle East in general. If there was support for 
reforms as in a few cases, such as Egypt and Jordan, US engagement 
influenced some domestic reform processes positively, but only to an extent 
that led the countries towards a semi-authoritarian path. Only after the US u- 
turn in 2002 to support reforms in the Arab countries, have there been vocal 
calls and policies to promote democratization. This accelerated some 
domestically motivated reforms temporarily in several Arab countries, until 
the tense external security environment after the Iraq war halted most of the 
reforms. The EU did not push democratization forcefully in the Arab world 
either, but the association agreements seem to have had a clear influence on 
the pace and direction of top-down economic and political reforms in some 
Arab states and in Syria. 
Based on the empirical analysis, engagement clearly brings more results 
than coercion. Coercion does not bring democratization. On the contrary, 
because coercion policy affects the external security environment of the 
state negatively and often directly aims to attack the regime, the states react 
by boosting the state and regime security by all available means. This does 
not give room for civil society to rise against the regime to push for bottom- 
up reforms. In these circumstances, the state does not push for possibly 
unbalancing top-down reforms either, with the exception of such reforms 
that would also in the short term enhance regime and state security. This is 
very evident in the Syrian case. The Syrian case also shows that coercion 
can only push a country to engage with another external actor that can 
promote reforms, as was the case with the US coercion and EU engagement 
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in Syria. Dual coercion by both the US and the EU has not brought results. 
On the contrary, at least in the Syrian case, a dual coercion policy has 
instigated a setback, given that it pushed the state to concentrate on boosting 
regime security. 
Indeed the most effective external reform promotion was produced by the 
combination of US coercion and EU engagement in the Syrian case, 
together with domestic necessity for reforms. Engagement with the EU has 
influenced the pace, intensity and direction of the reforms. In other words, 
the constructive engagement by the EU has had an influence on top-down 
reforms in the Syrian case. 
Influence of direct democracy support 
The US and EU policies of promoting bottom-up economic and political 
reforms in Syria have differed according to their different policies towards 
Syria in general. Engagement gives tools for direct democracy promotion, 
whereas coercion leaves fewer tools. The EU has engaged in some direct 
democracy promotion, whilst the US coercion policy has made concrete 
reform promotion almost impossible due to its self-imposed sanctions policy 
and legal restrictions that prohibit governmental projects in Syria. 663 The 
difference is significant. Whilst the EU has had specific policies for Syrian 
engagement in the context of the Euromed-partnership, the New 
Neighbourhood Initiative and the Strategic Partnership, pushed forward in 
practice by negotiations for the association agreement and other political 
dialogue, the US coercion policy left it with very few tools outside the use 
of primarily political rhetoric. 
`63 Interview with a Western diplomat, Damascus, 10. August 2004. Because Syria is 
included in State Sponsors of Terrorism List, it has been impossible to donate US foreign 
aid to Syria. However this was later changed by law (Consolidated Appropriations Act 
2005) that authorizes funding of promotion of democracy and human rights in Syria. 
"Syria: Political Conditions and Relations with the United States after the Iraq War", CRS 
Report for Congress, 10. January 2005. 
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Despite the tools available, the EU has not promoted democracy in Syria on 
a larger scale. In the early years of cooperation, conditionality was used 
once as European aid was frozen in 1991 because of human rights abuses. 664 
The Barcelona process in its first five years from 1995 did not enhance the 
EU's engagement with Syria on democratization and human rights issues. 
With all Mediterranean partners, the EU focused on the lowest common 
denominator, mutually shared interests, in order to keep the framework in 
place and slowly deepen the engagement. Therefore, the real actions were in 
the field of economic reforms and in the process of negotiation of bilateral 
association agreements. Economic reforms were also seen as the best route 
to promote democratization 665 This was also the case for Syria, which was 
the latest country to engage in serious negotiations with the EU. The 
relations deepened only slowly after 2000. As the Barcelona process has 
been, indeed, only a set of principles, concrete democracy initiatives, 
cooperation or dialogue has been difficult to implement before the 
association agreements are signed with the Mediterranean partners. Given 
the lack of Syrian interest in engagement and the lower priority of 
democracy promotion for the EU, the tools for the EU to promote domestic 
reforms in Syria have been few. During these years, the tools of the EU to 
bring up issues related to democracy and human rights were diplomatic 
demarches and attending human rights trials on a case-by-case basis. 666 
The democratization issues were not off the table for the EU, but neither 
were they at the core of EU-Syrian relations, just as they were not at the 
core of relations with other southern partners. This is highlighted by figures 
on spending on democratization. The EU Commission distributed only 14% 
of its democracy and human rights aid to the Mediterranean between 1996 
and 1999. This indicates that the Arab states were hardly a key area for these 
EU efforts. During this period, the EU had 306 projects in Mediterranean 
partner countries, encompassing 27 million euros, which were mainly 
concerned with human rights, women's rights and press freedom. More 
664 Ibid. 
665 Youngs, Richard. "The European Union and Democracy in the Arab-Muslim World". 
Working Paper No. 2, CEPS Middle East & Euro-hied Project, November 2002, p. 14. 
666 Interviews with European diplomats, Damascus, 4. August and 5. August 2004. 
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indicative of the lack of financial support from the EU for reform promotion 
is the fact that of all EU aid to the region only 2% was allocated to human 
rights and democracy, which was significantly less than the amount devoted 
to family planning and drugs. Despite the increase in rhetorical support for 
political reforms in 2002, the concrete funding was still small in the Arab 
world. Only 7% of the funds from the European Initiative for Democracy 
and Human Rights were used for reform promotion in the region 667 
The cautious policy of democracy promotion was also reflected in the 
strategies and types of projects. Generally in the Arab world, the EU has 
pushed for political reforms in practice through capacity-building and civil 
society support. Support for democracy projects and civil society actors 
have, however, been modest. The low-profile approach has allowed the EU 
to pursue two goals simultaneously: they can support their long-term goal of 
bringing about democracy without endangering their short-term goal of 
ensuring security. 
668 Most of the projects have dealt with issues such as 
women's rights, human rights and press freedom 
669 Thus, the EU has 
refrained from engaging directly in overtly political areas of democracy 
promotion in the Arab world in general. In the years up to 2000, there were 
only four EU MEDA projects in Syria. They were 'first step projects' for 
collecting information on the political situation, women's economic 
empowerment and inter-religious dialogue 670 
From 2000, relations between the EU and Syria deepened gradually until the 
deterioration from the moment of the Hariri crisis 2005-2006. During the 
first years, the engagement did not bring anything new to democracy 
promotion. The more intense negotiations on the association agreement 
started in 2002 and ended in autumn 2004. This era could have given the EU 
additional tools for democracy promotion in Syria, especially as the new 
president had committed to a certain degree of political reforms. This also 
coincided with the increased importance accorded to democracy promotion 
" Youngs, "The European Union and Democracy in the Arab-Muslim World", p. 16. 
66e [bid, pp. 8-9. 
669 Ibid, p. 16. 
670 Ibid, p. 22. 
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in the Middle East more broadly. The most important contribution of the EU 
engagement in Syria towards reforms was evidently the use of the 
agreement negotiations as a "road map" for economic reforms in particular, 
as discussed in the earlier chapter. The assistance for economic reforms was 
also emphasized in EU-funded projects in Syria. 
671 
In addition to this, the contribution was not very large, partly because of the 
sensitivities related to the association agreement talks and the unwillingness 
of the EU to use political pressure for reforms, and partly as a result of the 
Syrian unwillingness to allow the EU to raise the issue of political 
reforms. 672 There was really no political dialogue on political reforms. 
Importantly, the issues of human rights and democracy were never raised 
with the Syrians by the EU during the preparation of the association 
agreement. Political dialogue on civil society and human rights issues would 
officially only start after the signing of the agreement. By the time of the 
end of the negotiations on the agreement in autumn 2004, however, the 
mood within the EU was pessimistic on starting any significant political 
dialogue between the parties, due to Syrian objection. 73 Support for human 
rights, civil society and rule of law was the fifth priority area of the EU in 
2002-2006, but no projects in this field were assigned for 2002-2004 . 
67' The 
EU, however, had a handful of small projects ongoing in 2004. There were 7 
MEDA projects concerned with prisoners and women's rights. There were 
also smaller projects on electoral awareness and voter registration. however 
with regard to projects, there was evidence already in 2004 that the Syrians 
were more willing to enhance civil society formation in order to meet the 
EU demands and give an image of an opening up in Syrian affairs. This also 
provided the Syrians with new means for controlling civil society funding. It 
was considered that the positive response to civil society funding was likely 
to increase with the entry into force of the association agreement. 675 
671 Euro-Med Partnership, Syria. Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 and National 
Indicative Programme 2002-2004. 
672 Interview with a European diplomat, Damascus, 4. August 2004. 
673 Interview with a European diplomat, Damascus, 5. August 2004 and 8. December 2004. 
674 Euro-Med partnership, Syria. Country strategy paper 2002-2006 and National 
Indicative Programme 2002-2004. 
675 Interview with a European diplomat, Damascus, 5. August 2004. 
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There has been some political dialogue between the EU, the member states 
and Syria on reforms. For example, the European governments pressured 
Syria on its nationality law, which leaves large numbers of Palestinians and 
Kurds without citizenship 676 The Syrian parliament debated the issue, 
which in itself can be seen as a victory for the Europeans, but it was known, 
unofficially, that the Ministry for Interior was not going to move on the 
issue. 677 This reflects the true nature of European leverage. For the sake of 
good relations, the Syrians create an image of change and responsiveness, 
but there were clear red lines, and the relationship with the EU will not 
change Syrian politics, laws, or the balance of power significantly if there is 
no domestic rationale for reform. Later there were unconfirmed reports that 
Syria would consider offering the Kurds citizenship, but this has not yet 
678 materialized. 
Despite the new political capital related to deeper engagement and various 
declarations that highlighted need for political reforms in the Middle East, 
the EU had very few projects promoting human rights and democracy in 
Syria from 2002. In fact, only Algeria, Tunisia, Israel, the West Bank and 
Gaza, and Iraq were selected as target countries for assistance in the form of 
EIDHR funding. 679 
Policies and projects supporting economic and political reforms organized 
by international actors have been very limited in number and scale due to 
the difficult working conditions. The reasons for a lack of concrete 
democratization promotion even by the EU are understandable by the lack 
of regular political dialogue on the issue and problems in implementing 
concrete projects. 
680 The EU provided assistance in areas that were pre- 
selected by the Syrians and jointly agreed by Syria and the EU. This clearly 
676 Interview with a European Ambassador, Damascus, S. December 2004. 
677 Interview with a Syrian civil society activist, Damascus, 6. December 2004. 
678 "The Media Line: Syria to Grant 300,000 Kurds Citizenship", Arabnews. com 30. 
January 2006. "Al-Assad Meets Tribes of North Syria, Syrian Nationality for 100,000 
Kurds", Arabnews. com, 16. May 2005. "Syria to Grant 300,000 Kurds Citizenship", 
Kurdish media 29. January 2006. 
679 Youngs, "The European Union and Democracy in the Arab-Muslim World", pp. 22-23. 
680 Interview with a European diplomat, Damascus, 4. and 5. August 2004. 
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prevented the EU from supporting sectors and actors that are outside the 
government's control. Another significant problem for the implementation 
of projects has been the small number of NGOs in Syria. Many movements 
are not registered as NGOs but informal networks, in order to avoid some of 
the government's restrictions. One strategy of the EU Commission has been 
to support Syrian efforts to create "parallel structures", such as various 
"committees", such as the Family Committee. 681 All the international actors 
face the same problem when it comes to supporting civil society in Syria: 
there have been no independent civil society actors with whom they could 
engage with, only government-created groups that are very wealthy and, 
therefore, do not need financial support. The few independent groups that do 
exist suffer from restrictions limiting their contacts with international 
actors. 682 
Some member states also have projects in Syria. Generally, the projects of 
the member states concentrate on issues that are largely apolitical and make 
only an indirect contribution to democracy promotion, such as women's 
issues, the environment and health issues. Many EU members prefer to 
concentrate on economic reforms. Some projects also exist in more political 
areas. For example, the British have had projects on freedom of speech, 
human rights and citizenship issues. The freedom of speech component 
included an investigative reporting reward, workshops for journalists and 
English training of journalists. The work on human rights was concerned 
with supporting the quality and independence of the judiciary and provided 
lectures on international human rights. The citizenship project held seminars 
to introduce the wider concept of citizenship into the school curriculum. 
These projects were ongoing in summer 2004, and there were plans for more 
projects with the media, economic reforms, and human rights. 
683 
Many of the democratization projects of the EU, as well as the US in the 
Middle East are implemented by NGOs, institutions or non-profit making 
681 Interview with a European diplomat, Damascus, 4. August 2004. 
682 Interview in an American NGO working on reforms in the Arab world, Washington D. C, 
29. March 2006. 
683 Interview with a European diplomat, Damascus, 7. December 2004. 
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organizations in order to promote democratic values and establish contacts 
with liberal civil society institutions. European and US governmental 
development agencies (such as Danida and the USAID) work within a broad 
donor community, which also includes multilateral development agencies 
(such as the World Bank and the UNDP), independent democracy 
foundations (such as the American National Endowment for Democracy 
NED), national political and party foundations (such as the Ford 
Foundation, Conrad Adenauer Stiftung, Friedrich Neuman Stiftung, 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung) and other non-profit advocacy groups. 684 Of these 
different advocacy groups, American non-profit organizations have had the 
largest role as donors. All the non-governmental groups are funded by 
government contracts and grants and are, therefore, directly linked to the 
foreign policies of their respective states. It has been estimated that these 
actors were responsible for up to 600 projects promoting democracy in the 
Arab world during the 1990s. Traditionally, most projects have been in 
Egypt and Jordan, with very few in Syria. Of these institutions and others, 
Washington-based NED, for example, has a number of projects within 
Syria. It is a non-governmental organization and therefore not bound by 
laws that prohibit state actors' activities. NED projects in Syria include one 
civil society strengthening project, one election monitoring project and one 
NGO management training project. 685 In other countries, NED also conducts 
media training and advocacy campaigns, but these are not possible in 
Syria. 686 
Since 2005 the EU, after the halt of the signing of the association agreement, 
and after the EU pressure on Syria regarding Lebanon, has been more open 
in its demands for pushing for reforms in Syria. The National Indicative 
Programme 2005-2006 lifted civil society support to a new priority area. 
According to the plan, there was to be "institutional support to develop a 
more supportive institutional framework and to improve the operational 
684 The following draws on findings in Carapico, Shiela, "Foreign Aid and Promoting 
Democracy in the Arab world", Middle East Journal, Vol. 56, No. 3, Summer 2002. 
685 Election monitoring of elections is allowed in Syria if observers monitor for a candidate. 
NED provides education in monitoring and basic funding of operations. 
686 Interview with a NGO activist, Washington D. C, 29. March 2006. 
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environment of the civil society organizations" with 2 million curos, 
encompassing 2.4% of the entire EU aid to Syria. The EU planned 
concretely to assist in capacity-building, training and support for civil 
society activities, specified for example in the fields of poverty reduction, 
environment protection, basic services, human rights and community-based 
development initiatives. The document is also more direct regarding the lack 
of political reforms in Syria. It notes that projects on private sector support 
and administrative support are advancing, but the projects are severely 
hindered as a result of the slowdown of Syrian reform efforts. 687 
Significantly, Syria accepted this document that placed significant emphasis 
on civil society during a time when the position of the old guard and the 
president seemed arguably closer, and reforms in the political and social 
sphere were not really advancing. Syrians allowed the projects first in paper, 
and in their political rhetoric they supported the civil society initiative. 88 
The responsiveness from the Syrian side to the EU continued although the 
relations were deteriorating. The mood was positive before relations 
deteriorated, with Syria even agreeing to human rights dialogue with the EU 
within the cooperation emphasized in the association agreement. This is 
very significant because the EU has regular human rights dialogue with only 
few countries, such as Morocco and Jordan. 689 This clearly reflected the 
Syrian need to maintain its engagement with the EU. After the National 
Indicative Plan was agreed mutually with the EU and Syria, ever since 
overall relations deteriorated from winter of 2006, the Syrian regime became 
increasingly suspicious of civil society-related issues and foreign 
interference. This happened in conjunction with the onset of regime change 
rhetoric from the US and the isolation and coercion policy exercised by the 
EU. It also coincided with the threat from external opposition, especially 
Khaddam, to the regime and a threat to regime security and sovereignty 
687 European Commission. Syria. The National Indicative Programme 2005-2006, Brussels, 
14. October 2004. 
688 Interview with a European diplomat, Brussels, 9. October 2006. 
689 Interview with a European diplomat, Brussels, 10. October 2006. 
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posed by the UN-investigation. Civil society was equated with opposition to 
the regime more than ever before. 
690 
This had affected the EU's civil society project in such a way that planned 
and mutually agreed projects did not start. From 2005 there were plans for 
MEDA-funded projects to support work on legislation for NGOs, institution 
building and NGO support. These never materialized. The training centre 
for civil rights by Anour al-Bunni was closed soon after its opening. There 
were also plans for 6 EIHRD funded micro-projects with a budget of 
500,000 euros, but since 2006 only 2 projects have been running. 691 
The restrictions on foreign civil society support also became tighter. Before, 
NGOs were entitled to foreign funding if their projects were accepted and 
authorized by the ministry responsible for social affairs. This way the 
government was able to control foreign funding for civil society. According 
to a European diplomat, from the beginning of 2006 the Syrian regime saw 
civil society support as foreign interference for support of opposition to 
overthrow the government. From spring 2006 onwards, all projects were 
692 
required to gain acceptance from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
Clearly, the shift to side with the US coercion policy by the EU significantly 
lowered, if not completely evaporated, its ability to push for political 
reforms. Syria halted all political reforms following the intensification of 
external pressure. Although Syria has continued with its economic reform 
policies, according to estimates, the external pressure has hindered pursuit 
of these reforms as well. 
693 
Since the relations deteriorated further, interestingly enough, the EU 
demands for democratization in Syria simultaneously intensified further. 
The EU continued to follow human rights trials and used demarches on 
690 Interview with a European diplomat, Brussels, 9. October 2006. 
691 These were with registered NGO's working with street children and with a non-Syrian 
organization training in Palestinian camps on defending their civil rights. Interview with a 
European diplomat, Brussels, 9. October 2006. 
692 Interview with a European diplomat, Brussels, 9. October 2006. 
693 Interview with a European diplomat, Brussels, 9. October 2006. 
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human rights abuses, although its diplomats were often not given an 
audience at Syrian ministries. Human rights issues were also raised in all 
speaking notes during official visits. 94 The theme of political reforms has 
also featured more prominently in the publicly stated interests of the EU in 
Syria. On its web pages, the European Commission places high emphasis on 
democratization and human rights in conjunction with the association 
agreement, mentioning them even before economic issues. "The Association 
Agreement will establish a regular political dialogue between Syria and the 
EU aimed at a better understanding of each other's positions on important 
political issues. Human rights and democracy are universal values and 
dialogue on these subjects will constitute an essential element of the 
partnership. Creating a free trade area around the Mediterranean by 2010 is 
also a key objective of the Agreement. 9s695 
In contrast to the EU, the US had very little capabilities for democracy 
promotion in Syria. The main tool of the US in democracy promotion, the 
Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) was constrained by the US law 
that prohibits donating US aid to Syria based on the Syrian inclusion in the 
State Department State Supporters of Terrorism List. First, the only existing 
support from the US to Syrian democratization was a five million dollar 
democracy promotion donation to the Syrian opposition. Similar money has 
been promised to Iranian opposition. According to an American analyst, this 
support is not even expected to generate results, rather it derives from a need 
to do something for US domestic reasons. The funds resembled the support 
given to Iraqi exiles before the US invasion of the country. 696 Later in 2005, 
however, a new law, called Consolidated Appropriations Act 2005 made it 
possible to donate grants to projects on democracy and human rights 
promotion inside Syria as well. 697 
694 Interview with a European diplomat, Brussels, 10. October 2006. 
695 European Commission web-pages. 
696 Interview with an American analyst, Washington D. C, 28. March 2006. 
697 "Syria: Political Conditions and Relations with the United States after the Iraq War", 
CRS Report for Congress, 10. January 2005. 
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Although the US states that the purpose is to promote democratic reforms, in 
practice the announcement of financial support for the Syrian political 
opposition abroad can actually be seen more as a tool for political pressure 
on the regime in the Syrian context, rather than actual democracy 
promotion. 698 Its effect on domestic politics is also not constructive. Rather, 
it can be added to the measures that have tightened political control inside 
Syria and made the support by external actors more difficult in promoting 
democratic reforms, as has been discussed earlier. 
Conclusion 
As a conclusion, the result of Western democracy promotion policies in 
Syria has been close to non-existent. This is due to a lack of policies and 
projects during engagement and also due to the use of coercion, which has 
made democracy promotion policies and the bottom-up approach highly 
suspicious to the regime. 
The EU bottom-up reform promotion policies have included diplomatic 
demarches, human rights dialogue, civil society support and capacity. 
building. The EU did not push for democratization in the Arab countries 
forcefully, however, before 2002, which is apparent in the very low amount 
of funding for democracy support for the entire Arab world and in the focus 
on non-political projects such as women's empowerment and inter-religious 
dialogue. Even after the vocal democratization demands from 2002, the 
funding remained low and the projects small-scale. There were basically no 
projects in Syria before 2000. 
Because the association agreement had not materialized, there were very 
few pro-democracy policies or projects even after 2002. This is due to the 
fact that the EU did not wish to endanger the association negotiations. There 
was very little political dialogue and few projects on civil society and 
human rights by the EU, the member states or the European NGOs. The EU 
698 Interview with an American diplomat, Washington D. C, 29. March 2006. 
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countries did raise a few issues such as the Kurdish citizenship issue in 
political dialogue with the Syrians, nonetheless. There was a limited amount 
of funding given to the few Syrian NGOs, but this was ineffective, because 
of the semi-governmental nature of these organizations. One innovative way 
that the EU promoted reforms was the use and support for Bashar's creation 
of "parallel structures" that act parallel to or instead of official decision 
making mechanisms at the ministries, in order to widen the scope of people 
in decision-making and promote efficiency of reforms. 
The pro-democracy support combined with coercion only increased 
authoritarianism. From 2005, when the coercion policy was already used by 
the EU, the EU assigned 2 million euros for civil society support, which 
marked the start of a more aggressive democracy promotion. Syria reacted 
initially positively, because it wished to continue engagement, but as the 
coercion policy intensified, Syria saw civil society support as an extension 
of EU pressure against the Syrian regime to promote bottom-up change. 
Because of the coercion policy, the US has had very few means to 
practically promote democratization in Syria. The coercion strategy aimed at 
promoting bottom-up reform demands by supporting Syrian opposition in 
exile. This way of democracy promotion was not taken seriously even by the 
Americans themselves, rather it can be seen as an extension of the coercive 
policies as oppose to any democracy promotion, and it has increased 
authoritarianism. 
The bottom-up reform promotion by external actors is often seen by the 
regimes as an attempt to undermine their state power. Because of this and 
because of the ability of the regimes to dilute the effects of bottom-up 
reform initiatives, these policies have been unsuccessful. The next chapter 
will further view how the regimes have reacted to overcome reform 
demands. 
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Regime strategies against external democracy promotion 
In the Arab world, the effect of external pressure has been small if not 
minimal during the past few decades. This is logically due to the ability of 
the state to restrain external influence similarly as it restrains domestic 
opposition to its rule. Here, the ways in which the state resists external 
pressure for its position vis-ä-vis the society are briefly reviewed. The 
authoritarian Arab states have created sophisticated strategies for dealing 
with external actors who wish to support political reforms. The following 
strategies of the regimes are generally used by Arab regimes in dealing with 
external actors in reacting to external democratization initiatives: 
Q. Adopting some democratic policies and discourse 
Q Delegitimizing external actors' efforts as interventions and 
violations of sovereignty 
Q Prohibiting concrete projects 
Q Limiting, minimizing and manipulating the effects of the projects 
Q Monopolizing projects by government circles or circles close to 
government 
o Adopting some democratic policies and discourse 
The strategies of the states vary depending, in particular, on the relationship 
between the particular state involved and the external powers, and especially 
on how dependent the particular state is on external aid. Reliance on foreign 
aid has been clearly identified as increasing at least rhetorical support for 
democracy and receptiveness to projects by external actors. According to 
Carapico, "Arab governments that were most reliant on foreign finance 
adopted some of the rhetorical and symbolic trappings of democracy. "699 
This is logically due to the external leverage on economic liberalization that 
often leads to some minimal political liberalization. This, then again, is due 
699 Carapico, "Foreign Aid and Promoting Democracy in the Arab World", p. 391. 
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to the domestic need to balance the socio-economic setting that has been 
shaken because of economic reforms. The receptiveness to external pressure 
on political reforms has a domestic rationale. With deeper engagement, the 
external actor also gains more leverage for pressuring the states on variety 
of issues and states may choose to pursue reforms for some other benefits. 
The minimal political reforms are also pursued to resist true 
democratization. This seems contradictory, but the adoption of some 
democratic practices, with no true democratization or liberalization has been 
the most usual tool for the regimes. The democratic features can include for 
example elections, opposition parties, some level of political competition, 
freedom of speech, a free media, and civil society formation. These features 
exist without any ability of the society to change the power relationship to 
the state, in other words, the state powers are such that there is no scope to 
change the political power balance and overthrow the ruling regime. Indeed, 
the essence of the adoption of these democratic features is to promote 
regime security and ensure the power balance between the state and society. 
This semi-authoritarian development path has already been noted in the 
introduction. 
In reality, therefore, the dependence on aid and engagement does not 
necessarily lead to the furthering of democracy, as the semi-authoritarian 
regime in Egypt has demonstrated, because the image of openness to 
democratic policies is a deliberate strategy adopted by the regimes. 
Therefore, the states that are to a varying degree aid-dependent and have a 
long alliance with the US, such as Jordan, Egypt and Morocco, are not 
necessarily on a path towards democracy, although these kind of states are 
more inclined to use strategies that give the appearance of cooperation. 
If the regime is not engaged with an external actor that would pressure for 
democratization, the adoption of democratic features is small or non. 
existent. In this case, the external actor has had no or very little leverage to 
influence the regime. There has been no conditional aid for economic 
reforms and no measures to adopt some democratic practices. The states 
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have not had to balance their interests. In Syria's case, there has been a 
certain amount of small initiatives towards political reforms that could have 
led towards more semi-authoritarian behavioural strategies by the regime - 
had they been pursued further. These included the discussions on 
introducing free local elections scheduled for 2007, the creation of new 
parties and promotion of `civil society'. The record thus far in practice has 
been such that Syria has not moved towards semi-authoritarianism, but 
indeed lately enhanced authoritarianism at least temporarily. The reason for 
adopting some democratic features in the Syrian case is linked to economic 
needs that demand economic reforms and integration into the world 
economy, and therefore needs closer relations to the Western actors and 
markets. The need to show adaptive behaviour is indicative of a dilemma in 
Syrian foreign affairs: the readiness and necessity of opening to Western aid 
and trade in contrast to the need to preserve the playing cards for regional 
security reasons that prohibit closer ties to the West. As a result, the semi- 
authoritarian development is non-existent or at least delayed. 
Q Delegitimizing the external actors' efforts as interventions and violations 
of sovereignty 
Countries more intensively engaged with the US and the EU have, often 
even simultaneously with the adoption of democratic features, rejected 
pressure to democratize and the policies of the external actors with this 
regard. This happened especially after the increase in Western discourse on 
Arab democracy from 2003. The Arab leaders reacted to democracy 
demands fiercely on a rhetorical level and delegitimized this as foreign 
interference. International actors were accused of a degree of intervention 
that went beyond what had traditionally been acceptable in foreign policy 
and violated the concept of sovereignty. After the immediate rejections, the 
policies of delegitimation became combined with statements according to 
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which reforms were necessary, but the external input was not welcomed. 
The reforms needed to come from'within'. 700 
The countries not intensively engaged with the US and the EU have most 
notably used delegitimizing strategies. For example, Syria has been 
defensive to external pressure for reforms. The following is a typical 
example of rhetoric rejecting democracy by Bashar al-Asad, "We should not 
apply to ourselves the democracy of others. " PNF is "a democratic model 
developed through our own experience. 9401 Often the rejection of 
democracy in Syria also includes Arab nationalist or anti-American 
rhetoric. 702 
The delegitimation of Western democracy promotion as a violation of the 
norm of sovereignty was apparent, for example, in the way in which 
reformists and liberals were accused of being conspirators or Western 
agents. In Syria, oppression of the Damascus spring started with remarks by 
Information Minister Adnan Omran speaking to journalists in Damascus on 
29 January 2001 accusing the reformists all over the Arab world as being 
conspirators of the West. According to him, neo-colonialism no longer lies 
in armies, but in foreign financing of the dissidents. Syrian intellectuals who 
were engaged in `the Damascus spring' forums were attacked. Similarly, in 
Egypt, the main accusations made against the famous human rights activist, 
Saad Eddin Ibrahim, were based on his Western funding. 703 In 2005, after 
the US initiated funding for the Syrian external opposition, Bashar gave a 
verbal warning to prohibit contacts with foreign governments. Syrians 
engaged in NGOs were also prohibited from attending international 
conferences. 704 Particularly after the Hariri investigation and intensified 
coercion, delegitimation of Western policies, including democracy calls has 
700 See for example "Mubarak Son Offers 'Arab Vision"', BBC, 19. September 2006. 
President Hosni Mubarak's son has said Egypt must offer a new political vision for the 
Middle East - one not imposed from outside, but based on Arab values. 
701 George, Syria. Neither Bread nor Freedom, p. 32. 
702 Beck, Martin. "Pariastaat" Syrien: zwischen externem Druck und internem 
Beharrungsvermögen. GIGA Focus 7/2006, pp. 6-7. 
703 George, Syria. Neither Bread nor Freedom, pp. 47-48. 
704 Interview with an American NGO activist, Washington D. C, 29. March 2006. 
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from external actors such as the US. Such an example is the Bahrain Forum 
for the Future, an independent institution recently established, to which 
Western and Arab governments donate, and which then again further 
allocates aid to civil society projects. 707 
Q Limiting, minimizing and manipulating the effects of the projects 
More common than prohibiting projects is limitation, minimizing and 
manipulation of projects. If Western-funded projects are accepted, as is 
often the case in more semi-authoritarian states, the states still use the 
strategies of limiting, minimizing and manipulating the effects of the 
projects. Limiting, minimizing and manipulating the projects can be first 
achieved by channelling the efforts of external actors into areas where the 
effects of their projects can be contained. Projects therefore take place often 
in the fields of education, women rights and family planning, for example, 
instead of highly political fields such as human rights, political parties and 
election monitoring. The work of the projects is also often interrupted, 
harassed or prevented by some other means, such as arrests. Currently, Syria 
has prohibited almost all EU projects, so there is no need to minimalize the 
influence or overcome effects. Previously, the few projects that were 
assisted with Western funding faced coercive policies from the regime. 
Q Monopolizing projects by government circles or circles close to 
government. 
The most effective way of limiting the effect of a project is actually the 
strategy of monopolizing it close to the government circles. Monopolizing 
may involve, for example, either limiting access to foreign funds to circles 
close to the government, or controlling access to information about such 
projects. 708 The most commonly used method of controlling foreign funding 
and minimizing the impact of projects has been the application of old 
corporatist strategies to new situations: corporatist networks, through which 
707 Interview with a US diplomat, Washington D. C, 29. March 2006. 
708 Carapico, "Foreign Aid and Promoting Democracy in the Arab World", pp. 379-380. 
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the regimes provide employment, services and benefits in return for political 
loyalty are used to distribute foreign funding. In this way, the regime 
acquires extra funding for these loyalty networks and guarantees that the 
actors involved do not challenge the state. The funding of economic reforms 
stands a high chance of being used to support a regime's power base, as 
most of the actors involved in the economy have close links with the 
government. 
A common strategy is also the creation of NGOs that are dependent or close 
to the regime. The regimes have directly created NGOs (more commonly 
called GONGOs) and adopted or co-opted existing NGOs and their agendas. 
In Syria, the few new NGOs, working with women's issues, were created by 
the first lady and are not, therefore, independent. In Egypt, the government 
has adopted and co-opted numerous NGOs using many strategies in the 
process. Throughout the Arab world, the latest development has been to 
establish `national councils' and `national commissions' in the field in 
which much of the civil society funding is directed. The governments have 
adopted and incorporated these sectors and actors by bringing them under 
umbrella organizations, ruled by persons close to the regime. In Egypt, for 
example, most foreign funds are channelled into the sectors for women's 
issues and human rights. The regime created The National Council on 
Human Rights, lead by Boutros-Boutros-Ghali and the National Council for 
Women, lead by the first lady Suzanne Mubarak. In the women's sector, in 
particular, the NGOs have little ability to receive funding if they are not co- 
operating completely with the organization and the agenda of the first lady. 
The foreign funding largely goes to the National Council for Women. 709 
This money is no longer supporting an independent civil society, 
independent organizations or participation. This does not diminish in any 
way the impact these councils and NGOs have on the particular issues on 
their agenda, but civil society support to these actors is not democracy 
promotion any longer. The EU with many other donors seems to have 
already accepted this reality and are planning to work with GONGOs in the 
709 Interview with Sanna Negus, a Cairo based journalist, Cairo, 20. November 2004. 
260 
future, for the sake of increasing dialogue between the state and other actors, 
although close to the regime. 710 
To conclude, these strategies of adopting some democratic policies and 
discourse, delegitimizing democratization pressure, prohibiting concrete 
projects, limiting their effects and monopolizing projects have ensured that 
the foreign funding for democracy support is not in danger of affecting the 
state power, regime security or power balance within the country. 
Democracy support in the Arab world has therefore been very inefficient. 
If the state has been allied to a Western power and is dependent on foreign 
aid, receptiveness to Western economic reform and democracy promotion 
projects, such as civil society support, increases. This is because regimes 
`omni-balance' their external and domestic constraints and needs and 
sometimes accord concessions to their external financial supporter for other 
benefits. The effects of support for economic liberalization are clear and 
have been discussed elsewhere. The political concessions can be symbolic, 
such as an increase in pro-democracy rhetoric, or more substantial, yet not 
meaningful, such as the adoption of some democratic institutions including 
elections, opposition parties and free media. Although this semi- 
authoritarian development increases liberalization, it is not to be confused 
with democratization. Quite the contrary, it is often pursued to increase state 
power, which for some domestic reason has been diminished. The external 
actors therefore in the best case only aid the re-stabilization and re- 
adjustment of the power base of the regime and strengthen it. In the Syrian 
case, some indication exists of the beginning of a development towards 
semi-authoritarianism, if reforms were to be pushed further. This semi- 
authoritarian strategy benefits the state institutional capabilities. The 
economic liberalization strategy boosts states fiscal capabilities. 
Often simultaneously with the adoption of reforms, states reject external 
influence and accuse external actors of foreign interference and violation of 
710 Interview with a European diplomat, Brussels, 9. October 2006. 
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their sovereignty. In addition to rhetorical expression, in practice this is 
apparent when regimes accuse their opposition of being Western agents. 
This delegitimizing strategy is used both by states allied with Western 
powers and those against which coercion is used. This was the main Syrian 
strategy from 2005 particularly. States also prohibit concrete projects by 
NGO legislation that prohibits foreign funding, or by repressing the NGO 
activists. They also limit, minimize, manipulate or monopolize projects, for 
example by forbidding projects in politically sensitive fields or by limiting 
the foreign funding to those close to the state. The most effective way for 
the states to overcome foreign democracy pressure has been creation of 
government controlled NGOs instead of free NGOs, or more recently, the 
creation of "national councils". These strategies ensure that the democracy 
promotion projects on the ground benefit the regime and their financial 
support base - in other words, the state's financial capabilities increase as 
the instruments of allocation widen and the legitimacy of the state is boosted 
by the rhetorical opposition to foreign interference. 
It is suggested here that external pressure on democracy can lead to some 
concessions and development of semi-authoritarianism if there is a need to 
preserve the alliance with the external actor and receive aid, but not to the 
extent that it would endanger regime security. These strategies mentioned 
are designed to boost the fiscal and institutional capabilities of the state. 
This is why true democratization assisted by external powers has not 
appeared in the Arab world. 
6.4 Conclusions 
The reason for which there has been no democratization in the Arab world 
assisted by external actors is that a) the Western actors have not really 
promoted democracy in practice; and b) the states in the region have been 
able to successfully overcome the moderate attempts to influence. In the 
end, the external actors have at best assisted the strengthening of state 
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power, which has, although sometimes increased liberalization, indeed also 
stabilized authoritarianism. 
This is concluded by studying how engagement, coercion and external 
democracy promotion can promote or undermine state power. They can 
affect the fiscal, coercive and institutional capabilities and the autonomy, 
efficiency and legitimacy of the state to varying degrees. 
First, coercion clearly promotes such state responses that strengthen state 
power. Although the aim of coercion with respect to the domestic 
developments within a country is often specifically to pressure the regime, 
weaken it and create room for bottom-up change, this is most often not what 
happens. The external actors are able to weaken state power, but the state is 
able to overcome it. The external military and political pressure can create a 
lack of legitimacy domestically, as happened in the Syrian case, and 
although this can cause some weakening of institutional powers and 
efficiency, states can balance this weakness by fiscal capabilities - that is, by 
allocation and co-option, or by coercive capabilities, encompassing the 
tightening of control and arrests. Increasing legitimacy and national unity is 
also easy in the face of external pressure. Military and political coercion 
therefore does not, in the final analysis, reduce authoritarianism. 
External economic pressure, such as drying up of states' external revenues, 
as was the case in the application of US sanctions against Syria, could affect 
the fiscal capabilities of the state (although did not in this particular case). 
Such acts could indeed weaken state power significantly and cause 
questions of regime stability. Syrian fiscal capabilities were positive during 
this period of external pressure, and it is not possible to say how the regime 
of Bashar would have managed had its external revenues dried up. Although 
the empirical studies in this research do not cover such a case, it is suggested 
that most probably none of the Arab states would fall or democratize in the 
face of this kind of coercive pressure. This is because the state would still 
have the coercive capabilities in place and the all-powerful security sector 
would in the end guarantee the regime's survival. This would substitute the 
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lack of fiscal capabilities and narrowing of the power base of the regime. 
Also, the example of Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 demonstrates 
that states are able to find alternative sources of external revenues. As a 
result of intensive economic coercion, the authoritarianism would most 
likely increase because state power would rely on narrower coalition. This is 
what happened in Saddam's Iraq in the 1990s and in Syria during the period 
of external pressure related to Lebanon from 2005. 
Secondly, engagement appears to promote some economic and political 
reforms if there is domestic demand for them. Assistance for economic 
reforms appears to be the most efficient manner to promote change in 
practice. However, this change serves the interests of state power, because 
the economic liberalization is pursued in order to strengthen the fiscal 
capabilities of the state. Foreign aid is often conditional and tied to debt 
payments, which makes it impossible for the regimes experiencing 
economic difficulties to overcome the external influence on their economic 
restructuring completely. Although conditionalities used with foreign aid for 
structural adjustment weaken the sovereignty of the states to pursue such 
economic reforms that they wish, mostly the economic reforms are 
conducted in as controlled and as limited a way as possible to secure the 
regime and serve the purpose of their socio-economic designing. Economic 
liberalization has not brought political reforms, only some steps in a semi- 
authoritarian direction, which has only served to re-organized the support 
base of the authoritarian state. This has been proven by numerous studies. 
Support for economic liberalization can, however, weaken state power as 
well. The economic liberalization demands often lead to some adjustment of 
the economic reform program, which can weaken the ability of the state to 
use its traditional means of socio-economic designing for power balancing. 
Use of allocation, co-option and patronage can become more difficult and 
there is a lack of efficiency and legitimacy. Economic liberalization can also 
weaken institutional capabilities. For example, pressure for economic 
liberalization related to debt repayments or assistance in economic 
restructuring can cause intra-elite conflict and reduce the institutional 
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capabilities of the state and the efficiency in implementing economic 
policies as was the case in Syria. Also the regime-opposition divide can 
reduce the ability of the state to act efficiently in pursuit of the designed 
policies. The legitimacy of the state can be questioned if a state follows 
vocal external pressure for reform. This can happen particularly if there is 
already resentment among the public related to the alliance with the external 
actor. Although external actors may engage with and support economic 
liberalization, which would weaken state power when it comes to fiscal and 
institutional capabilities, in the end, the coercive capabilities of the state 
would be used to balance the weakening of the state and, again, 
authoritarianism would be stabilized. 
On occasions, the external support for economic liberalization can also be 
directly beneficial to state power. If there is a domestic need for economic 
restructuring and a shift in the power balance to ensure regime security, 
external aid channelled close to the regime or its patronage network can be 
very beneficial for the state. This is the case, for example, in situations in 
which the state directs the foreign aid to small and medium size enterprises 
or to administrative reform by actors close to government circles. This 
strategy is frequently used by the state to overcome the effects of foreign 
pressure on democratization. 
Thirdly, engagement with demands for democratic reforms can promote 
minor political reforms. Especially if the countries are aid-dependent, the 
external actor can condition aid in return for some political reforms. This is, 
however, not often possible in the Middle East, where the external actors 
have regional strategic interests that they safeguard with their conditional 
aid. Recently, the US has called for political reforms in Egypt in exchange 
for alliance, and this has met with some, but little, compliance the Egyptian 
state. Similarly, it is clear to Syria that deeper engagement with the EU 
requires some changes to the political system. The responses of the state 
create something that is often called "window-dressing of democracy" for 
external eyes, steps in a semi-authoritarian direction. It has already been 
concluded that semi-authoritarianism, although increasing liberalism, 
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mainly only serves to stabilize authoritarianism. It enhances the institutional 
capabilities and the efficiency and legitimacy of the state. 
Fourthly, engagement with democracy assistance does not support 
democratization in the Arab world. This is because states have created 
sophisticated strategies to overcome the effects of civil society projects. 
Foreign aid to civil society has not enforced civil society or weakened state 
power. 
Although the effects of foreign pressure or engagement for democratic 
reforms have not decreased authoritarianism, they have assisted in 
increasing liberalization, both economic and political. The role of the private 
sector has increased and a marginally broader section of society is involved 
in commercial economic activities where the state control has decreased and 
restrictions diminished. Semi-authoritarian development has created some 
liberal political institutions, elections are perhaps being held and the media 
is in some cases freer. Civil society support has in some countries increased 
the number of NGOs and the activities of civil society. Demands to follow 
international norms of human rights influence the ability of the state to use 
its coercive capabilities against opposition, when the regime has to take into 
consideration possible international criticism while quieting opposition by 
means of arrests, torture or by using army or police forces to end 
demonstrations. This can restrain the use of force of the regime but increase 
liberalization. All this is positive, as long as it is borne in mind that none of 
this liberalization has increased democratization or decreased 
authoritarianism. 
The few liberalization moves in the Arab world can be contributed to some 
extent to the engagement of external actors. Perhaps more than a result of 
external actors' practical policies, however, it has been caused by 
globalization of the hegemony of the liberal economic order and liberal 
democracy. Some Arab states have adopted certain features that help them 
appear pro-Western, exhibiting stable economic and political systems 
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suitable for foreign investment and Western cooperation, while still 
maintaining the political status quo. 
How did the coercion, engagement and democracy support influence Syria? 
As already mentioned, the US and later the dual US and EU coercion 
affected state power by reducing legitimacy. The president was able to 
overcome this very efficiently by uniting the nation in the face of foreign 
pressure by using aggressive rhetoric. The Syrian regime used Syrian and 
Arab nationalist and anti-American rhetoric successfully to increase its 
legitimacy. 
The economic coercion policy did not affect the fiscal capabilities, but it 
could have done so, had the EU put the planned sanctions in place against 
Syria. These did not reduce authoritarianism - on the contrary, the military 
coercion and isolation increased the use of coercive capabilities. The 
coercion affected mostly the institutional capabilities of the state as it 
created an intra-elite conflict that reduced efficiency. The irony is that even 
this did not serve to for reduce authoritarianism or even increase 
liberalization because it postponed or hindered the economic and political 
reforms that Bashar was aiming to promote that would have made Syria 
more semi-authoritarian in nature. Authoritarianism increased because the 
political elite behind the regime became narrower. External coercion 
influenced top-down reforms negatively, and had no effects on bottom-up 
reforms, because demands from below were being contained by the coercive 
capabilities of the state. 
Engagement with the EU influenced Syrian state power, particularly the 
efficiency of the state. The association agreement negotiations clearly aided 
efficiency. They supported the president line against the old guard in the 
intra-elite conflict and helped to a small extent to balance Bashar's power 
position. The assistance in administrative reforms and economic reforms 
would particularly have boosted efficiency. The contribution is difficult to 
assess, however, as the US coercion and later the coercion by both of the 
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actors intensified the intra-elite conflict and clearly instigated a setback to 
efficiency and the pursuit of reforms. 
The promotion of economic liberalization has not yet had time to have a 
great impact. In the future, economic reforms assisted by external 
engagement with the EU would however contribute to the fiscal capabilities 
of the state in the long term. Aid in pursuing restructuring would lessen the 
losses of the losers of privatization and help private sector development 
through aid to small and medium size enterprises. This economic 
liberalization would of course break some of the old structures created by 
allocation, co-option and patronage, but the state is suspected to adopt and 
use some of the old strategies in the new economic setting. 
Civil society support by external actors has not had much positive effect. 
What the civil society support has done is to show the regime the 
importance of civil society development for the EU and therewith enhanced 
the regime's strategies of creating its own NGOs to respond to the EU's 
policies. When the EU shifted to a coercion policy, the external involvement 
made the regime more suspicious of civil society actors. Without the move 
to coercion, the state would have most likely accepted civil society projects 
and funding and training of NGOs, but countering strategies would have 
been used to minimize and monopolize their effects. 
Engagement has not had a large effect on the use of the state's coercive 
capabilities in Syria. The engagement with the EU has not significantly 
affected the willingness or capabilities of the state to use surveillance, 
detentions, arrests and other means for ensuring stability. 
In the end, the coercion policy created intra-elite conflict, narrowed the 
power base of the Syrian state and enhanced authoritarianism. It hindered 
implementation of some economic and political reforms that the regime had 
planned to carry out, and therefore hindered semi-authoritarian development 
and some liberalization of the political sphere. Engagement did not manage 
to have a great effect on these circumstances, and although the association 
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agreement practically promoted some reforms, the effect was downplayed as 
a result of the coercion policies. 
The overall effect of the external powers, the US and the EU on Syrian 
political and economic change from 2000 to 2005 is that they enforced 
authoritarianism. This is despite the fact that by end of 2005 the Bashar 
regime appeared highly fragile or even at the brink of falling. There were 
some estimations that the US and EU coercion in the height of the pressure 
related to Hariri-investigation would have the effect of destabilizing the 
country and the regime. The state powers were indeed weakened. Because 
of the ongoing reform process, the opposition was to some degree activated, 
there was an intra-elite conflict of some kind and the country was 
experiencing some level of re-bargaining of political and economic power, 
although a very controlled one. Although the reform process itself created a 
slight decrease in state power, the state powers were still in place, and with a 
mixture of strategies including the use of coercive capabilities and boost to 
its legitimacy, the threat of instability was easily eliminated. The price was 
the increase in authoritarianism and end to reforms. 
In the long term, there is no democratization in sight aided by external 
actors in the Arab world. Rather, the question is about external actors' aid to 
a process in which the Arab states are adapting the old state-led economies 
and monarchist, or close to socialist, political systems to the age of 
globalization to ensure the creation of economic wealth and political 
stability. The result of engagement and moderate democracy promotion, 
combined with the domestic need for changes seems to lead to semi- 
authoritarianism. The states who are less subject to the pressures from 
engagement also seem to take steps towards semi-authoritarianism, or 
something closer to the `China model', in which the free economy exists 
side by side with authoritarianism. This would appear to prove that there are 
very similar strategies used by the Arab states of adaptation to the current 
global order, despite the level of engagement, as was the case with adopting 
the first steps of `Washington consensus' as a cure for the debt crisis. The 
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closer the alliance and the deeper the aid dependency, the more the Arab 
states appear to take steps towards semi-authoritarianism. 
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7. Conclusions: Reflections on sources of authoritarianism and the 
future of the Arab state 
The aim of this thesis was to "research the influence of the main aspects of 
the external environment on state power in Syria and show in which way the 
external level provides explanatory potential for authoritarianism or changes 
in it. " This was conducted by studying the effects of the main aspects of the 
external environment, which were considered to be the external security and 
fiscal environment to the resources of the state, namely the fiscal, coercive 
and institutional capabilities. These capabilities defined the strength of state 
power - in other words, the autonomy, efficiency and legitimacy of the state. 
The hypothesis of the research was that the external influence has aided the 
development of, and maintained the strength of, the state power to such an 
extent that it has contributed to the prevention of the development of 
participation in Syria. The external environment has therefore aided and 
maintained authoritarianism. This argument is presented as an explanation 
for much of the high level of authoritarianism in Syria. 
The Syrian security environment was very hostile from 1970 as a result of 
the Arab-Israeli crisis. Although the war preparation that followed was 
costly, the first conclusion is that due to the availability of external 
resources, it was not costly enough to necessitate domestic extraction and 
broadening of participation. Syrian war preparation was intense, peaking 
during 1979-1983 when military spending including arms imports varied 
between 27% and 38% of the GDP. However, the fiscal capabilities of the 
state were assisted by foreign aid and fuel export income, and they covered 
most of the military expenditure, to such an extent that war preparation did 
not create a fiscal crisis. According to the analysis in this research, the 
external revenues contributing to the state were an average of 20.1 % of GDP 
in 1974-1982 and 11.4% of GDP in 1983-1989. At their lowest, the external 
revenues were only 0.3% of GDP lower than the military expenditure in 
1979 and at their highest, 18.6% of GDP in 1983. In comparison, the annual 
average of domestic extraction covered 94.5% of military expenditure in 
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1973-1989, which shows how impossible even a modest war preparation 
would have been without the external revenues. This is why war preparation 
in Syria did not lead to increased domestic resource extraction and did not 
therefore alter the power balance that would have required increased 
participation. In striking contrast to Egypt and Israel, Syria did not have 
enough costly wars and war preparation to have been forced to resort to 
opening the political and economic system. 
Secondly, from 1970, war preparation greatly affected the coercive and 
institutional capabilities of the Syrian state and the creation of the 
authoritarian political system and its institutions. As a matter of fact, war 
preparation created most of the coercive capabilities of the state and brought 
the coercive apparatus under the single rule of the president, helping the 
state to create a monopoly of violence, repress opposition and ensure that 
the military was disengaged, preventing threats of coups from the army. The 
threat of war increased manpower in the army and the domestic intelligence 
services, and lifted the importance of the security apparatus in the state to 
such an extent that Syria can be said to have created a security state. Army 
recruitment was also a means of tying interests to the state, which broadened 
the support base of the regime. The security apparatus became one of the 
three pillars of the state. War preparation also assisted the concentration of 
power and strengthened the position of the president as an authoritarian 
ruler, assisted by the hierarchical power relations with the Ba'ath party, 
which interlinked with the army. This greatly enhanced the creation of `the 
three pillars of the state': the rule of the president, army and the party over 
political institutions. War preparation also affected the political culture and 
created legitimacy for the Syrian state under Asad. 
Availability of resources from the external environment helped the state to 
build a state-led economy and use economic strategies for domestic 
consolidation that were typical to rentier states. During the height of the 
Cold War, Syria may be viewed as close to a semi-rentier state economy. 
Syria gained external revenues from foreign aid (an annual average of 7.7% 
of GDP in 1974-1989) and fuel exports (an annual average of 8.7% of GDP 
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in 1974-1989). Although the aid revenues were significantly high at the end 
of the 1970s, during the entire period, fuel revenues were higher because of 
the drastic decline in aid revenues in the 1980s. Thus far, research has 
emphasised the aid revenues and there has been insufficient emphasis on the 
fuel export revenues already notable during the Cold War period. 
During the consolidation period of the Asad regime, and during the build-up 
of the authoritarian structures, the external revenues from foreign aid and 
fuel exports started flowing, which aided in building a state-led economy, 
including rentier features, such as allocation and co-option. With this 
economic restructuring, the state demolished the old class structures and the 
important role of the Sunni bourgeoisie and created a new, state-dependent 
bourgeoisie that allied the interests of the political power and economic 
interests and eliminated challenging social groups. Indeed, the state-led 
economy and the socio-economic structures that were created during this era 
by large state employment and co-opted bourgeoisie were the one other 
most important reason for authoritarianism, in addition to the rule of `the 
three pillars of the state'. In the 1980s, the external revenues declined and 
the fiscal capabilities declined accordingly. This was apparent in the debt 
crisis and a limited economic adaptation that followed, that gave more room 
for the private sector. This, however, did not change the rentier features or 
the political power structures. 
During the 1990s, Syria's external environment changed dramatically, after 
Syria lost its Cold War ally, source of superpower protection and aid, as 
well as the front-line position in the military confrontation with Israel after 
bilateral peace agreements between Israel and the Palestinians and Israel and 
Jordan were signed. Although both the reasons (intense war preparation and 
high levels of foreign aid) that were described to have aided the creation of 
an authoritarian state disappeared, Syria was able to adapt well to the new 
circumstances in the external security and fiscal environment. 
The primary reason would appear to be the fact that in the 1990s, external 
revenues mainly from fuel export revenues increased the fiscal capabilities 
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to such an extent, that major economic restructuring was not necessary for 
maintaining state power. The overall external revenues contributing to the 
state were almost at the same level in the 1990s as they had been at the end 
of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s: an annual average of 18.6% of 
GDP. Of that, fuel export revenues contributed an annual average of 16.3% 
of GDP. Although the low levels of aid revenues and increasing revenues 
from fuel export income have been well recognized, the fuel export income 
in the 1990s seems, however, to be more important to Syrian fiscal 
capabilities than has been thus far acknowledged. Again, Syria can be 
considered close to a semi-rentier state economy in the 1990s. The 
importance of the external revenues increased in -relation to domestic 
revenues by around 5% of GDP. This, combined with the decline of 
spending on war preparation, would indicate that Syria was more rentier in 
the 1990s, and that the fiscal powers of the state actually increased. This 
finding is significant in explaining the ability of the Syrian state to resist 
economic liberalization and external influence, and to continue on its 
authoritarian and isolated path also in its security policy, in contrast to many 
other Arab states. The fiscal powers were sufficient to continue with the 
allocation and co-option policies. They were also enough to guarantee the 
tools for efficiency in socioeconomic designing if needed. 
As a result of the peace processes, the need for war preparation declined. 
From the end of the 1980s, there was also less aid available to Syria, which 
immediately led to a decline in spending on war preparation as continuing 
military build-up at the same level would have affected the fiscal resources 
of the state. Because the fuel export revenues rose significantly, they 
buffered the fiscal capabilities and funded the rest of the declining war 
preparation expenditures. Indeed, the reduction of war preparation 
expenditures increased the fiscal capabilities of the state from the earlier 
Cold War era. The fiscal powers were such that they allowed Syria to adapt 
to the regional changes and a new era of hegemony of liberalism that started 
in the 1990s by maintaining domestic structures mostly intact. 
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The reduced war preparation effort did not reduce the coercive capabilities 
of the state, however. The reduction appeared mainly in arms imports, and 
military expenditures decreased only marginally, which indicates that the 
coercive establishment continued to function almost at its previous 
magnitude. As the coercive apparatus was in place and fully 
institutionalized, the change in the regional security environment did not 
affect the coercive powers, except possibly by giving them more room to 
operate for domestic security. The state structures were institutionalized - in 
other words, the institutional capabilities were in place and the state was 
consolidated, thus changes in the security environment did not affect the 
institutional powers and the rule of the president, army and the party. The 
impact of the end of the Cold War and the rise of liberalism did not greatly 
affect Syria. Neither did the peace negotiations with Israel affect the 
legitimacy of the state, because the urge for peace by political means was 
considered a victory. 
Increasingly from 2000, the external security environment worsened for 
Syria. Syria's regional and international position was now defined by the 
hostility of the hegemonic superpower, the US and to a lesser extent the EU. 
Syria became isolated as a result of the US war on terrorism, lack of a peace 
process, war in Iraq, the shift in regional power balance that followed, and 
the murder of the Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri. The US pressured Syria 
militarily and with economic sanctions, which the EU joined towards the 
end of the study period. Syrian foreign policy came under largely unseen 
pressure, and the nature of the threat became more directly focused on the 
regime itself. 
The external security environment from 2000 mainly affected the 
institutional capabilities of the state. For the first time since the 1970s, 
institutional capabilities were reduced. This was not primarily due to the 
external environment, but rather the change in leadership with the new 
president and the intra-elite conflict that followed. The institution of the 
presidency had been highly personalized, and thus Bashar's legitimacy was 
bound to the legacy of his father. After Bashar al-Asad carried out economic 
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reforms in contradiction with his father's legacy and shook the status quo, 
he faced some opposition and questioning of his rule from the political 
establishment formerly tied to his father. There was an intra-elite conflict 
and the institutional capabilities of the state powers weakened. For the first 
time since the establishment of the authoritarian state, the policies of the 
president were questioned. 
The external environment, however, contributed to the reduced institutional 
capabilities and undermining of the position of the president, first by a 
predicted reduction in the availability of external resources and second by 
external political and military coercion. The president was alarmed by the 
prediction that fuel export revenues would most likely be exhausted by 
2010, which according to the analysis presented here, based upon the latest 
revenue levels, would mean a 20% decrease in GDP -a scenario sufficient 
to scare the regime into further liberalization and to continue supporting the 
growth of the private sector. The predicted decline in fiscal powers led the 
president to pursue economic reforms that were intended to be restructural. 
This turn in economic policies contributed to the intra-elite conflict, which 
weakened the institutional powers of the president and the efficiency of the 
state in its pursuit of policy changes. This way the external fiscal 
environment affected the institutional capabilities, namely those of the 
president and the balance between the `three pillars'. 
The external military and political coercion caused concern in the political 
elite surrounding the ability of the president to harness benefits from the 
external environment through foreign policy. As a matter of fact, he faced 
opposition to many of his decisions, and the increasing isolation reduced the 
legitimacy of the president within the party and intensified the intra-elite 
conflict. There was also a small increase in opposition to the regime from 
different sectors of the society, but the regime used coercion and was able to 
regain its popular legitimacy by using the external threat, nationalism and 
anti-Americanism to unite the population. Indeed, there was no change in 
the coercive capabilities of the state. 
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Although the external pressure against Syria included economic sanctions, 
they had no real impact. In fact, the fiscal capabilities increased, and they 
were sufficient to maintain the stability and legitimacy of the state during 
intense external pressure. After 2000, external revenues to the state were 
actually at their highest, contributing an annual average of 19.8% of GDP. 
Fuel export revenue was almost the sole contributor to this figure, with an 
annual average of 19.2%. Foreign aid to Syria had indeed run almost 
completely dry. Syria can well be considered increasingly as an example of 
semi-rentier state economy from 2000. As there was almost no extra 
spending on war preparation, the fiscal powers of the state have been 
significant, especially given the accompanying increase in domestic 
revenues. The high fiscal capabilities explain the stability of the state power 
in the face of the external pressure. As a result of these fiscal resources, 
there would not have been any great urgency for any major economic 
restructuring or liberalization. These revenues assisted the ability of the state 
to start economic reforms to prepare for the post-oil era without any major 
threat of instability. 
The hypothesis of this research appears to be correct: the external security 
and fiscal environment have aided the development of, and maintained the 
strength of, state power in Syria. The Cold War era and particularly war 
preparation and the fiscal means available for this purpose provided the 
capabilities to build the authoritarian structures. In the 1990s and since 
2000, the fiscal capabilities boosted by fuel export income provided the 
means to maintain these authoritarian structures, without an urgent need to 
adapt the domestic political system to the era of Middle East peacemaking, 
liberal hegemonic world order or globalization. After the creation of state 
power and the completion of the main stages of state-making, contrary to the 
European experience, Syria as many other Arab states did not encounter a 
need to share power and increase political participation. From 2000, 
although the fiscal capabilities were better than ever, changes in state power 
were apparent for the first time. The external environment contributed to 
those changes: the future of the external revenues no longer seemed secure, 
and the external political pressure on Syria was severe, which contributed to 
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the implementation of a limited number of reforms and an intra-elite conflict 
that slightly weakened the power of the president. 
The external actors during the Cold War added to the development of 
authoritarian structures in Syria, as well as in other Arab states. There was 
very little direct political influence on domestic political systems by the 
Cold War superpowers in the Middle East. At the same time, the 
superpowers safeguarded the regimes of their allies by means of their 
military protection. Syria received military aid and protection for its war 
preparation from the Soviet Union. The Soviet aid, supported by aid from 
the Gulf states contributed particularly to the growth of the coercive 
capabilities of the state. 
After the Cold War, there was a complete lack of promotion of democracy 
and liberalism in the Middle East by the hegemonic powers, the US and the 
EU, which failed even to push their allies to democratize. There was no 
constructive engagement with these external actors in Syria in the 1990s or 
later, and therefore they had no influence on Syrian domestic economics or 
politics. 
It seems that engagement indeed enhances the capability of an external actor 
to pressure the ally towards some steps in building democratic institutions, 
and to assist the economic liberalization process through the application of 
conditionality. This has created some semi-authoritarian development in 
countries allied with the US, states that have some democratic institutions 
but no democracy. Since democracy promotion was lifted to the top of the 
agenda of these actors in the Middle East in 2003, the pressure has 
contributed to some steps that have further enhanced semi-authoritarianism. 
The effects of engagement were also apparent in the Syrian case. Between 
2000 and 2004, Syria engaged increasingly with the EU. This contributed to 
the direction of economic reforms particularly, and increased the willingness 
of the president to consider some small steps on the semi-authoritarian path. 
This had some effect on the fall in institutional capabilities and efficiency. 
However, the external influence added to the intra-elite conflict. The modest 
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EU aid in promoting civil society and democratization otherwise did not 
bear any great impact, due to the short period of constructive engagement 
and the ability of the regime to prevent or overcome the effects of EU 
projects. The pursuit of reforms in Syria was domestically initiated and 
motivated and dried out as the EU joined the US in coercion towards the 
country. The Syrian case proves perfectly how intense external coercion 
ends the pursuit of political reforms. 
The Syrian case also shows how states use the external environment for 
enhancing its capabilities for strengthening state power. On the other hand, 
states seek to stop or overcome external influence that would negatively 
affect them. The Arab states have used sophisticated strategies to overcome 
external democracy promotion attempts. The most common form has been 
the adoption of some democratic policies and discourse. Aid-dependent 
countries particularly have chosen the semi-authoritarian path and they are 
more receptive to projects by external actors. This is, however, an omni- 
balancing act which guarantees the interests of the state in terms of external 
aid and political support and safeguards the state from external pressure. 
Most often the adaptation of some democratic policies is also a domestic 
balancing act, which serves the purpose of guaranteeing state power 
challenged by domestic opposition. Flirtation with democracy is therefore in 
the interest of the state and not a sign of a true democratic spirit. Non-aid 
dependent states like Syria have mostly not had the need to use this strategy. 
However the country's engagement with the EU in 2002-2004 showed some 
adaptive behaviour, such as liberalization of the press and an initiative of 
introducing local elections. 
A more common response by a non-aid dependent country to external 
democratization pressure is to delegitimate it as intervention and a violation 
of sovereignty. In addition to hostile rhetoric responses, this strategy is 
apparent, for example, in the way states confront civil society actors, 
accusing them of conspiracy. States also prohibit projects by external actors 
by NGO laws governing foreign funding and limiting donors' ability to 
distribute aid by other means. In states which allow projects funded by 
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external actors a common strategy is to limit, minimize and manipulate the 
effects of the projects or to monopolize the projects close to government 
circles. In practice, projects are limited to less sensitive fields of education 
and family planning instead of areas such as election monitoring. States also 
use the old allocation networks to channel the new external project funding 
to small and medium size enterprises to the old loyalist businessmen, for 
example. External aid for civil society support is often channelled to 
GONGOs, the government organized NGO', which guarantees the 
monitoring of their activities. Due to these strategies, the results of external 
democracy support in the Arab world have been almost non-existent. 
The main contribution of this study to the field of Middle East research is 
the finding that the external environment of a state does have an impact on 
the political system, and the analysis of the external environment should be 
taken into consideration while researching the level and nature of 
authoritarianism, democratization or liberalization processes in the Arab 
world. In academic research related to authoritarianism and democratization 
in the Arab world, so far the domestic level of analysis has been dominant, 
and almost no room has been given to the aspect of the external influence, or 
the influence has been denied. This research has also provided data that has 
specified some findings of earlier research. 
This research has added a layer to explaining the causes of authoritarianism 
by showing the importance of the external level. The main theories, 
rentierism and theories related to war preparation have been referred to 
earlier, but not systematically analysed. Rentierism in particular has not 
been seen as an external factor. The analysis of rentierism has often lacked a 
view on how the rents are products of external environment, and constrained 
by it. Foreign aid is strategically motivated, be it for militarization or for 
economic reforms. It is influenced by the motivations of the donor, and it 
always demands some omni-balancing of interests from the state receiving 
aid. Foreign aid is always simply highly political, be it unconditional or 
conditional. Similarly, the fuel export revenues are a product of trade, which 
always create interdependency with the trading partners. This 
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interdependency gives means for bargaining or pressure, which can be 
politically motivated. The pressures can vary from threats of sanctions to 
setting the price of oil. 
During recent years, in policy-oriented research, vague references to the 
importance of regional insecurity to the lack of domestic reforms have 
become popular. In the Syrian case, the external influence has been 
considered increasingly important in recent years. For example, the 
Carnegie Paper says that the external environment and domestic position of 
the regime "are entangled to a much greater extent than in any other country 
in the region except Iraq... "71' Despite the recognition of the value of the 
linkage between external and internal, there is very little conceptualization 
on how the external actually affects internal political systems or changes 
within it. 
In addition to proving the impact in the Syrian case and emphasising the 
recognition of the need to focus also on the external factors, this research 
has provided a contribution to the conceptualization of how external factors 
can bear influence, and one option for a method of research. The framework 
of analysis created can also be generalized to fit to any other country, and 
many of the specifics of the Syrian case also fit to other Arab states, that to 
some extent benefit from rents and are troubled by an unstable regional 
security environment. 
Because of the rapidly globalizing world economy, growing 
interdependencies and diffusion of values, it should be clear that although 
the Arab states have been successful in resisting the impact of factors 
outside their borders, this does not mean that external factors can not affect 
their country. As a matter of fact, they influence the states and their 
populations to a great extent, and only some of the areas have been studied 
here that affect the political system most. Indeed, there is a lack of focus on 
711 "Reform in Syria: Steering between the Chinese Model and Regime Change". Carnegie 
Papers. Middle East Series. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
No. 69, July 2006, p. 3. 
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the inter-linkages and inter-dependencies between the domestic level and the 
regional and international level in Middle East research. 
In order to say few words on the general development of the Arab state 
structures and scenarios for the future, the following can be noted. The Arab 
states - like most third world states - were granted their sovereignty by the 
international norm of right for self-governance without a proper state- 
making process or state-making wars that would have determined the 
borders, the ethnic and religious composition of the state, the unifying 
ideology, a coherent civil society and domestic-born political institutions. 
The state-making process, the process of acquiring state powers under one 
sovereign rule took place in a very insecure regional environment. Because 
of the external threat, the capacities of the state became perhaps stronger 
than they would have become otherwise. At least the concentration of power 
under authoritarian rule and building of structures that guaranteed domestic 
stability, were clear products of this external threat and need to maintain 
sovereignty. It is often stated, that as long as the Middle East remains 
unstable, the authoritarian states will remain. This argument can be taken 
much further. In order to serve the power balance of the dominant classes 
and groups, because of the enduring authoritarian structures, there is no need 
to democratize even in the event of more peaceful regional development. In 
Syria's case, for example, this would mean that peace with Israel would not 
create a democratization process. 
According to Sorensen, states in the third world face pressure that derives 
from two conflicting international norms. On the one hand, states follow the 
norm of maintaining sovereignty. On the other hand, the states are obliged 
to follow the international norm of preserving human rights. Maintaining 
sovereign rule in societies with sectarian and religious conflicts, economic 
distress and a significant amount of external threats contradicts the demand 
to follow the norm of preserving human rights, including political 
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participation. 712 In the end, the Arab states with their strong state powers are 
weak states. According to one definition for strong and weak states, strong 
states should be able to 1) keep monopoly over resources and violence, 2) 
provide services, and 3) provide political participation. 713 Most Arab states 
fulfil the first and the second function of a state, but fail to fulfil the third 
function, that is providing political participation, legitimacy of political 
institutions, effective and accountable political institutions/governance and 
rule of law. A failure to fulfil these functions leaves the Arab states weak, 
with the exception of the almost failed states of Lebanon, Iraq and the 
Palestinian territories, which can not fulfil even the first function. 
There is no reason to believe that the weak Arab states, with strong state 
powers would be able to fulfil this function of providing political 
participation in the near or middle term, because of the current power 
structures. In the future, the external fiscal environment will continue to 
affect the capacities of the states through fuel export income in oil-rich 
countries (the Gulf states, Algeria and Libya). The resource rich countries 
will primarily continue along their authoritarian path, with some minor 
adaptation to their political systems. Countries with less or no natural 
resources (Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Syria) will have to pursue 
economic liberalization. As a mean of co-option, they are most likely to take 
steps in a more semi-authoritarian direction by introducing some political 
liberalization and democratic institutions with no real change in the power 
balance. Also, the security environment will continue to affect the political 
systems by legitimizing the centralized leadership, role of the army and need 
for national unity. Because of the possibly deteriorating security 
environment, in some cases there may be a greater need to use fiscal 
resources on war preparation, such as in the Gulf region. 
712 Sorensen, Georg: Changes in Statehood. The Transformation of International Relations. 
Macmillan: Palgrave, 2001. 
713 Schneckener, Ulrich. "Staatszerfall als globale Bedrohung. Fragile Staaten und 
Transnationaler Terrorismus". Internationale Politik, Vol. 11, No. 58,2003, pp. 12-13. 
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The external actors, such as the US and the EU, have the ability to pursue 
the semi-authoritarian model further in countries that they are engaged with, 
be they resource rich or resource poor. However, in resource rich countries 
the effects are likely to remain marginal. In resource poor countries, the 
scope is greater. In these countries, the external actors should indeed 
condition their foreign aid and make sure that the economic reforms that 
they assist benefit the creation of an independent bourgeoisie, and the birth 
of small and medium size enterprises from parts of society previously not 
engaged with business or governance. This economic activity not only 
benefits the business environment but also demands the state to consider the 
inclusion of the newly emerging bourgeoisie. The aid should also be 
directed in a way that prohibits the regime to allocate the funds to bodies 
close to government circles or allow the regime to use co-option strategies. 
The same applies to aid for civil society. 
The external actors should be very consistent with their democracy and 
human rights demands and use political dialogue to pursue the aim of 
democratization. When regimes omni-balance their needs, sometimes they 
have to comply with the pressures of political reforms. This all aids the 
semi-authoritarian development, and even if it does not lead to 
democratization, the liberalization of political space is already a step 
forward and improves human rights. This is all possible only if the external 
actor in question is constructively engaged with the regional partner. 
Coercion only prohibits the semi-authoritarian development and urgently 
needed economic reforms that would ensure some necessary economic 
growth. 
In Syria's case, the future of the political system looks like the future of the 
resource poor Arab states. Syria is unable to maintain its fiscal powers in the 
medium-term because of the fall and eventual exhaustion of the fuel export 
income. This would suggest that Syria desperately needs economic 
liberalization, foreign investments and foreign aid to compensate the fall of 
external revenues from the current 20% of GDP. This shows that Syria will 
be increasingly in need of finalizing the association agreement with the EU 
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and starting a constructive engagement. Because of the contradicting 
policies of the US and the EU, in the first half of the first decade of this 
century, Syria aimed to benefit from the EU engagement without giving up 
of its regional strategies against Israel. This strategy failed as the EU joined 
the US pressure. Syria, however, repeatedly stated its interest in continuing 
with economic reforms and engaging with the EU. As the interests and 
strategies of the US and the EU still fundamentally differ, it is likely that 
Syria can continue its engagement with the EU. 
This may, however, not be enough for the regime to gain sufficient fiscal 
resources. A peace deal with a large financial package and engagement with 
the US is therefore an urgent necessity for Syria the closer the end of the 
first decade of this century approaches. This scenario would balance the 
fiscal resources of the state, continue economic liberalization and also give 
room for the external actors to apply pressure for political reforms. A peace 
deal and economic growth would guarantee the legitimacy of the president 
to such an extent that the intra-elite conflict would be history and there 
would be more institutional capabilities and efficiency to pursue reforms. 
Syria would most likely take rapid steps in a semi-authoritarian direction. 
If this positive scenario fails, coercion policy by external actors continues 
and Syria has no peace option, Syria could be drawn to regional isolation by 
closer Iranian alliance and radical foreign policies. In the face of a lack of 
investments, the Syrian economy would encounter grave difficulties and 
coercive powers would have to be used for domestic stability. The reform 
drive would most likely become exhausted and authoritarianism would 
increase. 
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